

D681982


**FINAL REPORT** 

## DAMAGE TO THE BASIC CHEMICAL INDUSTRY FROM NUCLEAR ATTACK AND RESULTING REQUIREMENTS FOR REPAIR AND RECLAMATION

PREPARED FOR:

STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE Mento Park, California and OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE Washington, D.C.

This document has been approved for public release and sale, its distribution is unlimited





Summary URS 687-4 URS SYSTEMS CORPOSATION

#### DAMAGE TO THE BASIC CHEMICAL INDUSTRY FROM NUCLEAR ATTACK AND RESULTANT REQUIREMENTS FOR REPAIR AND RECLAMATION

Final Report

June 1968

by

Carl R. Foget William H. Van Horn Milton Staackmann

URS SYSTEMS CORPORATION 1811 Trousdale Drive Burlingame, California

Prepared for

OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE Office of the Secretary of the Army Washington, D.C. 20310

Task Order 3310(67), Work Unit 3311B

Subcontract No. 12475 (6300A-300) L- SRI Lubcontract number to URS. Contract DAHC-20-67-C-0136
OCD REVIEW NOTICE

This report has been reviewed in the Office of Givil Deleme and approved for publication. Approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Office ci Gvi Delesse.

This document has been approved for Public Release and Sale; its distribution is Unlimited

## **PAGES** ARE MISSING IN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT



#### Summary Report

of

#### DAMAGE TO THE BASIC CHEMICAL INDUSTRY FROM NUCLEAR ATTACK AND RESULTANT REQUIREMENTS FOR REPAIR AND RECLAMATION

#### THE PROBLEM

The continued survival of the population after a nuclear attack is closely related to the economic and technological recovery of the country. The basic elements of survival during the recovery period are dependent on the capability of a number of basic industries to survive or, at least, recover quickly from the effects of the attack. Since chemicals are used in almost all phases of material production and product manufacture, the chemical industry will have an especially important role in postattack recovery. In recognition of the importance of the basic chemical industry in the postattack period, the Office of Civil Defense and Stanford Research Institute have funded the present study to examine damage to the industry following nuclear attack.

#### **OBJECTIVES**

The objectives of this study were as foliows:

- 1. Identification and characterization of the major unit operations or the processes commonly used by the SIC Group 281 industries (i.e., the basic chemical industry).
- 2. For each process identified, analysis of the physical damage expected to result from various overpressure ranges produced by a megaton-range meapon.
- 3. For each selected process and for each level of damage, preparation of repair estimates which include time, manpower, by skill, and support equipment.
- 4 Using the damage and repair results for the selected processes, synthesis of case studies of selected industries showing:
  - a. Probable overall damage at various levels of attack
  - b. Associated repair requirements

- c. Time-phased sequence of repair operations
- d. Alternate modes of operation

#### PROCEDURE

The procedures followed were:

- Detailed functional descriptions were developed for five "typical" chemical plants (chlorine-caustic, oxygen, ethylene, sulfuric acid, and ammonium nitrate). These plants are representative of the many types of plants found within the SIC 281 group.
- 2. Elements or components employed in one or more of the "typical" plants were identified and characterized.
- 3. Damage to the various elements was estimated for a range of weapon effects and intensities; all weapon effects were keyed to overpressure.
- 4. Repair time and effort requirements were estimated for each critical element. Repair efforts for individual components were then summarized to obtain the repair effort for each typical plant.
- 5. The results of the repair estimates were analyzed, and a mathematical model was developed to relate damage (expressed as overpressure) to repair effort (in man-days).
- b. Using the mathematical model, repair estimates were prepared for each subindustry (SIC 281X) and for the entire industry (SIC 281).
- 7. The time-phased repair effort was determined for each subindustry and for the entire industry including requirements for time, manpower (by skill), and supplies; alternate operating procedures which might alleviate constraints created by shortages of resources were also considered.

#### MAJOR FINDINGS

The major findings of the report are:

• The damage/repair catalog for chemical equipment which was developed as a result of the study provides the basis for estimates of the repair requirements for establishments of the basic chemical industry. It appears possible to use such a catalog for repair estimates of a wide range of industries outside the SIC 281 group by the addition of appropriate equipment.



- The calculated estimates of equipment repair for the various damage levels can be represented by a mathematical model which also reflect changes in equipment size or capacity. Appropriate models were developed to relate repair effort to damage level for the basic chemical establishments, industries, and the whole industry group.
- The repair effort required for restoration of equipment used in the basic chemical industry generally reflects the complexity and vulnerability of the equipment. The least vulnerable equipment items (those requiring the least repair effort) were those in which little internal damage occurred and the resultant repair required only realignment or resetting on foundations.
- The "worst case" repair effort required for the basic chemical industry could over-whelm the existing capability. It was estimated that the "normal" annual construction capability of the chemical industry is equivalent to only 20 percent of the estimated maximum repair effort (13.2 x 10<sup>6</sup> man-days for the SIC 281 industry for an overpressure of 25 psi).
- It appears that the supply of certain labor skills would be inadequate to meet the requirements for repair effort in the basic chemical industry in the postattack period. However, the existence of many persons with latent skill in the required categories may help in meeting the demand.
- The basic chemical industries are concentrated in the vicinity of standard metropolitan statistical areas (SNSAs), with over 70 percent of the industry production capability located within SNSAs.
- The more modern basic chemical establishments, which depend on automation and computer control systems, appear to have greater vulnerability to nuclear attack.

----

#### FINAL REPORT

# DAMAGE TO THE BASIC CHEMICAL INDUSTRY FROM NUCLEAR ATTACK AND RESULTING REQUIREMENTS FOR REPAIR AND RECLAMATION

June 1966

by

Carl R. Foget William H. Van Horn Milton Staackmann

URS Systems Corporation 1811 Trousdale Orive Burlingame, California

#### PREPARED FOR:

STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Menie Park, California
and
OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE
Washington, D.C.

Contract DAHE-20-67-6-0136

This report has been reviewed in the Office of Civil Defense and approved for publication. Approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Office of Civil Defense.

This document has been approved for public release and sale; its distribution is unlimited.

Contract No. 12475(6390A-300)

Work Unit 33115

TABLE OF CONTENTS

AE	STRACT STRACT	1
IN'	TRODUCTION	5
	The Problem	7
	Objectives	S
	Limitations on the Study *	9
	Report Organization	10
	Acknowledgments	10
1	THE BASIC CHEMICAL INDUSTRY	13
	The Chemical Industry	15
	Geographical Distribution of the Basic Chemical Industry Group	17
	Criteria for Selection of Representative Industries and Establishments	22
II	TYPICAL ESTABLISHMENTS AND PROCESS EQUIPMENT	25
	Process Equipment and Auxiliary Equipment	27
	Critical Elements	31
aı	DAMAGE ESTEVATES	33
	Weapon Effects and Secondary Damage	35
	Daviage Estimation	36
	Results	37
ัง	REPAIR ESTEMATES	11
	Repair Criteria	43
	Results	-14
r-	MATHFUATICAL MODELS FOR REPAIR ESTIMATES	-₹5
	Results	47
	Repair Versus Capacity Model	-19
	Scaling Model	<del>1</del> 3
	Results	50

#### Table of Contents - Continued

VI	REPAIR ESTIMATES FOR TYPICAL ESTABLISHMENTS	
	AND INDUSTRIES	57
	Procedure	59
	Repair Estimates for Typical Establishments	61
	Repair Estimates for the 281xx Chemical Products	66
•	Repair Estimates for the 281x Industries	66
	Repair Estimates for the 281 Industry Group	67
	Repair Effort for 281 Industry Group Based on Geographical	
	Distribution	71
	Comparison of Repair Effort with New Construction Effort	71
	Comparison of Results	75
VII	TIME-PHASED REPAIR AND SKILLS	77
	Procedure	79
	Results	79
	Critical Stills	91
	281x Industries	92
	281 Industry	92
	Parametric Analysis of Industry Destroyed and Population Killed	95
VIII	PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND PREATTACK PLANNING	101
	Chlorine-Caustie Plant	103
	Oxygen Plant	103
	Ethylene Plant	104
	Ammonium Nitrate Plant	104
	Sulfuric Acid Plant	105
	2S1 Industry	105
	Operation Versus Shut-down	109
IX	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	111
	Conclusions	113
	Recommendations	116
X	REFERENCES	119
AP	PENDIX A - BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR CHEMICAL PROCESSES	
	AND THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY	125

URS 687-4 iii Table of Contents - Continued APPENDIX B - SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVE INDUSTRIES 129 131 First Selection Level Second Selection Level 132 APPENDIX C - TYPICAL PLANT PROCESSES 137 Chlorine and Sodium Hydroxide 139 Liquid Oxygen 139 Ethylene 145 Ammonium Nitrate 145 Sulfuric Acid 145 APPENDIX D - AN APPROACH TO STRUCTURAL FAILURE PREDICTION 155 Prediction Bases 157 The Prediction Method 158 References 163 APPENDIX E - DAMAGE/REPAIR CATALOG 165

APPENDIX F - DISTRIBUTION

ntenkatennmenningvan isterik enmit. Leding san idher sainar tenakarak skerit Kakeken tena mengan.

215

		TABLE OF TABLES
1	Selected Characteristics of 281x Industries	18
2	SIC 281x Industries Selected for Detailed Study	23
3	Representative Establishments Selected for Detailed Study	23
i	Chemical Equipment and Auxiliary Equipment	28
5	Mathematical Model Parameters for Equipment Repair	51
5	Mathematical Model Parameters for Typical Establishments	61
7	Scaling Factors for Repair Effort Versus Size for the Typical Establishments	63
8	Repair Effort for 281 Industry Group	69
9	Repair Effort as a Function of Total Plant Cost	72
10	Comparison of 1965 Construction Effort in the 281 Industry Growith Repair Effort	up 74
11	1960 U.S. Census Detailed Characteristics	95
19	Establishment Typical Constraints	106

TABLE OF FIGURES

1	Report Organization	11
2	The Basic Chemical Industry Group (SIC 281)	16
3	Capacity and Location of Ethylene Plants in the U.S.	19
7	Distribution of SIC 281x Industry Groups	21
5	A "Typical" Chemical Establishment Snowing Important Components	30
6	Repair Effort Versus Overpressure Levels for Three Chemical Equipment Components	48
7	Progression from Repair Estimates for Process Equipment to Total Industry Group Repair Estimate	60
S	Repair Effort as a Function of Damage Level for Five Typical Establishments	62
9	Delta Damage Level and Fifty Percent Repair Effort for Typical Establishments	65
10	Repair Effort Versus Damage Level for the 2SLx Industry Group	68
[]	Repair Effort Versus Damage Level for the 281 Industry Group	70
12	Repair Effort/Total Cost as a Function of Total Cost	73
13	Time-phased Repair for Chlorine-Caustic Plant at 5 psi	Sī
14	Time-phased Repair for Liquid Air Plant at 9 psi	83
15	Time-phased Repair for Ethylene Plant at 7 psi	85
16	Time-phased Repair for Ammonium Nitrate Plant at 6 psi	87
17	Time-phased Repair for Sulfuric Acid Plant at 8 psi	89

#### Table of Figures - Continued

18	Requirements for Critical Skills for the SIC 281x Industry Group	93			
19	Requirements for Critical Skills for the SIC 281 Industry Group	91			
20	Fraction of Unsheltered Daytime Population Killed and Industry Destroyed for Different Attack Objectives				
21	Parametric Analysis of industry Damage Versus Population Survived for 281 Industry	97			
22	Demand on the Surviving Labor Skills to Repair the 281 Industry Group	99			
C-1	Process Flow Diagram, Chlorine-Caustic Plant	141			
C-2	Process Flow Diagram, Typical Liquid Air Piant	142			
<b>C-</b> 3	Process Flow Diagram, Typical Ethylene Plant from Ethane	147			
C-1	Process Flow Diagram, Typical Ammonium Nitrate Plant	149			
C-5	Process Flow Diagram. Typical Contact Sulfuric Acid Plant	153			
D-1	Probability of Structural Failure as a Function of the Strength Factor	159			

ABSTRACT

URS 687-1 3

ABSTRACT

This study for the Office of Civil Defense identifies the major equipment components commonly used by industries of the basic chemicals group [Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 281], estimates damage to the equipment components as a result of various nuclear weapon effects, and estimates the consequent repair requirements. Case studies for selected industries were synthesized by assembling the damage and repair estimates for the equipment components of various chemical establishments. These estimates were then scaled up to represent damage/repair for the selected chemical industries. Mathematical models were developed to relate repair effort with damage level for the individual equipment, establishments, industries, and the overall basic chemical industry group. From the output of the models, time-phased repair effort (with delineation of manpower by skills) was derived. The major findings of the report are:

- The damage/repair catalog for chemical equipment was crucial to the study results as it was the basis for estimates of the repair requirements for establishments of the basic chemical industry. It appears possible to use such a catalog for repair estimates of a wide range of industries outside the SIC 281 group by the addition of appropriate equipment.
- The calculated estimates of equipment repair for the various damage lavels were represented by a mathematical model which also reflected changes in equipment size or capacity. Appropriate models were developed to relate repair effort with damage level for the basic chemical establishments, industries, and the whole industry group.
- The repair effort required for restoration of equipment used in the basic chemical industries generally reflects the complexity and vulnerability of the equipment. The least vulnerable equipment (those requiring the least repair effort) were these in which little internal damage occurred and the resultant repair required only realignment or resetting on foundations.
- The repair effort required for the basic chemical industries could overwhelm the existing capability. It was estimated that the "normal" annual construction capability of the chemical industry is equivalent to only 20% of the estimated maximum repair effort (13.2 x 10<sup>5</sup> man-days for the SIC 281 industry for an overpressure of 25 psi). (In four cases, the maximum repair estimates were shown to approximate or exceed new construction effort. This indicates that the study results are realistic—or even conservative.)

- It appears that the supply of certain labor skills would be inadequate to meet the requirements for repair effort in the basic chemical industries in the postattack period. However, the existence of many persons with latent skill in the required categories may help in meeting the demand.
- The basic chemical industries are concentrated in the vicinity of standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) with over 70 percent of the industry production capability located within SMSAs.
- Some of the more modern basic chemical establishments appear to have greater vulnerability to nuclear attack because of their dependence on automation, computer control systems, and in some cases, on interconnecting pipelines with related establishments.

#### Recommendations for future work include:

- Application of the results of this study to a large multichemical plant complex or to the Five-City Study.
- Exploration of the application of the study results to other industries.
- Examination of the effects of varying demand for chemical products after nuclear attack and the resultant changes in basic chemical industry repair requirements.
- Conduct of an in-depth study of the geographical distribution of establishments within the basic chemical industries.
- Incorporation of the study results into the National Entity Survival (NES) Study model.

INTRODUCTION

URS 687-1 7

INTRODUCTION

#### The Problem

The continued survival of the population after a nuclear attack is closely related to the economic and technological recovery of the country. The basic elements of survival during the recovery period include not only food, clothing, and shelter, but water, pharmaceuticals, disinfectants, soaps, and other health-related materials. The production of safe, adequate supplies of basic survival materials is dependent on the capability of a number of industries to survive or, at least, recover quickly from the effects of the attack.

Since chemicals are used in almost all phases of material production and product manufacture, the chemical industry will have an important role in post-attack recovery. For instance, food production is highly dependent on fertilizers, insecticides, preservatives, and various processing chemicals. Chemicals are used directly and indirectly in the production of construction materials as well as in synthetic fabrics. Some manufactured products, such as plastics and paints, use chemicals directly, while there use chemicals indirectly as agents to clean, pickle, or otherwise treat. None of our basic survival materials can be supplied in adequate quantity or satisfactory quality without sources for basic chemicals. In recognition of the importance of the basic chemical industry in the postattack period, the Office of Civil Defense and Stanford Research Institute have funded the present study to examine damage to the industry following nuclear attack.

Various investigations of the vulnerability and/or repair of industries and utilities have been concluded in the past. These included water supply, sewage treatment, electric power systems, steel plants, food processing plants, sugar refineries, petroleum refineries, and industrial plants in general. Although most of these studies were not directed toward the problems of the basic chemical processing industry, they have provided useful guidance and input information.

The concepts and results of the investigation of the repair and reclamation of electric and gas utilities recently completed by URS [1] proved to be the most directly applicable. In fact, the techniques and procedures developed in that study provided the technical basis for the current effort. Other related or complementary studies, covering a broad spectrum of industries (such as petroleum refineries, steel mills, and food processors) and effects (such as blast damage, rapid shutdown, and repair requirements), have been discussed [1].

The research required both a systems approach—supplied by URS—and specialized competency in the field of chemical engineering practices—supplied by Rogers Engineering Co., inc., of San Francisco. This arrangement proved highly satisfactory and is recommended as a desirable approach for research projects requiring application of both broad concepts and specialized expertise.

#### **Objectives**

The Statement of Work is reproduced below.

The Subcontractor shall provide the personnel and facilities necessary to conduct a research study to develop estimates of damage to industrial facilities from nuclear weapon effects and to develop estimates of manpower and resources to repair and reclaim such facilities. Manufacturing or processing plants representative of those in the SIC\* three-digit group 281-Basic Chemicals will be selected on the basis of criteria developed by the Subcontractor. These plans will then be defined in terms of their structures, processes and process equipment, physical layout and other appropriate elements. The definition will include the identification of the degree to which the elements of the plan or processing system are critical to the operation of the facility. For each of these plants and their critical elements, detailed estimates of damage from nuclear weapon effects will be derived primarily on the basis of a 5-311 weapon. Weapon effects will include overpressure, fire, follout, and others as appropriate. Secondary effects, such as missile and debris effects, will be considered to the extent permitted by the state-of-the-art. Estimates of damage will be restricted to the two conditions of plants under normal operation and shutdown. On the basis of these estimates of damage the requirements will be derived over time for manpower and equipment and other resources for the repair and reclamation of the plants and the cestoration of operation. The estimates of damage and repair to individual plant components will be presented in a form such that the findings can be applied to similar components in other plants not considered in this study. To the extent possible the findings developed from the analysis of individual plants will be utilized to characterize plants, in general, of the industry which the specific plants represent.

<sup>\*</sup> Standard industrial Classification [2].

URS 687-4 9

From the Statement of Work, a work plan was prepared and the following major objectives were delineated:

1. Identify and characterize the major wit operations or the processes commonly used by the SIC Group 281 industries.

- 2. For each process identified, analyze the physical damage expected to result from various overpressure ranges from a 5-Mt-range weapon.
- 3. For each selected process and for each level of damage, prepare repair estimates which include manpower, by skill, and support equipment.
- 4. Using the damage and repair results for the selected processes, synthesize case studies of selected industries showing (a) probable overall damage at various levels of attack, (b) associated repair requirements, (c) time-phased sequence of repair operations, (d) alternate modes of operation.

#### Limitations on the Study

The investigation was limited to those industries defined by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Group 281; major industries in this group are chlorine-caustic, industrial gases, organic dyes, inorganic pigments, basic organic chemicals, and basic inorganic chemicals.

The range of weapon effects considered included both primary effects (such as air blast, thermal radiation, primary fires, and fallout\*) and secondary damage (such as building collapse, secondary fires, utility failure, explosions, and tidal waves). A major portion of the effort was directed at blast effects as these are considered the most important cause of damage [1,3] and predictive methods are relatively well advanced. For those effects where predictive techniques are poorly developed, the analysis considered the possibility or probability of occurrence. While damage estimates were made for the plant in normal operation at the time of attack, if it appeared that the resultant damage would differ markedly with the plant shut down and secured, a second estimate was prepared. Repair estimates were based on restoration of approximately 90 percent of preattack production capability. No consideration was given to the reduced demand for chemical products as a result of the attack.

<sup>\*</sup> Fallout was not considered a contributor to equipment damage and the possible effects of fallout on susceptible chemical products were not included in this study.

#### Report Organization

In most cases, the results of the study are reported in the sequence accomplished—that is, from damage estimates to repair estimates to time—phased repair by skill. To facilitate understanding of the material presented, backup and secondary data are presented in Appendixes.


The organization of the report and the relationship of the various sections and appendixes are shown in Figure 1.


#### Acknowledgments

The study was conducted under the guidance of Messrs. R. B. Bothun and R. Rodden of the Civil Defense Technical Office at Stanford Research Institute. who as Technical Monitors provided valuable assistance and direction. Mr. Michael Pachuta, OCD Action Officer, also contributed direction and understanding. The assistance of personnel of Rogers Engineering Co., Inc., is also acknowledged and appreciated. Data provided by the Manufacturing Chemists' Association, Inc., Washington, D.C. also proved helpful in various phases of the study.

The authors are gradeful for the assistance of URS personnel who contributed to various sections of this study. Dr. Bernard Gabrielson provided guidance and input for the damage estimates and prepared Appendix A. Miss Lee Saff assisted in data reduction.

Project manager was W. H. Van Horn; C. P. Foget was principal investigator, and was assisted by M. Staackmann. The entire effort was conducted under the supervision of  $M_{\star}$  B Hawkins, Manager of Environmental Systems.





#### THE BASIC CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

URS 687-4

I

THE BASIC CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

#### The Chemical Industry

The chemical industry is one of the key industries in the United States and includes 14,000 plants in 50 states. When broadly defined, the chemical industry embraces a complex of subindustries. The borders of the industry and of the subindustries are indistinct, for most chemical companies not only manufacture products that fall into a number of subindustry groupings, but produce items classified outside the chemical industry entirely. Conversely, many of the products classified in the chemical industry are manufactured in large quantity by companies listed outside the chemical industry (such as, the petroleum refining industry).

Thus, any system of classification that attempts to separate chemical companies into special segments must be arbitrary to some extent. For reporting purposes, the Bureau of the Census combines establishments producing chemicals and those producing finished chemicals (products) into one major group—Chemicals and Allied Products (SIC 28). SIC subgroup 281 (industrial inorganic and organic chemicals) includes some 1,900 establishments engaged primarily in manufacturing "basic" chemicals that are further processed by other major groups or subgroups to produce end products. The value of shipments for the SIC subgroup 281 in 1965 was \$11,438,346,000, which represents approximately 37 percent of the total value of shipments for the SIC 28 group of industries.

Figure 2 illustrates the relationship of the basic chemical subgroup (SIC 281) to the industries (281x\*) of the subgroup and to other 28x subgroups. The industries are compared in Figure 2 on the basis of value added by manufacture, adjusted (MVA)[5]. The organic chemicals not elsewhere classified (nec) industry (SIC 2818) represent 48 percent of the total SIC 281 subgroup. Next in relative importance is the inorganic chemicals industry (SIC 2819), representing 27 percent of the total. The remaining SIC 281x industries are a relatively small but vital part of the basic chemical industry group.

<sup>\*</sup> Hereafter x will be used to indicate undesignated 3-, 4-, or 5-digit SIC subgroups, industries, or products.

1. 1. 24 A. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.


Carl Butter Contract

The state of the state of the Man Man Samuel State of the Samuel S

Tolk Garage Soft and the manufacture of the same of the

The state of the s

Figure 2
THE BASIC CHEMICAL INDUSTRY GROUP (SIC 281)



NOTES: SIC groups from reference 2. Dollar values are for MVA (value added by manufacture, adjusted) for 1963 (reference 4).

URS 687-4

Table 1 indicates the degree to which establishments manufacture products classified in more than one industry. (These data are presented in terms of value of shipments made because there is no MVA data for this particular breakdown.) Using these data, the specialization ratio—an index of primary products produced by a given SIC industry—can be calculated. For instance, alkalies and chlorine represent 66 percent of the SIC 2812 industry, and industrial gases 98 percent of the SIC 2813 industry. Secondary products made within the SIC 2812 industry include hydrogen and sodium nitrate, which are classified under the SIC 2813 and 2819 industries, respectively. Another interesting statistic is the value of the primary products made in other industries—for example, 21 percent of the total production of alkalies and chlorine (or \$110,538,000) are produced by other industries.

The most modern chemical establishments today endeavor to manufacture their raw materials and produce the finished products. This results in the absence of a clear differentiation among (for example) a petroleum producer, a petrochemical company, and a chemical manufacturer. Another trend is the formation of chemical complexes that are comprised of independent establishments located in the same geographical area with a large volume of intermediate product transfer between establishments. Table 1 indicates this interplant production consumption.

Another definite trend in the chemical industry group (and other industry groups) is the increased use of automation in process control. While automation provides better quality control at lower operational expense, it could prove detrimental in a nuclear attack. Controls and control systems are relatively soft in comparison with most chemical equipment, but are expensive and require extensive labor effort to install. Computer control systems are becoming prevalent [6], particularly in multichemical complexes, and add greater sophistication to the normally complex control systems. Thus, even at relatively low overpressures, the loss of a control system could cause extensive damage to a plant that would not have been damaged by blast effects alone. An illustration of this occurred at a petroleum refinery in Pennsylvania during a four-hour power failure. Although auxillary power was supplied to some instrumentation, the refinery could not restore full production for four days and suffered losses in excess of a quarter of a million dollars [7].

#### Geographical Distribution of the Basic Chemical Industry Group

The geographic distribution of the 1905 plants in the basic chemical industry group varied. The inorganic chemicals and coal tar products (SiC 2812, 2813, 2815, 2816, and 2819) are widely and fairly evenly distributed throughout the country; however, the organic chemicals (SIC 2818) are concentrated in four states: Texas, Louisiana, California, and West Virginia [8]. Figure 3 indicates that

### Table 1

# SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF 281x INDUSTRIES

Yalue of Primary Products	Other Industries (in \$1,000)	110,538 (21,0%)	IR, 450 (12.4)	147,757 (31.7)	80 M20 (13.7)	100, 55* (10, 1)	774, Jak (46.0)
Poveent of	Primary · Prajact Consumed Interplant	Ξ	N.N.	5	•	g.	=
Speciali-	futtor.		ž	2	=	<u>.</u>	ţ
ne of Shipments This Industry (in §1, (mi)	Secondary Products	214, 140	1,774	127, 721	क्षा व	. 300, 001.	CST - CO.
Value of Shipments This industry On St. (mu)	of Secondary Products Products	11.6, 90H	a 10, 170	97.7	110, 583	, 1 and 102 1, 300, 047	2. 417. In
Number	Planta.	충	<b>101</b>	11	=	=	111
Number of	Production	13, 149	5, 250	2	8 1315	701, 307	ba, 413
	Catter Preducts	Chiorino-cauntic He, ness and	Osvgen, bydro- gen, acolyhene	Bruggue doriva- tives, synthetic organis des-	Penanan doxide, chrone pigments	Organic neids, solvents, nicolods plastict seu, ethysche	Safere acal annucha. potasten ettote sedan metel beneter
	interter Sume	Alkalten and chlorine	Intinted Biren	intermedinte cont hiz producte	horpanie pagnonia	Cryanto chonseada K.e e	fnorgan.c cherokale, n.e.e.
Ä.	Sumbay.	7.0 H	2) 7 74	etv.	=	<u>e</u> <del>g</del>	<u>.</u>


\* Specialter ton rates Values of Perman, and Sprondary Products . 100

\*\* Extinute based on most important primary 128 desire

Konzool Prom Rol, & SR333431-2811 Tublon on not na.

Lesses to be a substituted of the control of the co

Figure 3 CAPACITY AND LOCATION OF ETHYLENE PLANTS IN THE U.S.



2

1.71

ř

920 URS 687-4

approximately 54 percent of the ethylene production capability is located in SMSAs and over 80 percent is concentrated along the Texas-Louisiana Gulf Coast [9]. A few dozen well-placed nuclear weapons would incapacitate ethylene production plants. Since ethylene is a basic chemical, this would jeopardize the production of other chemicals.

The extent of damage that the basic chemical industry could expect to receive in the event of a nuclear attack can be related to the proximity of the chemical industry to population areas or Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs). Figure 4 shows the percentage distribution (based on 1965 production) of each industry in the 281 industry group and the 281x industries located in and out of SMSAs. As Figure 4 indicates, three industries—2812, 2813, and 2815—have over 80 percent of their production capability located inside SMSAs, while the other three industries have at least 60 percent or more of their production capability so located. The entire 281 industry group has over 70 percent of its production capability located in SMSAs. This indicates that less than 30 percent of the industry group could expect to remain unscathed following a nuclear attack concentrated on the SMSAs.

A major trend of the basic chemical industry group, particularly the petrochemical industry (2818), has been to the interrelated chemical plant or multichemical complex. In this type of an operation, as many as 10 or 12 separate chemicals are manufactured within one plant, with many of the chemicals utilized internally to manufacture other chemicals which are the final end products. One result of the multichemical complex trend has been a tendency for different chemical complexes to become interconnected by pipelines and through interplant transfer to sell various chemicals necessary for another plant's processes. Although this procedure has provided an economy of scale that has contributed to the growth of the petrochemical industry, it could prove disadvantageous if a plant supplying the necessary feed stock is Shutdown, thus causing a "domino" effect whereby all dependent plants might have to shutdown [9]. These interplant connections probably will have a great effect on the postattack recovery of the chemical industry since the damage to or destruction of one chemical plant might incapacitate several other plants 40 or 50 miles distant. An example of relatively long distance interconnections is the Grange-Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas, area that has interconnections with plants almost 60 miles away in the Lake Charles, Louisiana, area [10]. While this was a problem beyond the scope of this study, it would be useful to perform an in-depth study of a large multichemical plant complex such as that located in Giesman, Louisiana, or the Houston, Texas, area [11] and more accurately ascerbio the effects a nuclear weapon attack would have on an interconnected chemical complex.




Figure 4
DISTRIBUTION CA 外C 1832 社会人名下代公司及

22 URS 687-4

#### Criteria for Selection of Representative Industries and Establishments

The individual process lines used in basic chemical industries included in the Standard Industrial Classification Group 281 are too numerous to analyze in depth. A selection process whereby a limited number of establishments were isolated by a set of criteria designed for optimum satisfaction of the research objectives was performed at two levels. The first level examined the six major industry headings (2812, 2813, 2815, 2816, 2818, and 2819) within the group to decide whether any of the major headings could be eliminated from detailed study; the second level examined all of the chemical products (281xx and lower) listed under each of the qualifying major headings. For each of the selected representative industries, a typical establishment (producing the selected chemical products) was designated as representative of that particular major industry heading.

The criteria used in selection of the representative industries and establishments are as follows:

- The industry/establishment shall have importance in the postattack period.
- The industry/establishment shall represent a considerable volume (weight) and dollar value.
- The industry/establishment shall produce chemicals with wide application in a variety of uses and over a wide geographical area.
- The industry/establishment shall atilize processing equipment and techniques representative of those used throughout the basic chemical industry group.
- The industry/establishment shall produce chemicals not readily available through alternate sources.

Using the above criteria for industry, alkalies and chlorine (2812), induzicial gases (2813), organic chemicals (2818), and inorganic chemicals (2819) were retained for detailed study. The other industries (2815 and 2816) were studied further, but only in a gross manner. Table 2 summarizes the results of the selection process; further details are included in Appendix B.

Next, products that would be representative of each of the 281x industries retained were selected (asing the same criteria) and typical establishments manufacturing these products were designated. The details of the selection process are given in Appendix B and the results are summarized in Table 3.

 $\begin{tabular}{ll} Table~2\\ SIC~281x~INDUSTRIES~SELECTED~FOR~DETAILED~STUDY\\ \end{tabular}$ 

SIC Industry	Postatiack Importance	Production Volume	Number of Essential Uses	Processes and Equipment	Alternate Sources
2812*	High	Moderate	yiany	Unique	Few
2813*	High	Moderate	Many	Typical	Few
2815	Moderate	Moderate	Some	Typical	Many
2816	Lon.	Moderate	Limited	Unique	Few
2818*	High	High	Many	Typical	Some
2819*	High	High	Many	Typical	Few

<sup>\*</sup> Industries retained for detailed study.

Table 3

REPRESENTATIVE ESTABLISHMENTS
SELECTED FOR DETAILED STUDY

SIC Industry	SIC Product C	Code Number - 1	Product	Product/Industry Ratie*
2812	28121 28123	Chlorine Sedium hydrox	ide }	0.61
2813	28134 54 28134 43 28134 15	Nitrogen	}	0.51
2818	28182 11	Ethylene		v. 022
2819 2819	28193 28191 50	Sulfuric acid Ammonium nit	rate	$0.062 \\ 0.045$ 0.107

<sup>\*</sup> A ratio of the MVA for the chemical products indicated over the total MVA for industry which the products represent.

As Table 3 indicates, the establishments chosen to represent the 2812 and 2813 industries manufacture products that represent more than 1/2 of the total MVA (0.61 for SIC 2812 and 0.51 for SIC 2813); the choices are obvious. For the SIC 2818 industry, the choice of an establishment producing ethylene—representing only 2.2 percent of the total industry MVA—is less certain although it is the largest single chemical produced in the 2818 industry. However, it was determined that an ethylene plant represents physically, if not in terms of process, most organic plants. Accordingly, using the ethylene plant as an example of the very large industry was deemed valid. The 2819 industry is represented by two establishments—one producing sulfuric acid (a representative liquid chemical) and another producing ammonium nitrate (a representative bulk solid chemical); these two products represent approximately 11 percent of the total 2819 industry MVA.

TYPICAL ESTABLISHMENTS
AND
PROCESS EQUIPMENT

H

TYPICAL ESTABLISHMENTS
AND
PROCESS EQUIPMENT

The basic chemical industries comprise chemical establishments that utilize various chemical process equipment. This chemical process equipment can be considered the working modules characterizing a particular chemical plant. Thus, the first step in determining probable damage and subsequent repair effort was to identify the chemical process equipment. Two previous studies [3,12] presented methods by which manufacturing equipment (including chemical process equipment) could be classified. In the first study, Sachs and Bickley of IDA [3] classified equipment as: general purpose, special to industry, or unique to the product, with subdivisions of light and heavy, and regular and precision. The second study by the National Planning Association [12] presented a more detailed classification under three broad headings: specialized equipment, common equipment, and auxiliary facility modules. As these studies examined the entire manufacturing industry, their classification systems had to encompass the entire range of manufacturing equipment. Since this study investigated one industry group, a classification system specific to chemical equipment was devised in conjunction with the Rogers Engineering Company.

#### Process Equipment and Auxiliary Equipment

Rogers Engineering provided URS with a list of the standard equipment used in the basic chemical industry. From this list, URS and Rogers selected 37 items of chemical equipment and 9 auxiliary equipment that would be representative of the total 281 industry group. These modules provided the basis for a catalog from which various types of chemical establishments could be built hypothetically.

Table 4 lists the chemical equipment and auxiliary equipment included in the catalog and represents for each typical plant the specific equipment modules that make up that plant.

Figure 5 illustrates the layout of a typical chemical establishment and the relationship of various components of chemical equipment. The pressure vessels, cooling tower, storage tanks, heat exchangers, control house, and pipe rack are typical of the chemical industry. Appendix C contains more detailed information on the equipment and the processes of the five typical establishments.

Table 4


CHEMICAL EQUIPMENT AND AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT

	Ec	nipment Used i	ia Specific	Establishmer	<b>a</b>
	2812	2513	2515	2519	2515
	Causic -	Air		Ammonium	Selferic
	Chlorine	Limitedia	Dhylese	<u>Narate</u>	Acid
Columns and Pressure Vessels					
C-1 Distillation Column		x	x		x
C-2 Liquid/Liquid Extraction Column					
C-3 Packed Column					x
C-4 Pressure Vessel - Horizontal Cylindrical		x	x	z	
C-5 Pressure Vessel - Versical Cylindrical		x	x	x	
C-6 Liquid Phase Reactor with Mixer				x	
C-7 Finidized Bed Vertical Reactor					
Storage Tanks					
C-S Atmospheric Storage	x			x	x
C-9 Spherical Starage		x			
C-10 Solids Storage				x	
C-11 Open Storage Tanks	x				
Exchangers					
C-12 Harizonal Shell and Tube	x	x	x	x	x
C-13 Vertical Shell and Tabe		x			
C-14 Multiple Effects Evaporator	x				
C-15 Cooling Tower induced Draft	x	x	x	x	Z
Fired Heaters					
C-16 Box Type - Floor Fired			×		
C-17 Horizontal Fired Rotary Kila				x	x
Pumps and Drivers					
C-15 Centrifugal Parap	<b>x</b>	x	x	x	x
C-19 Electric Motor Drives	x	x	x	x	x
C-20 Seam Turbine Drives					x
C-21 Blower					x
Vacuum Equipment					
C-22 Steam Jet Ejector				x	

(treatizaed)

Table 4 (Continued)

	Ec	sipment Used	is Specific	Establishmen	<u>a</u>
	2512	2813	2518	2519	2819
	Candic -	Air		Ammonium	
	<u>Chlorine</u>	Liquifaction	Ethylene	Nitrate	Acid
Compressors					
C-23 Reciprocating Compressor		x			
C-24 Centrifugal Compressor	x	x	x		
Special Equipment					
C-25 Baremetric Condensor	x				
C-26 Bell and Spigot Drying Toxer	x				
C-27 Cemrifages	x				
C-25 Electrolytic Disparam Cell	x				
C-29 Electrolytic Mercury Cell					
C-30 Rotary Vacuum Filter	x				
C-31 Seren Cornegor				x	
C-22 Telekener or Clarifier	x			à	
C-33 Acid Coolers					x
Parkage Laits					
C-34 Refrigeration Units		x			
C-35 Regenerative Liquid or Gas Drying Systems		x			
harmeta					
C-36 Control Cubicles	_	_	_		
C-05 CICLIO COSRSES	x	x	x	x	x
Piping					
C-37 Pipe Racks	x	×	x	x	x
Gas System					
A-1 Gas Regulator	x	x	x	x	×
A-2 Gas Neter	x	x	x	x	x
Electric System					
A-3 10 XVA Transformer	x	×	x	x	x
A-4 Electric Switchgear	x	x	x	x	x
A-5 Rectifier	x				
Water and Sewer System					
A-6 Vertical Sand Filter	x	x	x	x	x
A-7 Elevated Water Tank	x	x	x	x	x
A-S Package Beiler Unit	x			x	
Building					
A-9 Prefat Buildings	x	x	x	x	*



A TYPICAL CHEMICAL ESTABLISHMENT SHOWING IMPORTANT COMPONENTS

#### Critical Elements

One of the goals of this study was to ascertain the critical elements in the typical chemical manufacturing establishments. The ascertainment of the relative importance of various chemical equipment components to an overall chemical process is necessary since the postattack repair effect would probably place major emphasis on getting the chemical plant back "on the line." To accomplish this in the most expeditious manner. components contributing a fraction of efficiency undoubtedly would be bypassed. In a previous study on the gas and electric utilities [1], the equipment components of the two utilities were almost always used in exactly the same manner in each plant; this permitted a fairly rigid definition of their criticality. In the chemical industry, however, an item of chemical equipment might be critical in one plant but not in another (a filter might be absolutely necessary in one process but of minor importance in another). As this restriction precluded the assignment of a criticality rating to chemical equipment listed in the catalog, the equipment was rated for its criticality on a plant-by-plant basis.

Accordingly, the functional contribution of each element was carefully examined, and criticality was rated according to the following classifications:

CRITICAL

C

Loss of element would result in a loss of <u>more</u> than 10 percent of the design capacity. The cause of this reduction in capacity might be due to operational limitations or a degradation of the system's safety or reliability.

SEMICRITICAL

(sc)

Operation without element would result in a loss of less than 10 percent of design capacity. The safety or reliability of the system might be degraded, but not seriously. Conversion of the system to operate without this element would require a significant expenditure of manpower and/or materials.

NONCRITICAL



Operation without element, would result in a foss of less than 10 percent of design capacity. The safety or reliability of the system might be degraded, but not seriously. Conversion of the system to operate without this element would not require a significant expenditure of manpower and/or materials.

Figures C-1 through C-5 of Appendix C depict the ratings of each chemical component.

DAMAGE ESTIMATES

CHARLEST CONTRACTOR OF THE CON

in the Constitution of Americal and the Wille West South Section of the Section of Management and the Constitution of

Ш

#### DAMAGE ESTIMATES

The 46 equipment modules in the chemical equipment catalog were examined to determine the extent and nature of damage they would receive as a result of nuclear attack. The purpose of these damage estimates was to establish a quantitative relationship between given levels of damage and the overpressure at which such damage would occur. This information was subsequently combined with information relating damage to the repair effort required for restoration and resulted in establishing a relationship between overpressure and repair requirements. Damage was assumed to be produced by a 5-mt low air burst with all overpressures in the Mach region. Although a rigorous analysis of other veapon yields was not pursued, the results of the damage estimations are believed to be applicable for weapon yields in the low megaton range (1.0 - 10.0 mt). The major difference in blast phenomena for weapons of different yields (besides distance) is the duration of the positive phase of the blast wave. Although this duration shanges with the overpressure level (it is the longest at low overpressures), ever the weapon yields mentioned it is of sufficient duration to equal or exceed the natural period of the equipment structures investigated in this study. For example. a distiliation column SS ft high by 4 ft diameter has a period of 2.6 secs. At 9 psi, the column would overturn due to anchor bolt failure. At this overpressure level, the duration of the blast wave is 2.75 and 6.3 secs for yields of I and IO mt, respectively. Therefore, the duration exceeds the period of the structure and the wave can be considered a static loading force. For weapons of lower yields, certain structures will have periods that now are greater than the blast wave duration values. Under these conditions, the assumption that the wave acts as a static loading force no longer applies and damage to such structures will be less than predicted by large weapons at the same overgreeous legels.

#### Weapon Effects and Secondary Damage

The primary nuclear weapon effects considered in analyzing camage to the chemical equipment components were the diffraction and drag phases of the blast wave and the thermal ruise. Secondary damage was mainly assessed in a qualitative manner and was mainly attributed to missiles generated by the diffraction and drag phases of the blast. Other secondary damage investigated briefly was die mainly to the nature of the chemical processes themselves (such as a liquid oxygen spill from a ruptured storage tank). Appropriate references [13,14,15] were used where applicable. All damage effects were related to the overpressure

26 URS 687-4

level at which they occurred. Three weepon effects—electromagnetic pulse (EMP), direct—induced ground shock, and air—induced ground shock—were not considered with respect to their effects on individual chemical equipment components but possible implications are presented.

Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) fields are reported (in the open literature) to be of sufficient intensity to produce appreciable degredation of communications, power, and computer systems even outside the range of extensive blast damage. Although the complexity of these systems and the many possible interactions preclude the development of detailed vulnerability assessment procedures [16], some implications can be made. If the EMP effects cause a power failure, the subsequent unscheduled shut-down of the plant could cause serious damage, including secondary fires and explosions [11]. If the EMP effects disrupt communications within the plant or erase the magnetic memory of the computer in a highly automated plant, the plant might experience an unscheduled shut-down with similar disasterous consequences. A prolonged power outage also would effectively disrupt the expability of the computer.

Direct-reduced ground shock can cause damage to underground lines and components of chemical plants, the degree of damage falling off rapidly with distance from ground zero. It is expected that underground components will receive significant damage only within the zone of plastic soil movement. Since this zone is relatively small and would simultaneously be subjected to extremely high overpressure and thermal levels, the direct-induced ground shock is felt to be of minor significance. A special case occurs for chemical plants located in the vicinity of a body of water in which the nuclear determined occurs [17]. Under these conditions, coupling effects could produce significant structural damage in ranges where the air blast effects would produce no such damage. However, additional research is necessary to establish the extent of the problems likely to be created by direct-induced ground shock.

Air-induced ground shock is expected to cause virtually no damage to underground chemical plant components at surface overpressure levels below 15 or 25 psi. Above this level, damage is expected to occur, with severity increasing with overpressure. It was concluded [1] that the present proficiency is not sufficiently advanced to allow even approximate quantitative prediction of damage resulting from given overpressure levels.

#### Damage Estimation

The estination of the probable damage to the various equipment modules considered in this study involved assessing the module to determine the most likely failure modes and, using standard engineering formulas, calculating the overpressure level at which the element would fail. Since generalized damage

estimations of equipment modules are desired, standard design criteria (for example, 190-mph wind force) with appropriate safety factors were used to arrive at a structural resistance to blast effects for a given module. From this resistance, the failure-overpressure was calculated. Realizing that calculated failure levels would not be accurate for all types of any given module or even for two identical types, we derived a mathematical method of assessing the probability of failure for a given loading condition based on observed structural failure response. These probability-of-failure factors were applied to the calculated failure levels and an overpressure range given which corresponded with failure probabilities of 1 percent, 50 percent, and 99 percent. Appendix D presents the rationale and a more detailed discussion of the procedures used.

Two factors affect the severity of damage at any given overpressure levels: the directional orientation of the element to the blast wave front and the proximity of the element to other compenents or structures. In the directional orientation of a chemical equipment component, the worst-case orientation was assumed (that orientation producing the greatest damage from blast effects). The proximity of components to other components or structures also affects the severity of damage resulting from both missiles and reflected overpressures. The significance of missile damage is discussed below. Reflected overpressure was not examined in detail due to a lack of specific information regarding equipment location relative to possible blast-reflecting surfaces.

## Results

The validity of the damage estimates that were prepared for this study would be in the range of a "study estimate" as defined by the American Association of Cost Engineers [18]. This means that the damage estimates would have a probable error of no more than plus or minus 30 percent, based on the stated overpressure. If the damage estimates are to be applied to equipment that is either considerably larger or considerably smaller than the standards used for this study, the probable error would be greater.

Damage estimates were prepared for chemical equipment in both an operating and a shut-down condition. In many cases, there was little or no difference in the equipment damage predicted for the two modes. However, secondary hazards could exist if the chemicals contained inside the equipment were allowed to leak or spill. The major exception to this tenet involved storage tanks and process vessels—empty tanks or vessels became more susceptible to damage at lower overpressures.

Appendix E describes the damage for each chemical equipment and auxiliary module. The damage predictions are based on actual computations involving response of the materials making up the modules to the various weapon effects.

38 urs 687-4

For each damage description, the cause of the damage is noted (diffraction, drag, missile, or a combination of these three) with the overpressure level at which the failure would occur for an estimated probability of 1 percent, 50 percent, or 99 percent failure. As an example of the use of these charts, at 6.6 psi, there would be a 50 percent probability that a distillation column (C-1) would have external pipe severed at the ground connections due to deflection of the column.

The findings for overpressure and dynamic pressure evaluated in detail were:

- Overpressure (diffraction phase) was found to be a major cause of damage to buildings. storage tanks, cooling towers, electrolytic cells, and controls. In other instances, it was a contributing cause of damage with other weapon effects.
- Dynamic pressure was found to be the major cause of damage to certain exposed equipment components. These components were columns, process and pressure vessels, heat exchangers, pumps and drivers, compressors, most of the special equipment, package units, and piping.

The findings for those weapon effects assessed only on a qualitative basis were:

- Missiles were found to contribute significantly to the damage of nearly all equipment components. Those elements located inside buildings or in relatively built-up areas were damaged primarily by missiles generated by overpressure effects. Elements located outdoo's in less built-up areas received damage from missiles propelled by the drag effects of the dynamic pressure.
- Thermal pulse was found to cause varying but relatively insignificart damage to the equipment components. The most significant effect of the thermal pulse was its initiation of primary ignitions and its contribution to secondary fires, the effects of which could not be covered in detail in this study.

A wide range of damage response versus overpressure existed for the equipment components in the study; severe damage levels. for instance, ranged from 5 psi for a cooling tower to 24 psi for a horizontal heat exchanger. For presentation purposes here and in preparing the repair estimates for the next section, damage conditions considered are for the 50 percent failure probability and the corresponding overpressures. Generally, the vulnerability of the chemical equipment modules to damage can be delineated in three broad classifications: soft, where severe damage\* is experienced below 5 psi; medium, where severe

<sup>\*</sup> Severe damage as used here refers to severe distortion of the equipment frame and, or displacement of the equipment off its mountings.

damage is experienced between 5 and 10 psi; and hard, where severe damage occurs at greater than 10 psi. The list below shows examples of chemical equipment modules in these classifications.

## Soft, 2-5 psi

Controls
Cooling towers

Fired furnaces

Diaphram cells

Storage tanks (except spherical)

Control buildings

# Medium, 5-10 psi

Pipe racks Blowers

Mercury cells Rotary vacuum filters Screw conveyors

Columns

Multiple effects evaporator

Package boilers

## Hard, > 10 psi

Heat exchangers Pressure vessels Compressors

Pumps

Steam and electric drivers

Centrifuges

Spherical storage tanks

REPAIR ESTIMATES

IV.

#### REPAIR ESTIMATES

Repair estimates were prepared for the 46 equipment modules at each indicated level of damage. The Rogers Engineering Company assembled a panel of experienced engineers from their staff plus a representative from Uits and for each equipment module at each damage level, evaluated the effort in man-days to complete the repair, the time needed for the repair, the specific labor skills required, special construction equipment needed, and resources necessary for repair (supplies and spare parts). This evaluation was performed by means of engineering judgment and standard construction estimating techniques. The various equipment modules were assigned for estimation to individuals on the panel according to their expertise. Each engineer audited the estimates to achieve a group consensus.

#### Repair Criteria

In a postaitack environment, there would be many limitations on the repair of any physical facility—whether a chemical plant, an electric utility, or a school house. Undoubtedly there would be shortages of the necessary skilled labor, equipment, and supplies. However, as it was beyond the scope of this study to take such diverse factors into account, the following criteria were used for deriving the repair estimates for each compenent:

- All repairs would be performed by skilled repair personnel using the equipment, supplies, and facilities normally available under preattack conditions, unless otherwise noted.
- The repaired system would be virtually identical to the original (preattack) system from the standpoints of design, performance capabilities, operational requirements, reliability, safety, and longevity.

The following basic assumptions were made for all repair estimates:

 No unusual environmental conditions (inclement weather, frozen soil, flooding, high groundwater table, fallout radiation, fires, or remote or inaccessible location) are present to interfere with the repairs.

- Travel time to and from repair sites is not included.
- Time is allowed for the field testing of each repaired element but not for testing the entire system following repair.
- The values given for repair effort do not include the time spent by supervisory personnel above the level of "foreman."

# Results

Appendix E presents the results of the repair analysis in tabular form. Both damage and repair estimates are keyed to overpressure, with other weapon effects cited specifically as applicable. The validity of the repair estimates were in the same range as that of the damage estimates (a "study estimate") and should be accurate to within plus or minus 30 percent. A further refinement of the repair estimates reflecting different sizes of the same piece of equipment is discussed in Section V.

In general, the repair effort required to restore the chemical equipment components to an operating mode reflected both the complexity of the piece of equipment and its vulnerability to blast damage. To illustrate this point: a direct fired heater is a large complex piece of chemical equipment and is also structurally soft (it suffers severe damage at less than 5 psi); consequently, it required the largest repair effort (400 man-days). A 2,500 hp centrifical compressor, also a large complex item of equipment but structurally very hard, required only 47 man-days of repair effort at its severe damage level. For the most part, the chemical equipment modules in the hard category required less repair effort than the equipment modules in the soft and medium categories.\* In addition, the type of repair was much different since most of the equipment classified as hard suffered little or no internal damage and required only realignment or resetting on foundations. Equipment modules in the medium and soft category required the greatest repair effort since the majority of this equipment would experience both external and internal damage at the severe damage levels. While the type of repair was varied, generally it required some form of complete rebuilding.

As an example of the use of the repair estimates (using the example given above), the repair of a distillation column at 6-1/2 psi would require 35 mandays of repair effort; take 4 days to accomplish; require a crane, oxyacetylene cutting torches, rigging gear, and electrical welding machines; pipes, miscellaneous wrenches, and gaskets; and a repair crew comprising of 4 riggers, 2 equipment operators, 1 millwright, 2 pipe fitters, 1 ironworker, and 2 certified welders.

<sup>\*</sup> Or. as a corollary, most "hard" components, because they are often designed to operate under the stresses of very high pressure, are less complex than "soft" components and hence less subject to extensive repair requirements.

# MATHEMATICAL MODELS FOR REPAIR ESTIMATES

٧

THE SECOND STATES OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE SECOND STATES O

. P. Similan Salahara

## MATHEMATICAL MODÈLS FOR REPAIR ESTIMATES

In a previous study [1], a mathematical model was developed that used an exponential function relating repair effort to overpressure. The purpose of the mathematical model was to take the data for the repair of individual equipment components (such as that presented in Appendix E) and express them in a more compact and facile form. The model served another purpose by allowing interpolation between data points so that a repair effort could be expressed for every overpressure level. As mentioned in Section III, all weapon effects considered (overpressure, dynamic pressure, missiles, and thermal pulse) have been related to one effect: overpressure. Hence, even though overpressure is the index used, all effects that contribute to damage to a given component are implicit in this index.

This mathematical model (with some revision) satisfactorily related the damage at various levels of overpressure to the estimated repair effort for each of the 46 chemical equipment components studied. The mathematical function used to express this relationship is:

$$R = L \left[ 1 - e^{-k(p-x)^{2}} \right]$$
 (1)

orsdia '

Ser 中国的特殊特殊等于企业的更加企为50年。

(California to the interior marketing

R = repair effort (num-days)

L = maximum repair effort (man-days)

p = cvergressure (psi)

x = lewest overpressure (50 percent probability estimate) at which damage is observed, psi

k - empirical constant for a given equipment module


y = empirical constant for a given equipment module

Empirical constants, to give an expression that best fit the data for repair estimates of each component, were found by successive iterations.

## Results

Generally, the mathematical functions express the damage/repair relationship of most of the chemical equipment components in a highly satisfactory manner. Figure 8 shows three typical examples (an electric motor, a rotary kiln, and a centrally with their corresponding mathematical parameters) of the curves

Figure 4
REPAIR EFFORT VERSUS OVERPRESSURE LEVELS FOR THREE CHEMICAL EQUIPMENT COMPONENTS



obtained for the chemical equipment components. These curves are representative of the accuracy of the curve fits to the data points obtained by the mathematical model. As was found with the previous study [1], deviations of the model from the calculated values do occur, usually for low repair efforts (therefore of less importance). However, "study estimate" validity (accuracy to within plus or minus 30 percent) is the premise emissioned.

# Repair Versus Capacity Model

The size or capacity of a typical equipment epidponent varies wilely throughout the chemical industry (a distillation column may be as short as 90 ft or as tall as 390 ft) and since the effort required to repair a chemical equipment component in most cases raries with size of the component, this factor had to be taken into account. Another mathematical expression was developed to allow scaling of the repair effort and the scaling factor—different for each piece of chemical equipment—allowed the scaling of repair effort to match the size (or capacity) of a given chemical equipment component. This flexibility permitted a more precise estimate of repair effort for each typical plant. In addition, the scaling factor was a time-saving device since it permitted an easily determined repair estimation for any component not of standard size.

#### Scaling Model

The expression for the realing factor was derived empirically from the repair effort data supplied by Rogers Engineering. For each chemical equipment component, the determination was made on the type of repair performed at each damage level, and whether the repair would change with size (welding a seam on a large or small tank) or remain the same despite a size variation (replacing instrumentation gauges). The repair estimates for three sizes of the same piece of equipment were then graphically depicted and the following equation was derived to represent the graphical results:

$$S_{f} = m\left(\frac{C}{C_{o}}\right) \div b \tag{2}$$

where

S<sub>f</sub> scaling factor for a given chemical equipment component

m - empirical constant for a given equipment component

C - capacity or size of equipment component being investigated

C capacity or size of equipment component standard

b empirical constant for a given equipment component

0 URS \$87~4

In use; the scaling factor is multiplied by the repair effort derived from the mathematical model (eq. 1) for the standard equipment component, to give eq. 3, which represents the relationship between damage and repair for an equipment component of any given size:

$$R_{S} = L \left( 1 - e^{-k(p-x)^{y}} \right) \left[ ln \left( \frac{C}{C_{o}} + b \right) \right]$$
 (3)

where  $R_s = \text{repair effort for any size component (man-days)}$ .

#### Results

For each of the 46 equipment modules, Table 5 lists the 7 parameters that were used (L, k,  $\pi$ , y, m, b,  $C_0$ ) to define the repair effort for that equipment component in the mathematical model. The scaling parameters (m and b) varied at different overpressure levels for several of the chemical components and are indicated in the table. Table 5 indicates several variations of scaling that have to be taken into account. In some cases, a piece of chemical equipment will not vary in size but is truly a module (a modular equipment component would be manufactured in one size only) and more of the same size module are added when an increase in capacity is desired. This type of equipment is identified by the term "modular" in the m and b columns. In another case, the repair effort for a given piece of equipment varies directly with a certain standard dimension ( $C_0$ ) and in this case m=1 and b=0. Finally, in some instances, the repair effort remains constant for any size of a given equipment component and is so designated in Table 5 where the m=0, b=1 and  $C_0$  is left blank (the size of the equipment is not relevant).

The technical literature [19-24] contains many articles concerning the scaling of chemical equipment by size or capacity. However, the literature reviewed uses either the initial cost or installed cost in dollars of the chemical equipment versus size or capacity as the units of measure. The scaling method used for this study is different from the methods usually found in the literature\* and is not directly comparable to the results that these methods give. The reason is that the equipment scaling method in this report is strictly concerned with the repair effort for different sizes of chemical equipment; whereas the standard, cost-versus-size methods are concerned with the overall cost of purchasing and installing a chemical equipment component and include many other cost factors besides the actual installation labor (such as shipping, material cost, and manufacturing labor).

The classical method is the exponential capacity-adjustment technique that uses a constant exponent value of 0.6 for most types of processes. An example of this method is given in Reference 21.

Tuble 5

MATHEMATICAL MODEL PARAMETERS FOR EQUIPMENT REPAIR

		-1	~	×	24	a	و	ဝိ
G-1	Distiliation Column psi s 8* psi > 8	088	0,003	ဗ	₹	1.1	-0.08 0.13	1100 ft <sup>3</sup> 1100 ft <sup>3</sup> 1100 ft <sup>3</sup>
ੂੰ ਹ	Liquid/Liquid Extraction Column psi s 8 psi > 8	340	0.004	9	<del>.</del>	1.1	-0.08 0.13	1100 ft <sup>3</sup> 1100 ft <sup>3</sup> 1100 ft <sup>3</sup>
O-0	Packed Column	022	0.005	<b>5</b>	~	0,68	u. 30	1100 ft <sup>3</sup>
วั	Prossure Vessel - Horizontal Cylindrical	31	0.37	21	73	0		
S-5	C-5 Prassuro Vossol - Vortioni Cylindrical	90	1, 1	21. 21.	-	0	-	
5	Liquid Phase Reactor w/(Fall) Mixer (Empty)	9 8 8 8	0.015 0.55	1.9	21 <b>~</b>		00	0'0** x 8' (226 ft <sup>3</sup> ) 0'0** x 8' (226 ft <sup>3</sup> )
C-2	Fluidised Bod Vertieni Renetor psi s 4 psi > 4	<b>₹</b> 8	0.3	53 	=	~ ci	0.30	6'9 x 30'
* *	* The values indicated apply for all everpressure levels unless otherwise indicated.	suro lo	vols unicss	otherwt	se Inc	lleatod.		(continued)

mthuod)		
Table 5 (oc		
Ę		

	12	Y	×	7	ш	٥	၁
C-8 Atmosphoric Storago Tanks (Full) (Empty)	170	33 03 23 5-	0.0		v-i	00	50' dlam. x 20' 50' dlam. x 20'
C-O Sphorianl Storago Tanks	200	0.005	2-	<b>=</b>	00.0	0,18	80' (dlam.)
C-10 Solids Storngo Tranks	170	0,000001	3.0	5.7	<b>~</b> 41	0	21'\$ x 72'
C-11 Open Storage Tanks	10	0.05	Ţ	23		0	100
C-12 Hortzontal Shall & Tubo Exchangers (singlo) (stacked)	1.5 80	0.35 0.8	5 <u>1</u> F	21	00		
C-111 Vartlen! Sholl & Tube Exchangor	10	0.4	117		ಎ	****	
C-14 Multiple Effects Evaporator	310	0,0005	7	ೞ	0.60	0.50	:) affacts 26' x 16'
C-15 Couling Tower, Induced Draft	88	0.1	0	÷χ	Modular	J coll B	20' x 20' x 15'ø
C-16 from Type Ploor-Plued Heater	370	1.0	0.0		-4	0	46,000 R <sup>3</sup>
C+17 Hortzonful Fired Rotary Kila (w/Brick) (w/o Brick)	210	0.7 0.6				<b>0</b> 0	10'\$ × 75' 10'\$ × 75' (continued)

		Table	Table 6 (coatinuct)	())				
	COMPANY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE	Ĥ	<b>~</b>	r]	>.	=	[2	ပ
3.4.3.8	C.1.8 Contribugal Pump	0	0.7	12.6			<b>•</b>	10'9 x 75'
2	C-19 Bloatric Motor Drives pul s G pel > 6	50	0.10	: ::	<b>-</b>	0.88 0.74	0.10	dy 0001
07 <b>-</b> 50	Staum Turbino Drives psi < 1: psi < 1:1	81	(s, 007	<b>3</b> 0	:2 :2	0.64 0.80	0.17	લેવ છર
77	C-21 Blowar	11	0.45	~		_	0	1 50 hp
77-53 C-53	Stoam Jut Bloctor	10	900'0	91	==	ప	_	
÷	C-23 Rachrocating Compressor	æ	900.0	23	<b>53</b>	0.59	0,40	1000 hp
÷i •	C-24 Contribugal Compressor psi x 8 psi > 8	19	0.11	e çı	-	0.30	0.61	2500 hp
ය න	C-25 Barometric Coadonsor psi < 3 psi > 3	98	1.1		فسه	0°.0	0.47	. 8 × 9 · 3
37 -	C-20 Boll & Spigot Drying Towor	å	8.0	<b>a</b>	:	4	0	(1 stuges) (2 stuges)

		อ. ,พ.เ.	Tr. o 6 (continued)	ŧ					51
		긔	إد	×	ᅿ	m	j	ပိ	
C-27	С-27 Contrifugou psi s 14 psi > 14	2	0.001	<b>6</b> 3	<del>1</del> 2	0.31	0.70	30 hp	
C-28	C-28 Bloctrolytic Diaphram Coll	18	0.6	<b>53</b>		Modular		01 × 61 × (11	
02-D	C-29 Blootrolytle Moreury Coll	36	0.0	~4	~	Modular		40' x 4' x 0.5'	
08-3	C-30 Rotary Vacuum Filtor psi < 4 psi = 4	53 27	0 61 61	0.1		0.91	0.10	61 drum	
C-31	C-31 Serow Convayor	M	0.3	න ප	-	Modular		20' section	
70-0 70-0	C-32 Thiokonar or Chariftor psi = 3 psi = 4 psi = 6	Ē	0	21	<b>.</b>	1.50 1.00 0.80	-0.60 0 0.17	50' (dlam.) 50' (dlam.) 50' (dlam.)	
S - S	C-13 Aeld Cooler	ã	0.0	4.6	<b>23</b>	Modular		e 2) 0271	
19-D	3-34 Bafrigoration Units	Š	0.5	1.4	-	0	~ <b>=</b> ;		
0 <del>0-</del> 0	C-36 Regeneralive Liquid or Gas Dryor	10	0.006		<b>e</b> 5	9	-4		
G-36	C-36 Control Cubicles	50	<b>-</b>	-	<del></del>	Modular		4' x 4' x 7.6'	UNG
C-23	C-37 Pipo Racks	30 30	8.0	2. i.	1.7	0.83	0.16	20' wide x 20' lg. (continued)	

URS 687<del>-4</del>

The Maria and Maria Maria and the second of the second of

	1	L, k	×	>	Z	عر	ວິ
A-1. Cas Regulator	2.1	0.7	9	-			Industrini Sizo
A-2 Cas Motor	51 	2.1 0.0	1. G		Modular		Industrial Sizo
A-3 1.0 MVA Trunsformer	130	0.0007	<del></del> i	<del>-4</del>	Modular		
A-4 Blootric Switchgoar	30	p.0	댝	ນ.ນ	Modular		Sized for 10 MVA
A-S Roctlifier	100	-4	51 52	-	Modular		20' x 10' x 10'
A-6 Vortical Sand Filtor	35	0.53			0		
A-7 Blovated Wator Tank (full) (empty)	51 S1	4.1 1.0	ಬ <u>ಇ</u> ಚ		<b>4</b> -	00	5'8 × 8'3
A-8 Packago Bollor Unit psi = 3 psi = 4	120	0.08	n. 5	રા	0.45 0.59 0.71	0.54 0.48 0.28	7 x 10" Btu/hr 7 x 10" Btu/hr 7 x 10" Btu/hr
A-O Profab Bulldings	6.1	0.0	-	<del>-</del>	<b>≠</b> 4	0	6600 ft <sup>2</sup> (floor area)

To find the repair effort for a 1,000 hp centrifugal compressor at 12 psi, for example, use the parameters given for a centrifugal compressor (C-24) in Table 5 and substitute them in eq. 3 as follows:

$$R_{12 \text{ psi}} = 51 \left[ 1 - e^{-0.11 (12 - 2.9)^{1}} \right] \left[ 0.51 \frac{1000}{2500} \div 0.45 \right]$$

= 21 man-days of repair effort

REPAIR ESTIMATES FOR TYPICAL ESTABLISHMENTS AND INDUSTRIES

the state of

VI

REPAIR ESTIMATES FOR TYPICAL ESTABLISHMENTS AND INDUSTRIES


#### Procedure

The SIC 281 industry group was differentiated successively from industry group to industry, to preduct, to establishment manufacturing the product, and, ultimately, to basic process equipment of the establishments. At this lowest common denominator—the process equipment common to all establishments and industries within SIC 281 group—detailed damage and repair analyses were made.

Using a mathematical model derived in Section V for each item of process equipment, it is possible to estimate the repair effort 60 percent failure probability) versus overpressure for each of the typical establishments by assembling the process equipment required for each and adding up the repair estimates for the constituent process equipment. The total repair effort then is estimated for all the manufacturing capability involved in the total production of the chemical products. This is done by comparing the typical establishment's annual production of its product with the total annual production of that product. This ratio and the repair estimate for the typical establishment are used to derive the repair estimate for the total product manufacture. (This estimate includes factors necessary to account for "atypical" establishments, that is, establishments with production capabilities, products, and process equipment different from the typical.) Ultimately, repair estimates for the 281x industries and 281 industry group can be obtained in this same manner. Figure 7 shows this integration process. At each of the levels the repair estimates for items in the typical unit are summed and repair estimates for the atypical units are either estimated or otherwise compensated for. For example, at the establishment level (five or more digit SIC code), we studied a 400-ton per day chlorinecaustic plant that produced only chlorine and caustic by the Hooker process. (Appendix C gives an analysis and report of the process equipment; Appendix E indicates corresponding damage and repair estimates.) Other plants with differing production capability were not examined in detail. We did not study a chlorine plant using DeNora cells, nor did we investigate byproducts such as soda ash. lience, we have had to calculate the repair estimate for total chlorine-caustic product by including considerations for atypical as well as typical establishments. These estimates were of a gross nature and often no more than a simple extrapolation. Important exceptions will be noted. The use of such approximations does decrease the reliability of the repair estimates increasingly as the integration of the industries progresses, but the results, even at the 3-digit SIC level. are believed adequate for general planning purposes.

THE RESERVE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF

SECTION SECTIONS OF SHIPSTON DESCRIPTION OF SECTION SECTION SECTION OF SECTION SECTIONS OF SECTION SEC



PROGRESSION FROM REPAIR ESTIMATES FOR PROCESS EQUIPMENT TO TOTAL INDUSTRY GROUP REPAIR ESTIMATE Figure 7

# Repair Estimates for Typical Establishments

Repair estimates for a typical establishment are obtained through the summation of the repair estimates for all chemical processing equipment in that particular plant. Though simple in concept, the actual practice is complicated because of network-type components (such as control wiring and miscellaneous piping). The network-type components were usually accounted for by the use of an appropriate rule-of-thumb. It was generally assumed that miscellaneous conduits and piping not carried on pipe racks (component C-37) accounted for an additional piping quantity equivalent to 20 percent of the piping carried on pipe racks. However, variations compensating for individual plant characteristics were used when necessary.

Figure 8 presents the results of this summation process for the five establishments considered (Figures C-1 to C-5 show plant layouts). It was found most convenient to obtain initial results by summation at several overpressure levels as this provided a basis for derivation of a mathematical expression for each curve thus generated. The mathematical expressions derived for these curves were all reduced to a common equation which is identical to Equation 1 except the repair effort parameters and empirical constants are now applicable for the individual establishments rather than the equipment components. Table 6 indicates the establishment parameters used in deriving these mathematical expressions.

Table 6


MATHEMATICAL MODEL PARAMETERS
FOR TYPICAL ESTABLISHMENTS

	Size	I	aramete	rs	
Establishment	(tons/day)	L	<u>k</u>	<u>x</u>	<u>r</u>
Chlorine/caustic	400	12,600	0.043	0.5	2.0
Oxygen	100	5,510	0.005	0.5	2.4
Ethylene	685	25,600	9.01	0.1	2.2
Sulfuric acid	1,000	11,575	0.002	0.2	2.9
Ammonium nitrate	240	2,260	0.02	0.5	2.0

In Figure 8, damage level is expressed as overpressure (in psi), and repair effort is expressed in total man-days for the typical establishments with the indicated production capacities. The use of normalized repair effort, expressed in man-days per ton per day of production capacity, is not permissible since repair effort scales differ with size for the different establishments.

л Невовы желектерине желектерине желектерине желектерине намакта желектерине желект

Figure 8 REPAIR EFFORT AS A FUNCTION OF DAMAGE LEVEL FOR FIVE TYPICAL ESTABLISHMENTS



In order to examine the scaling of repair effort with changes in plant size, a second damage versus repair iteration was performed on two additional plants for each of the five typical establishments, using capacities different from the typical. These results were depicted graphically for each establishment type and eq. (4) was then derived to represent the graphical results:\*

$$R^{i} = R^{i} o \left( \frac{C^{i}}{C^{i}} \right)^{n}$$
(4)

shere.

R' = Repair effort for the typical establishment

C' = Size or capacity of the typical establishment

C' = Size or capacity of the establishment being investigated

R' = Repair effort for the establishment being investigated

n =Scaling factor

Table 7 indicates the scaling factors for each chemical establishment studied.

Table 7


SCALING FACTORS FOR REPAIR EFFORT VERSUS SIZE
FOR THE TYPICAL ESTABLISHMENTS

Typical Istablishment	Capacity (C'o, tons/day)	Repair Effori** (man-days)	Scaling Factor
Chiorine/caustic	200 (chlorine)	7,300	0.71
Oxygen	199	3,200	0.61
Ethylene	685	12,509	0.71
Ammonium Nitrate	240	1,000	0.55
Sulfuric Acid	1,000	6, 200	0.48

<sup>•</sup> The form of this equation is similar to that one used in the chemical industry for scaling estimated plant costs: an example of the use of this equation for scaling is given in Reference 18.

<sup>\*\*</sup> The repair effort chosen for examination here corresponds to 50 percent of the maximum repair effort for each of the typical establishments.

Two useful indices can now be derived from Figure 8 and Table 7--delta damage level and 50 percent repair effort. These indices are being employed so that the various establishments can be compared on a common basis. The delta damage level corresponds most closely with the moderate damage category commonly used in nuclear weapon effects terminology. The 50 percent repair effort and delta damage level indices are shown on an example curve below:\*




For any particular typical establishment, the delta damage level was not found to vary significantly with changes in plant size. For subsequent damage estimations the delta damage level was rounded off to the nearest integral psi. The 50 percent repair effort index depends on plant size, and comparisons of this index should be made using establishments having the same production capacity. These two indices are displayed in Figure 9; there is no correlation between delta damage level and 50 percent repair effort. For example, the chlorine/caustic plant is the most vulnerable (i.e., damage occurs at the lowest overpressure level) and it is also one of the most "expensive" to repair. On the other hand, the sulfuric acid plant is relatively "hard" and repair effort is relatively low.

<sup>\*</sup> For example, the maximum repair effort for an ethylene plant is 25,600 mandays; the 50 percent repair effort is then 25,600/2 = 12,800, which corresponds to a delta damage level of 7.9 psi.

ndes i Descentrates es espektivas por establecia del

The state against the



The 50 percent repair effort Index here is for establishments all with expacities of 200 tons per day. Over the total range of from 100 to 1,000 tons per day capacity, the relative ranking of the various establishments remains the same oven though differences between them become greater with larger capacities.

Figure 9 DELTA DAMAGE LEVEL AND FIFTY PERCENT REPAIR EFFORT FOR TYPICAL ESTABLISHMENTS

©€ URS 687-4

Despite the lack of correlation on a plant-by-plant basis, the relationship between delta damage level and 50 percent repair effort appears fairly consistent, within a given SIC 281x industry, as is discussed in Section VII. The two typical SIC 2819 establishments (ammonium nitrate and sulfuric acid) have relatively low repair efforts, which indicates the simplicity of their manufacturing processes in comparison with those of the other three establishments.

## Repair Estimates for the 281xx Chemical Products

A proper representation of different chemical plant sizes was required to extrapolate the findings of the typical establishment analysis to the total production of the chemical products being represented. Since the basic repair versus damage data were tied to the typical establishment capacities, the repair effort had to be scaled to plants of different sizes; the scaling factors derived are given in Table 7.

A stepwise procedure was used to extrapolate the results of the typical establishment repair analysis to the 251xx chemical product. The first step entailed selecting a spectrum of representative plant sizes. Then, using the scaling factors of Table 7, the total repair effort for this mixture of establishments was calculated. By comparing the production of this assortment of plants with the total annual production of the chemical product, it was possible to calculate the repair effort required for the total production of the chemicals involved.

THE THE PARTY OF T

# Repair Estimates for the 281x Industries

The extrapolation of the repair efforts for the 281xx chemical products to the 281x industries was performed using the 1965 annual production of each industry as the basis for the integration procedure. For the 2812 industry, a simple ratio of the annual production of the chlorine/caustic industry to the total 2812 industry annual production was used to extrapolate the repair estimates. A similar procedure for the 2813 industry used the production of oxygen, nitrogen, and argon relative to the total 2813 industry production.

A somewhat different procedure was employed in ascertaining the repair effort for the 2818 industry. While ethylene is the largest volume chemical produced in the 2818 industry, it also utilizes one of the simpliest processes of the industry in manufacturing its product. Therefore, to take into account the increased complexity of the rest of the 2818 industry, the repair effort for the ethylene plant was doubled, and the ratio of its production to 2818 industry production was used to arrive at the final repair effort for the total industry. The factor of 2 was derived by comparing the price per ton of ethylene to

URS 687-4 67

the average price per ton of the total production of all chemicals of the 2818 industry.

Extrapolation of the typical plant results to the 2819 industry was somewhat more complicated. Since both liquid and solid chemicals are produced in the 2819 industry, the sulfuric acid industry was used to represent the liquid chemicals portion of the industry (except for ammonia) and ammonium nitrate was used to represent the solid chemicals portion. The ammonia industry is unique and represents a sizable segment of the 2819 industry (11 percent); therefore, it was given special consideration. The ammonia process, which is classified in the 2819 industry, is more representative of a petrochemical process, and therefore the ethylene plant was used to represent it. These three typical industries were then extrapolated to the 2819 industry by using their respective repair efforts and the ratio of the liquid chemicals, solid chemicals, and ammonia production to the total 2819 industry production.

Results of the integration process for the 281x industries are shown in Figure 10 for the 2812, 2813, 2818, and 2819 industries. The relationship between repair effort and overpressure levels was found to fit the mathematical model expressed in eq. 4; the curves shown in Figure 10 (with their corresponding parameters) are based on this mathematical expression.

#### Repair Estimates for the 281 Industry Group

Two of the six industries (2815 and 2816) that make up the 281 industry group were not analyzed in detail in this study, since they are a part of the 281 industry; however, approximations as to their repair efforts were required. It was assumed that the repair effort for these two industries would be proportional to the total repair effort of the other four industries that were investigated. The extrapolation procedure was similar to that used previously. The ratios of the annual production (in tons) of the 2815 and 2816 industries to that of the total 281 industry group were multiplied by the summation of the repair effort for the other four industries to obtain the total repair efforts for both the 2815 and 2816 industries—equivalent to 7 percent of the total for the other four industries.

Table 3 shows for the six 281 industries, the repair effort in man-days for each industry per annual unit of output, and the repair effort in man-days for each industry as a function of the 1965 MVA of each industry. The results for the four industries (from Figure 10) were then summed over the 1 to 25 psi range of overpressures (plus the fixed 7 percent effort to account for the 2815 and 2816 industries) to arrive at the total repair efforts for the 281 industry group as a function of overpressure level (Figure 11). In these calculations, it was assumed that 90 percent of the preattack production capability is restored by the repair effort; this allows for the noncritical components that could account for 10 percent of production capacity (see Section II). The mathematical model (eq. 4) was the basis for the curve in Figure 11.

Figure 10

REPAIR EFFORT VERSUS DAMAGE LEVEL FOR THE 281x INDUSTRY GROUPS STUDIED




Table 8

REPAIR EFFORT FOR 281 INDUSTRY GROUP


Ropair Effort for Industry in Man-Days Por \$1,000 MVA**	1.81	2.16	0.67	0.18	0.08	0.78	0.00
Repair Effort for Industry in Man-Days Por Amual Ton**	. 040	.051	. 046	7.042	.105	.022	.048
Total Repair* Effort for Industry in Man-Days x 10 <sup>6</sup>	0.80	07.	0.30	00.00	3,46	1.62	6, 08
1965 MVA (Millions of \$)	442.0	352.0	087.6	320.8	3, 624.4	1,901,1	7,290.8
1966 Production of Chemicals (Millions of Tens)	19.9	15.0	9.8	1.4	32.0	08.4	1.45. 9
Industry by SIC Code	2812	2813	2815	2810	2818	2819	Total

\* Ropair offort at dolta damage lovol.

€.

<sup>\*\*</sup> The figures presented in these two columns could be used for repair effort for segments of the industry.

Figure 11 REPAIR EFFORT VERSUS DAMAGE LEVEL FOR THE 281 INDUSTRY GROUP



DAMAGE LEVEL - pai

URS 687-4 71

### Repair Effort for 281 Industry Group Based on Geographical Distribution

Based on the geographical distribution discussion of Section I, it might be expected that a nuclear attack concentrated on the SMSAs would leave approximately 30 percent of the 281 industry group production capability unscathed. The repair effort required for such an attack may be discussed in terms of Figure 11 to give the following example: assuming that all exposed establishments in the 281 industry group experience a damage level of 3 psi, the total required repair effort would be approximately 900,000 man-days. If the overpressure level were raised to 4 psi, the repair effort required would nearly double to over 1.5 million man-days.

## Comparison of Repair Effort with New Construction Effort

For the electric utility industry, it was found [1] that the maximum repair effort required after nuclear attack approached new construction effort (not including site preparation but including debris removal). To check this parameter for the chemical industry, the data shown in Table 9 were assembled for four of the five typical plants studied. In all but one case, maximum repair effort costs exceeded the estimated new construction costs, reaching a maximum of 240 percent for a sulfuric acid plant. The reason for the wide variation (55 percent to 240 percent) is not immediately apparent, but, when plotted (Figure 12) the complexity of the plant (as measured by capital cost in dollars per ton per day of rated capacity) is found to vary regularly with the ratio of repair effort to capital cost. Figure 12 can be used to make gross approximations of maximum repair effort when only plant size and capital costs are known, affording a useful tool for estimation purposes when little information is available. For example, if the cost of a given plant were known to be \$5,000 per ton/day of rated capacity, the estimated maximum repair effort would be (Figure 12):

$$0.0040 \frac{\text{man-days}}{\$} \times \$5,000 = 20 \text{ man-days (per ton/day of capacity)}$$

The data from Table 9 and Figure 12 serve to confirm the validity of our repair estimates since we find, as with the gas and electric utilities, that maximum repair effort costs approach or exceed new construction costs. For cases in which repair effort exceeds new construction effort appreciably, it is hypothesized that we are dealing with components that are readily constructed initially but are most difficult to re-structure after damage. Similarly, for some items of equipment, perhaps even for entire plants, it may be necessary to decide whether complete razing might not be most advantageous when damage

REPAIR EFFORT AS A FUNCTION OF TOTAL PLANT COST

	(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (6) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7	Fraction of New Construction Cost	0. 63	1.60	1.00	2.40
1200	(1) Ropair Effort	Costs (\$ per T/13)#	1180	1170	001-1	ሳትሳ
TOTAL TOTAL	CO / CO	as a Fraction of Costs Capital Cost (\$ per 1/19)#	0,000081	0.003140	0.001950	0.004500
METAIN REPORT AS A FONCTION OF TOTAL FLAME COST	9	Ropalr Effort (man-days por T/19)†	31.4	33.0	97. d	11.6
METALIK EFFOR	© Now Construction	Labor Costs (\$ per T/D)**	2,240	736	1,340	181
	Θ	Capital Costs (\$ per T/D)*	12,000	10,500	10,200	2, 580
		Plant	Chlorine- Caustic	Oxygon	Ethylono	Sulfuric Acid


\* Data from Rof. 26 with plant size changed, where necessary, to correspond to the plants of Table 8.

\*\* Based on labor costs being 7 percent of capital cost for construction [18].

† Based on maximum repair effort (from Table 8) for typical size plants.

† Based on labor costs of \$4.70/hr [18].

Figure 12
PLANT REPAIR EFFORT/TOTAL COST AS A FUNCTION OF TOTAL COST



RATIO, MAXIMUM REPAIR EFFORT - ann-days per ton per day

CAPITAL COST - dollars per ton per day

is severe. (Of course, razing would not apply to underground components and foundations which could be salvaged.)

Another check on the magnitude of our repair estimates can be made by comparing the maximum repair effort for the SIC 281 group (13.2 x 10° manuays from Figure 11) to the normal, enguing construction activity of the SIC 281 group. Using the 1965 figures for capital construction costs [4] and a labor-to-construction ratio [18], it was possible to compute the actual man-days of labor that went into the new construction effort. The results are given in Table 10 which shows that the new construction effort in 1965 was approximately 20 percent of the maximum repair effort that would be required for the 281 industry group. In other words, if the "normal," undamaged capability of the chemical construction industry could somehow be directed to reconstructing the heavily damaged SIC 281 industry, the required repair time would be approximately 5 years.

Table 10

COMPARISON OF 1965 CONSTRUCTION EFFORT IN THE
281 INDUSTRY GROUP WITH REPAIR EFFORT

281 Industry Group	Man-Days of New Construction Effort in 1965* (103)	Repair Effort in Man-Days at 25 psi (10 <sup>5</sup> )	Ratio of New Construction Effort to Maximum Repair Effort
2812	139	1,350	0.103
2813	167	1,320	0.127
2815	151	730	0.206
2816	29	119	0.243
2818	1,520	6,860	0.222
2819	694	2,878	0.216
Total	2,619	13,209	6_197

<sup>\*</sup> Excludes man-days required for foundation work and painting and in-plant employees engaged in routine repair activities. Typically this latter force is small and would not increase the "New Construction Effort" total appreciably.

### Comparison of Results

Advanced Research, Inc. has conducted two studies [14,26] dealing with damage and repair of manufacturing industries—the food industry group (SIC-20) and the petroleum industry group (SIC-29). Although the food and chemical groups have little in common, some equipment is similar (e.g., heat exchangers, storage tanks, vacuum filters etc.). However, it was impossible to compare results of the above study with those obtained in this study, for two reasons: the repair estimates concentrated mainly on building repair with little emphasis on equipment, and even when repair estimates for equipment of interest were given, they were only gross estimates.

The petroleum industry group is similar to the petrochemical industry (SIC 2815) and employs comparable equipment in its processes. Although the Advanced Research study of petroleum refinerics [14] concentrated on damage and repair of equipment, it was very difficult to compare results since a number of specific items of auxilliary equipment (e.g., heat exchanger) were not enumerated by Advanced Research for the processes they studied. In only two cases was direct comparison possible; in these cases the repair efforts reported by Advanced Research for repair of cylindrical storage tanks and a cooling tower checked within 20 percent of the repair efforts for similar size equipment derived in this study. In a third case, by making some assumptions as to auxilliary equipment, it was possible to compare results for an 80,000 barrel/day crude still\*; in this case, the Advance Research results were a factor of 2 higher than our results. Aithough these comparisons indicate reasonably good agreement for the cases cited, the Advanced Research results for the petroleum industry are of limited usefulness for our purposes because of the lack of identification of process equipment and the failure to include information on support and auxilliary components (such as controls, utilities, and pipe racks).

A recent SRI study, a part of the National Entity Survival (NES) Study [27] investigated repair effort as a function of damage for various manufacturing segments of the economy. Included in this study was the SIC 28 major group (chemicals and allied products) of which the SIC 281 industry group is a part. By using the ratio of the SIC 281 MVA to the MVA of the SIC 28 major group, it was possible to derive a repair effort for the SIC 281 industry group that could be compared with the results of this study. The outcome of this comparison shows that the SRI results, based on repair efforts (in man-days) per \$1,000 MVA, were a factor of 2.2 and 2.6 greater for overpressures of 3.4 psi and 5.5 psi, respectively, than

<sup>\*</sup> The crude still precess was assumed to consist of two towers or columns, various heat exchangers, pumps, and piping.

76 URS 687-4

were the results of the present study. This agreement is remarkably good for estimates based on two such different bases. The present results have greater validity, however, for they are based on detailed analyses rather than, as for the NES results, on the extrapolation of limited data to a related, but nonhomogeneous, industry (i.e., SIC 28 group). The current findings, especially the considerably lower repair effort, should be incorporated into the NES study as soon as possible.

VII

TIME-PHASED REPAIR AND SKILLS

VII

TIME-PHASED REPAIR AND SKILES

The time-phased repair analysis was performed to determine repair requirements in terms of both man-days and manpower skill classification. It also provided information on the number of workers required during any given work period (8-hour shift) and how their skills would be scheduled throughout the course of the repair program.

The time-phased repair sequence was prepared for the five typical establishments at the delta damage level for each plant, that is, at the overpressure level for which 50 percent of the maximum repair effort is required.

### Procedure

The Repair Analysis Sheets (Appendix E), the mathematical models for each typical plant, and the experienced judgment of the Rogers Engineering staff, provided the basis for time and manpower skill schedules. It was necessary to balance such factors as crew size, working space, type of repair, equipment requirements, and job completion time to arrive at realistic repair schedules. From such basic information, time-phasing for repair of each plant was estimated and total manpower requirements for each plant was determined. These time-phase repair sequences were estimated only for qualified work crews and assumed availability of specialized equipment, replacement parts, and supplies.

Since most chemical plants are relatively small in area, uniform overpressure levels throughout the plant were assumed. Only the critical and semicritical chemical and auxiliary components were considered for the time-phased repair analysis in each typical establishment. As indicated in Section VI, disregard for the non-critical components implies that plants are restored to only 90 percent of their pre-attack production capability.

### Results

Figures 13 through 17 present the work schedules by skill for each of the typical plants at their delta damage levels. The results have been presented as the total number of S-hour work shifts required for each labor skill; thus, the total elapsed time required to repair a typical plant could be determined by deciding how many work shifts per day would be usefully employed.

Figure 13
TIME-PHASED REPAIR FOR CHLORINE-CAUSTIC PLANT AT 5 PSI

LABOR SKILL						NUM	BER OF	SHIFTS	5	
CLASSIFICATION		10	20	30	4	0	50		60	70
Boilermakers				4	Number of	Men per	Shift			
Bricklayers							,			
Carpenters				. 2						
Electricians			5	,	4		3	- 10	4	
Equipment Operators	14	16		1	5	7	1			
Insulators								1		
Ironworkers		20		22	34	29	,	4		
Laborers			•	4				6		
Millwrights					3					•
Pipe Fitters	20	22	2	3	26		32	22	2	
Riggers	28	29	28		29	2 <b>7</b>	21	24	4	
Truck Drivers			1							
Welders, Certified				·	5	6	4			
Welders		20	21	20	27	18		6		
TOTALS										

NOTE: Shift length = 8 hour, i.e., 1 man-day = 8 man hour.

UMBER OF SH	IFTS				TOTAL MAN-	PERCENT	MEN PER SHIF	
50	60	70	80	90	DAYS OF SKILL REQUIRED	OF EFFORT	AVER- AGE	MAXI- MUM
per Shift					88	1	4	4
1					8	< 1	1	1
					40	<1	2	2
3	10 4			,	287	4	5.3	10
7 1					696	10	13.4	16
, 1					21	<1	1	1
29	4			•	1,280	18	20.6	34
	6				272	4	4.4	6
					15	<1	3	3
32 22	2 2				1,399	20	21.5	32
7 21 24	. 4				1,592	23	24.5	29
					6	<1	1	1
4					112	2	5.3	, 6
13 6					1,126	16	18.2	27
					6,942		125.2	

Figure 14

TIME-PHASED REPAIR FOR LIQUID AIR PLANT AT 9 PSI

LABOR SKILL								NUMBER	OF SHIF	TS	
CLASSIFICATION		10		20	3	0	40		50	60	70
Carpenters				2 Nun	nber of	Men p	er Shift	,			
Electricians		12	11	8		10	7	6		2	
Equipment Operators	4 .	8			2			1			
Insulators					,		9		4	1	
Ironworkers		5		7	5		3				
Laborers	8	ļ	4	6		4					
Millwrights		1			2						
Pipe Fitters		22		18		22	15	8	4	4	
Riggers		6			8		2				
Truck Drivers			1								
Welders, Certified		9		16			5		2		
Welders	4	9	6	8	6		1				
TOTALS											

NOTE: Shift length = 8 hour, i.e., 1 man-day = 8 man hour.

NU	MBER OF S	SHIFTS		w t		TOTAL MAN-	PERCENT	MEN PI	ER SHIFT
	50	60	70	80	90	DAYS OF SKILL REQUIRED	OF EFFORT	AVER- AGE	MAXI-
						80	2.3	2	2
:	6	2				419	14	7.1	12
1					,	155	5	3.4	8
i	4	1				202	7	5.6	9
		1				230	7	3.6	7
						196	6	5.6	8
						79	3	1.9	2
	8	4				854	28	14.5	22
						226	7	6.5	8
						25	1	1	1
		2				383	12	6.5	10
						235	8	5.2	9
						3,084		62.9	

Figure 15
TIME-PHASED REPAIR FOR ETHYLENE PLANT AT 7 PSI

LABOR SKILL					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		NUMBER	OF SHIF	TS .	
CLASSIFICATION	<b></b>	3	0	20	30	40	5	0	60	70
Boilermakers				•	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	8 Nun	nber of Me	n per Shi	fi	- ;
Boilermokers* Helpers						4				
Bricklayers									<b>32</b>	, se
Carpenters					•		. <b>8</b>			
Electricions			.23	-	,	<b>1</b> 2				13
Equipment Operators	: (	ş	. * <b>9</b>	6		4		1.		
Insulators					-	6			8	; ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
Ironworkers	;	4	12	13.		12		11	j3	- 8
Loborers	40			-	. <b>8</b> .			-		9.
Millwrights	( · · ·	2-		Î.					-	2
Pipe Fitters			<b>38</b> ,	40	<u>.</u> .	3	8	-	<b>33</b>	
Rīggers		2	.5	4				1 -		jo §
Truck Drivers	 2-	z	• •	-			<b>. 2</b>		:	- P
Welders, Certified			24	27	25		24		16	
Welders	e, <b>4</b> ,	.12		7.		4		·8 <del>··</del>		13
TOTALS								-		

NOTE: Shift length = 8 hour, i.e., 1 mon-day = 8 mon hour.

NUMBER OF SH	IFTS				TOTAL MAN-	PERCENT	MEN PE	R SHIFT
50	60	70 L	80 1	90	DAYS OF SKILL REQUIRED	OF EFFORT	AVER- AGE	MAXI- MUM
er of Men per S	hift				504	5	8	8
					32	<1	4	4
	32		-		1,310	12	32	32
8	**************************************			-	736	7	8	8
		1ã	-	4	1,033	9	12	23
E i			5		459	4	5.2	9
-	8.		6	2	416	4	6.1	8
- 12	13		2	•	703	6	7.6	13
	٠.	Š	-		944	8	10.5	40
		2			117	1	1.8	2
	33		9	8	2,482	22	28.5	40
1.	,	-10		2	367	3	5.6	10
2			•		180	2	2	2
24	16	•	4	-	1,509	14	17.3	27
8	7.* · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1.			382	3	4.3	12
					11,174		1,539	

Figure 16
TIME-PHASED REPAIR FOR AMMONIUM NITRATE AT 6 PSI

					The production of the second	
LABOR SKILL "				Ν	UMBER OF SHIFTS	
CLASSIFICATION	10	20	30	40 1	50 60	70
Boilermakers	2 Number	of Men per Shif	t			
Bricklayers	Ī,					
Carpenters		gen i sige	2			
Electricians	4	<b>6</b> <sup>4</sup> (1) (1) (4)	3	2		
Equipment Operators	7 4 3					
Insulators	1	<b>3</b>				
Ironworkers	9	5 <sub>2</sub> 13 3 2				
Laborers	2	1 2				
Millwrights		.1		s		
Pipe Fitters	2 10	8	4 1 2 2 2	2		
Riggers	2 4	2				
Welder, Certified	3 6	4	1			
Welders	8	4 2				
TOTALS				y <b>a</b> s		

NOTE: Shift length = 8 hour, i.e., 1 man-day = 8 man hour.

R OF SH	IFTS				TOTAL MAN-	PERCENT	MEN P	ER SHIFT
50	60	70 L	80 	90 I	DAYS OF SKILL REQUIRED	OF EFFORT	AVER- AGE	MAXI- MUM
					10	>1	2	2
					5	>0.5	1	1
					30	3	2	2
					130	12	3.6	6
					90	8	4.7	7
		-			. 40	4	1.7	3
					171	16	5.5	9
					32	3	1.5	2
					30	3	1	1
					220	21	5.5	10
					62	6	2.4	4
			<del>-</del>		109	10	3.2	6
					138	13	5.3	8
					1,067		39.4	

Figure 17

TIME-PHASED REPAIR FOR SULFURIC ACID PLANT AT 8 PSI

LABOR SKILL							NUME	BER OF S	HIFTS		
CLASSIFICATION	10		20	,	30	41	0	50	60		70 1
Carpenters	5						4 N	umber of	Men per S	Shift	
Electricians				7		8	4		10		6
Equipment Operators	10		8	9		10			6	4	
Insulators							12			2	
Ironworkers			10				14	1	1	3	
Laborers	5		12		9		8		4		
Millwrights		3		8				2			
Pipe Fitters	8	36	3	39		38	18	16	24	14	6
Riggers			10	11		8	. <b>.</b>	. <b>7</b>		6	
Welders, Certified				14				4			
Welders	10			11			10		4	2	
TOTALS											

NOTE: Shift length = 8 hour, i.e., 1 man-day = 8 man hour.

NUMBER OF	SHIFTS			TOTAL MAN-	PERCENT	MEN PI	ER SHIF	
50 1	60	70 1	80	90	DAYS OF SKILL REQUIRED	OF EFFORT	AVER- AGE	MAXI-
4 Number o	f Men per Sh	ift			298	4.8	4.3	5
4	10	6			366	5.9	6.9	10
	6	4.		,	574	9.2	8.2	10
2		2			322	5.2	7.0	12
14	11	3			674	10.8	9.6	14
	4				465	7.5	6.6	12
2					221	3.5	3.6	8
18 16	24	14 6			1,815	29.1	25.2	39
7	,	6			416	6.6	8.0	31
4					526	8.3	9.7	14
1	4	2			571	9.2	8.2	11
					6,248		97.3	

ûRS 687-å 91

Figure 13 represents the time-phased work schedule for the chlorine-caustic plant at the 5 psi damage level. The plant required 66 work shifts to complete repair and used 14 different labor skills. Riggers, pipe fitters, and ironworkers represented 61 percent of the total work force.

Figure 14 depicts the oxygen plant time-phased repair sequence at the 9 psi damage level. Sixty-four work shifts were needed to repair the plant and 12 separate skills were used. Pipe fitters, electricians, and certified welders constituted 54 percent of the total work force.

Figure 15 illustrates the time-phased repair sequence for the ethylene plant at the 7 psi delta damage level. Fifteen separate labor skills and 98 work shifts were required. Pipe fitters, certified welders and bricklayers constituted 47 percent of the total work force.

Figure 16 indicates the time-phased repair sequence for the ammonium nitrate plant at the 6 psi delta damage level. Forty-two work shifts and 13 separate labor skills were needed to place the ammonium nitrate plant back in operation. Pipe fitters, ironworkers, and welders represented 50 percent of the total work force.

Figure 17 illustrates the time-phased repair sequence for the sulfuric acid plant at the S psi delta damage level. Seventy-six work shifts and 11 labor skills were needed to repair the sulfuric acid plant. Pipe fitters, ironworkers, and equipment operators constituted 50 percent of the total work force.

The ethylene plant repairs required the longest time period while the ammonium nitrate plant required the least time to restore production. The number of different skills required for repair varied for each of the typical establishments; however, 11 of the 15 labor skills utilized were common to all five typical plants. Pipe fitters accounted for at least 20 percent of the total repair effort in all of the typical plants, with ironworkers and both classifications of welders the next most important skills. The time-phased repair sequences are based on having the required labor skills available; if alternate skills would have to be used, the time periods needed to repair the plant would increase.

### Critical Skills

The time-phased sequencing has shown which labor skills would be in the greatest demand, that is, which skills would have to centribute the greatest manpower to repair the 281 industry group. This is one definition of a critical skill; however, a more accurate indication of a critical skill would be the percentage of the total manpower pool of a given skill required to repair the industry. For this study, this was ascertained by extrapolating the delineated labor skills in the time-phased, typical plant sequences to the 281x industry which each typical establishment

92 URS 687 -4

represented. The extrapolation was carried out on the basis of annual production of the typical establishment versus the annual production of respective industry.\* The availability of a specific labor skill (the total number practicing that labor skill in the United States) was based on the United States 1969 Census of Population, Detailed Characteristics [28]. Eight categories of labor skills were examined for their criticality instead of the 14 labor skills used in the time-phased sequencing. Six labor skills were not included for two reasons: (1) the total demand of some of these skills was less than one percent of the total skilled manpower (for example, millwrights), or (2) the census data either did not delineate that specific skill or combined it with another skill (for example, welders were not listed in their various subclassifications).

### 231x Industries

Figure 18 illustrates the relative criticality of various labor skills in the 2812, 2813, 2818, and 2819 industries. The figure is based on all establishments of each industry damaged to the delta damage level and the availability of preattack quantities of labor skills as shown in Table 11. Equipment operators/riggers and ironworkers are the two most critical skills in the 2812 and 2813 industries. Boilermakers are the most critical in the 2818 industry (almost 25 percent of the boilermakers in this country would be required to repair that industry). In the 2819 industry, boilermakers, equipment operators/riggers, and ironworkers are the most critical.


### 281 Industry

Figure 19 summarized the critical skills of the 281 industry group and includes subgroup industries 2815 and 2816. The subgroup inclusion was based on their annual production and its ratio to the annual production of the 281 industry group. It was assumed that these two industries would require the same distribution of skilled labor as the other four industries studied. Figure 19 is based on all establishments of the 281 industry damaged at the delta damage level versus the presitack availability of the eight different skills. Three labor skills—boilermakers, equipment operators, riggers and ironworkers—each had to supply over 25 percent of their preattack labor force to repair the 281 industry group.

<sup>\*</sup> The 2819 industry includes the manufacture of both liquid and solid chemicals. Ammonium nitrate was used to represent the solid chemicals portion (approximately 67 percent) of the 2819 industry on an annual production basis. Sulfuric acid (approximately 21 percent) was used to represent the liquid chemicals portion of the 2819 industry production, except for ammonia manufacture. Ammonia, which accounts for 12 percent of the 2819 industry annual production, was approximated by using the ethylene plant that contains chemical equipment modules more representative of ammonia manufacture than the other 2819 establishments.


Figure 18

REQUIREMENTS FOR CRITICAL SKILLS FOR THE SIC 281x INDUSTRY GROUP
FOR DELTA DAMAGE LEVEL



FERCENT OF TOTAL NATIONAL PREATTACK SKILLED LABOR REQUIRED TO REPAIR INDUSTRY

Assumed: 100 percent of industry severely damaged, no skilled later cascalites



Assumed: 100 percent of Industry severely damaged, no skilled labor casualities

REQUIREMENTS FOR CRITICAL SKILLS FOR THE SIC 281 INDUSTRY GROUP FOR DELTA DAMAGE LEVEL Figure 19

Table 11

### 1960 U.S. CENSUS DETAILED CHARACTERISTICS

	Total No. in U.S. A.		Total No. in U.S.A.
Boilermakers	23,713	Ironworkers	57,987
Bricklayers	191,169	Pipe Fitters	303,541
Carpenters	816,195	Welders (certified and	
Electricians	334,732	others)	344,385
Equipment Operators and Riggers	123,335		


### Parametric Analysis of Industry Destroyed and Population Killed

The previous figures assumed that all establishments of the industry were damaged to the median damage level and all of the preattack industrial population was available for making repairs. A more realistic appraisal would assume a mix between these two states, that is, certain percentage of the industry destroyed versus a certain percentage of population killed. The Lambda Corporation [29] derived a relationship for fraction of population killed versus fraction of industry destroyed for various levels of nuclear attack. Figure 20 depicts this relationship. Utilizing this information, a parametric analysis was performed to determine the impact of labor availability versus industries destroyed. Three attack levels-500 mt, 1,000 mt, and 2,000 mt-were used, and corresponded to three population versus industry mixes indicated by the dashed lines on Figure 20. Figure 21 illustrates the results of this parametric analysis. In the worst case (the 2,000 mt attack), over 50 percent of the surviving boilermakers, ironworkers, and equipment operators/riggers would be required to repair the 281 chemical industry group. As indicated in the Introduction, the degradation of demand for chemicals as a result of the attack is not considered and it is assumed that skilled labor experiences the same casualty rate as the general population.

The basic chemical industry, although essential to the economy of the country, represents only a small segment of the total manufacturing capability of the United States. The MVA for the 281 chemical industry group was approximately 3 percent of the MVA for the entire U.S. manufacturing industry in 1963. However, during the same year the 281 industry group did account for 6.5 percent of the Manufacturing Industries New Construction [30].

The percent of labor skills normally employed in the 281 industry group is indicated by the shaded area of the bar graphs in Figure 21 as a percentage of

Figure 20
FRACTION OF UNSHELTERED DAYTIME POPULATION KILLED AND INDUSTRY DESTROYED FOR DIFFERENT ATTACK OBJECTIVES



FRACTION OF INDUSTRY DESTROYED

SOURCE: Lambéa Corporation (Reference 29).




Figure 21
PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRY DAMAGE VERSIJS LABOR SKILLS SURVIVING FOR 281 PNDUSTRY GROUP

survivors. For example, using the 2,000 mt attack in which 44 percent of the population survives, 6 percent of the surviving pipe fitters would represent the number of pipe fitters normally used in the 281 industry group for construction and maintenance. The remaining 24 percent of the surviving pipe fitters would have to be taken from other industries or jobs in order to repair the basic chemical industry. Under these conditions, it would appear that seven of the eight labor skills could be considered critical, and boilermakers, equipment operators/riggers, and ironworkers would head this list. It is interesting to note that under the straight time-phased sequencing of labor skills (based on the required number of men of any one skill) pipe fitters and welders were most in demand. However, personnel possessing these skills are more numerous and the demand would be less critical than that for the other labor skills.

Based on the previous figures,\* it appears that the supply of certain labor skills would be inadequate to meet the demand in the postattack period, and that a source of alternative labor skills would be needed to perform the necessary repair tasks. However, we have not made a rigorous analysis of consumer demands for chemicals—that being outside the scope of the contract—so that the results given here are for maximum repair efforts required. A further study is needed to delineate, for several national attack conditions, the actual repair effort required to meet the surviving consumer demand. In a previous study [1], a qualitative examination of this problem indicated that part of this postattack demand for skilled labor could be met by people who possessed a latent skill through former occupation not declared in the current census. To delineate this latent capability, research in this area would be very important. Other alternatives would involve selective repair of a limited number of establishments or an elengation of the time scale for repair with the available manpower.


Typically, the majority of chemical plant expansion and construction is performed by the construction industry. With the heavy damage that could be expected following a nuclear attack, the chemical industry, lacking the capability to perform necessary repairs itself, would have to rely on the construction industry to supply the men and equipment required. Therefore, a further indication of critical skills and the magnitude of the repair problem can be ascertained by comparing the postattack demand for labor skills that the 281 industry group would place on the construction industry.

Figure 22 presents the results of an analysis showing the percent demand of surviving skilled labor employed in the construction industry that would be required to repair the 281 industry under the 1,000 mt attack levit conditions (Figure 20). The surviving labor skills in the construction industry were derived from the preattack quantity of labor skills [31]. As indicated, there would be an

<sup>\*</sup> In the recent National Entity Survival study [27], SRI stated that only a small fraction of the surviving labor force was required to restore the damage to the manufacturing industries. However, as the results of the critical skill analysis show, the type of labor (boilermaker, pipe fitter, or welder) is of greater importance than the total manpower available; thus even though SRI indicated a surplus of labor in general, a serious deficiency of skilled labor would exist postattack.

Figure 22

DEMAND ON THE SURVIVING LABOR SKILLS TO REPAIR THE 281 INDUSTRY GROUP



100 URS 687-4

insufficient number of survivors in three labor skills (boilermakers, equipment operators, and welders) to meet the demand from the chemical industry, and two other skills (pipe fitters and ironworkers) require more than 30 percent of the construction industries' surviving supply. This means that the construction industry would be unable to meet the demands of the chemical industry (disregarding damage to any other segment of the manufacturing industry) and other sources of skilled labor would have to be found.

vIII

andani akadameranterbengenterbengen padan akadamiki "Arebanan perijen padan panabanakan laheran bengerbenga

PROTECTIVE ACTIONS
AND
PREATTACK PLANNING

VIII

PROTECTIVE ACTIONS
AND
PREATTACK PLANNING

The type of chemical plant and its relative location would determine the degree of damage caused by a nuclear attack. It is pertinent, therefore, to consider the type of damage that could be expected at various overpressure levels, alternate modes of operation to re-establish the plant on line, any supply and equipment constraints germain to a typical plant, and preattack planning and protective actions a plant might undertake to improve its survivability under nuclear attack.

### Chlorine-Caustic Plant

At very low overpressures (i to 2 psi), the chlorine/caustic plant would suffer only minor damage, the most extensive would be the collapse of cylindrical storage tank roofs; the cooling tower, control system, and vacuum filters also would suffer minor damage. Although the plant itself would require some 1,000 man-days of repair effort, the greater part of this period would be spent in the repair of the storage tank roofs; this probably would not prevent plant start-up within two weeks after the attack.

At overpressure levels between 3 and 5 psi, more serious damage would occur. The disphragm cells and chlorine dryer would be severely damaged and insperable, the control cubicles and cooling tower would be destroyed, and the electrical system and vacuum filters would sustain heavy damage. The plant repair effort would require between 4,000 to 6,000 man-days and would be shut down for more than two months. At overpressure levels of greater than 8 psi, the plant would be considered destroyed and repair would be infeasible except under extraordinary circumstances. Canaibalization of some chemical equipment (heat exchanges, pumps, and compressors), however, might be possible and be of particular value when secondary efforts (such as fire and explosion) has caused scattered damage.

### Oxygen Plant

At low everpressure (1 to 2 psi), damage to the liquid oxygen plant would be restricted to the controls and cooling tower. The plant would require only 100 max-days to repair and probably would be in operation within a week. At 3 to 5 psi, the plant would suffer light to maximum damage, with the controls and cooling tower destroyed and the electric system damaged. Restoration of the plant to an

104 URS 687-4

operating condition would require from three hundred to six hundred man-days and would take several weeks to complete. At higher overpressures (between 6 and 9 psi), the plant would suffer severe damage, with the loss of piping and pipe racks, destruction of the electrical system, and heavy damage to distillation columns, electric motor drives, and refrigeration units. Two to three thousand man-days over six to eight weeks would be required to restore the plant. Overpressure levels in excess of 12 psi would make the plant infeasible to repair, as the majority of equipment would be destroyed; however, compressors, pumps, and heat exchangers probably could be salvaged.

### Sthylene Plant

At low overpressure levels (between 1 and 2 psi), the ethylene plant would sustain light damage. However, the large cracking beaters necessary for the production of ethylene would be seriously damaged and the plant as a whole would require up to 3,000 man-days and six to eight weeks for complete repair. At somewhat bigher overpressure levels (between 3 and 5 psi), the ethylene plant would suffer light to medium damage; the cracking heaters, control cubicles, and cooling tower would be destroyed and the electrical system damaged. Five to six thousand man-days of re, air effort would be required to repair the plant and production would be halted for at least 10 to 12 weeks. At overpressure levels between 6 and 8 psi, severe damage would occur. Distillation columns and piping and pipe racks would be severely damaged or destroyed, electric motors would be damaged, and 12,000 to 14,000 man-days of repair effort would be required. At overpressure levels greater than 10 psi, repair of the plant would be infeasible, although compressors, pumps, and heat exchangers probably could be salvaged.

### Ammonium Nitrate Plant

At low overpressure levels (1 to 2 psi), the ammonium nitrate plant would surtain light damage. The equipment elements damaged would be the atmospheric storage tanks, the control system, and the cooling tower. The repair effort would not exceed 200 man-days and would require only one to two weeks. At higher overpressure levels (between 3 and 5 psi), the plant would suffer moderate damage with the cooling tower and controls destroyed, and the package boilers, electrical system, solids storage bins, and barometric condensor suffering severe damage. Six hundred man-days of repair effort over a period of several weeks would be required. At overpressure levels between 6 and 8 psi, the plant would suffer severe damage; reactor vessels would be damaged, the conveying system destroyed, and the piping, package boiler, rotary kiles, and prilling tower severely damaged. Repair would require up to 1,690 man-days and six to eight weeks. Overpressure levels greater than 9 or 10 psi would make the plant

URS 687-4

infeasible to repair, although pumps, heat exchangers, and pressure vessels might be cannibalized.

### Sulfurie Acid Plant

At the 1 to 2 psi overpressure levels, damage to the sulfuric acid plant would be limited to the acid storage tanks, the control system, and the cooling towers. This damage would require over 1,000 man-days and over four weeks to repair. At higher overpressures (between 3 to 5 psi), the plant would suffer light to moderate damage. The storage tanks, cooling tower, and control cubicles would be destroyed and the electrical system and air blower damaged. The repair effort would require from 1,500 to 2,000 man-days over a period of six to eight weeks. At overpressure levels between 6 and 9 psi, the sulfuric acid plant would sustain severe damage. The acid absorbers, converters, and towers would be severely damaged and the piping, electrical system, and air blower would be destroyed. Six thousand to 8,000 man-days of repair effort would be required during a period of three to four months. At overpressure levels in excess of 12 psi, repair of the sulfuric acid plant would be infeasible; however, heat exchangers, steam turbine drives, and acid coolers might be salvageable.

Table 12 lists secondary hazards, supply and equipment constraints, alternate operating procedures, and possible damage due to uncontrolled shut-down for the five typical establishment studied.

### 281 Industry

The 281 basic chemical industry group could reduce its overall vulnerability to damage from a nuclear weapon attack by judicious planning and preventive measures. Preattack plans should include procedures on a safe, orderly shutdown of the plant's chemical processes, provisions for specific employees to be sheltered on the premises (to handle postattack contingencies), and procedures for taking precautionary actions to protect the plant and equipment. Examples of precautionary actions that would help to reduce the vulnerability of a chemical plant are:

- Harden control rooms and controls whenever possible (using sandbags, etc.).
- Stud down plant in an orderly, systematic manner [32].
- Fill vessels and tanks with water or the product to increase resistance to overturning.

# Table 12

# ESTABLISHMENT TYPICAL CONSTRAINTS

Estublishmont	Secondary Hazards	a ans	Equipment and Supply Construints	1	Alternate Postatiack Operating Proceedures	Dumage Possible for Uncontrolled Shut-down
Chlorino-Caustle	Lonknge of CL <sub>2</sub> gns. Lonkngo of hot caustle	ન લં	<ol> <li>Carbon Anodos</li> <li>Nickel Compo-</li> </ol>	-i	Use one of three multiple offects evaporator, reduce eapnetty	Fouling and plugging of pipolines [32]
	solution		nonts	્રાં	Bypass barametric condonsor, reduce quality of product	
				<b>∷</b>	Bypass filtors in brino lino	
				₹	Use only three-fourths of acid driers	
Onygon	Liquid oxygon	7.	Collulubo	ä	Bynass compressors	None*
	enuse explo-	ο <b>3</b>	Comprossor		oxygon	
	ulon		Parts	21	Bypass dryors in air intake line will lower officionsy	
Ethylono	Fire from	1.	Compressor Parts	<b>-</b> i	Use only one dehydrater (reduces offlelency)	Wires and explosions [32]
	[33]					# : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :

(continued)

Table 12 (concluded)

Damage Possible for Uncontrolled Shut-down	None *			Corrosion, fouling, and plugging of pipelines [32]
Altornato Postatlack Oporating Procedures	<ol> <li>Bypaus one evaporator reduce eapacity</li> </ol>	2. Bypass conting drum – dogrados product	3. Bypass drying - roducos quality of product	1. Bypass ofthor drum or acid absorption towors could make only I grade of acid
Equipment and Supply Constraints	1. Stainloss Stool 1. Components	ខរិ	ä	
Socondary Hazards	Lonkago of ammonia or nitric acid			Lonkago of sulfurio acid or sulfur tri- oxido gas
ßstablishmont	Ammontum Nitrato			Sulfurio Aoid

\* Roasonable responses of safety equipment frequently with redundant functions shut these units down safely. The statistical possibility of a high order of safety equipment fallure exists. However, this is not considered significent.

Source: URS Corporation, Rogers Engineering Co., Inc.

• Utilize missile barricades (steel mesh screens) around equipment that could be severely damaged by missiles (for example, glass-lined reactors).

- Protect sight glasses on equipment containing chemicals that are explosion hazards [34].
- Isolate (by valving) all storage tanks and vessels to prevent fire spreading from one to another through interconnections.
- Tie down reactor vessels, transformers, etc., to increase resistance to overturning.

A weak-link approach to hardening should be undertaken, that is, harden those chemical equipment elements that would suffer damage at the lower overpressure levels. (Attempting to harden all equipment in a chemical plant to resist damage above 5 or 6 psi probably would prove both expensive and difficult.)

Certain alternate operating procedures have been described for the five typical establishments in this study. The use of these interim measures would reduce the efficiency and capacity of the chemical manufacturing process and in most cases would usually lower the quality of the final product. The reliability and safety of a chemical process also would be degraded through the use of these alternate procedures. However, through the use of these procedures it is possible to regain some production capability in a shorter period of time.

Some general alternate operating procedures that would be applicable throughout the basic chemical industry are:

- Automatic controls—when automatic controls have been damaged, an
  alternate procedure is to resort to manual operation. While this would
  increase the size of operating crews by a factor of three or four, manual
  controls would allow partial or full operation while an expedient control
  system was being rigged.
- Atmospheric storage tanks—when the roof on an atmospheric storage tank has been badly damaged, an immiscible floating liquid acting as a vapor barrier could be utilized in lieu of repair.
- Cooling tower—when a cooling tower has been completely destroyed, an
  alternate method of cooling can be arranged by bulldozing the debris of
  the cooling tower into the undamaged cooling tower basin and spraying
  the water over the debris. Although this expedient will considerably reduce the cooling capacity, it will return some cooling capability to a
  damaged plant.

URS 687-4 109

A nuclear attack on this country would undoubtedly disrupt the normal channels of supply and transportation. Equipment supply and spare part constraints have been discussed previously for each of the five typical establishments. How this would affect the resteration time of a basic chemical industry would be very difficult to quantify and is beyond the scope of this report. However, it would be reasonable to assume that many spare parts and replacement equipment would be extremely difficult (if not impossible) to secure in the aftermath of a nuclear attack. The option remaining would be cannibalization and salvage of chemical equipment from several different plants to reactivate one plant. This probably would be the most feasible method of restering production to the basic chemical industry.

#### Operation Versus Shut-down

The chemical equipment damage predictions and the secondary damage hazards tabulated in Table 12 were predicated on the assumption that the typical establishments were operating under normal conditions at the time of the nucleur attack. Insofar as blast-induced damage to chemical equipment is concerned, there appears to be no significant difference between the vulnerability of equipment in an operating condition versus a shut-down condition; however, vessels or tanks supported on columns will fail at lower overpressures if emptice of contents. (Demage estimates were performed for tanks and vessels in the full and energy condition and are notated as such in the damage/repair catalog, Appendix E.) A more important aspect [32], however, is the nature of the chemicals contained in the equipment when subjected to blast overpressures. Many of the chemicals manufactured in the basic chemical industry are noxicus, toxic, or flammable; if allowed to leak or spill to the atmosphere, serious secondary hazards could be created that would cause more severe damage to a plant and its personnel than would have been predicted by blast levels alone. Thus, precautivary measures would shut down a chemical plant prior to a nuclear attack, with pipelines and equipment being drained of their contents and water or some other inert fluids substituted in vessels, tanks, and distillation columns. This is a safety measure practiced in some areas of the country when a hurricane is expected [37].

Another possible hazard that was investigated briefly is the possibility of certain chemicals within tanks or vessels detonating when the tank or vessel containing the chemical is struck by missiles. However, the explosive susceptibility of chemicals is complicated and published information is limited mainly to those chemicals commonly classed as explosives [35 and 36].

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

IX

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

#### Damage/Repair Catalog for Equipment

The catalog of individual chemical equipment components with corresponding damage and repair estimates was crucial to the development of study results. The existence of the catalog permitted accurate estimation of the repair requirements for actual establishments of the basic chemical industries. With this catalog, it is possible to estimate repair requirements for a wide range of manufacturing establishments—even those outside the chemical industry when the required equipment is added to the catalog.

#### Mathematical Models for Relation of Repair Effort with Damage Level

Repair estimates for the 46 chemical equipment components studied were calculated for a wide range of damage expressed in overpressure levels. A mathematical model was found that satisfactorily represented the calculated repair versus damage relationships for all equipment components when appropriate empirical constants are used for each component. The model includes a scaling factor relating the repair effort with equipment size or capacity, thus permitting the scaling of repair effort to the size of a given component.

Mathematical models were developed to relate repair effort and damage level for the four typical industries (SIC 2812, 2813, 2818, and 2819) as well as for the overall SIC 281 basic chemical industry group.

#### Repair Effort Required for Chemical Equipment Components

The repair effort required to restore damaged chemical equipment components generally reflected the complexity and vulnerability of the equipment. The type of repair required for equipment with a hard vulnerability classification usually included only realignment or resetting on foundations since little internal damage occurred. Medium or soft category components, on the other hand, usually experienced both internal and external damage and required additional types of repair.

#### Repair Effort for the SIC 281 Basic Chemical Industry Group

The maximum repair effort (for overpressures greater than 15-20 psi) required to restore the basic chemical industry group (SIC 281) was found to be approximately 13 million man-days. The damage level requiring 50 percent of this maximum repair effort was found to be about 7 psi overpressure. (The curve shape is very steep at this overpressure.)

The maximum repair effort represented from 50 to 240 percent of the new construction effort for the various industries of the basic chemicals group, validating the magnitude of our repair estimates. This repair effort corresponds to about five times the labor effort expended annually for new construction in the basic chemical industry group (for the year 1965). To repair the entire industry—an unlikely eventuality if probable surviving consumer demand were to be considered—would overwhelm the surviving repair capabilities. However, even a selective, limited repair effort would be likely to encounter constraints and shortages of a long-term nature.

An interesting relationship relating plant capital costs to the ratio of maximum repair effort over total cost was identified. In this relationship, the plant capital costs could be considered an index of plant complexity. Although this relationship probably is useful only for gross approximations, it can be a tool for estimating repair requirements.

#### Skilled Labor Requirements

it appears that the supply of certain labor skills would be inadequate to meet the demand in the postatiock period and that an alternate source of labor or skills would be needed. The most critical skills were found to be boilermakers, equipment operators/riggers, and welders. From previous investigation [1] it appears that there are a number of people with latent skills that could be utilized to meet the demand.

#### Preattack Planning and Precautionary Actions

Preattack plans should include procedures for plant shut-down, provisions for sheltering specific employees, and procedures to cover precautionary actions for protection of the plant and equipment.

Precautionary actions to help reduce chemical establishment vulnerability include: (1) harden controls and control rooms; (2) shut down plant safely; (3) leave vessels, tanks, and distillation columns full of water or other inert liquid; (4) protect equipment susceptible to missile damage with appropriate harricades; (5) protect sight glasses on equipment susceptible to a plosion hazards; (6) isolate storage tanks and vessels to prevent fire spread; (7) secure tall equipment items with tie-down to reduce overturning vulnerability.

VVINDADARINI PERIODE PARALLA PARAL

#### Vulnerability of Chemical Equipment Components

Chemical equipment components have been classified into three broad groupings according to damage vulnerability: soft, medium, and hard. Examples of the soft group (severe damage experienced below 5 psi) include controls, cooling towers, and storage tanks (except spherical). The medium group (severe damage occurring between 5 and 10 psi) includes items such as blowers, columns, and package boilers. Examples of the hard group (severe damage experienced above 10 psi) are heat exchangers, pumps, and spherical storage tanks.

Damage to equipment was identified according to the particular weapon effect producing the damage. In this regard, overpressure (diffraction phase) was found to be the major cause of damage for buildings, storage tanks, cooling towers, electrolytic cells, and controls. Dynamic pressure was found to be the major cause of damage for certain exposed components such as columns, process and pressure vessels, heat exchangers, pumps and drivers, compressors, most of the special equipment, package units, and piping.

#### Critical Chemical Equipment Components

It is not possible to assign a criticality rating to individual chemical equipment components in a general manner. A component may be critical in one particular application in a processing scheme and semicritical or noncritical in another. Equipment must be rated for criticality on an individual establishment-by-establishment basis.

#### Comparison of Study Results with Other Work

A portion of the National Entity Survival (NES) Study [28] examined repair effort for the SIC 28 major group. A comparison indicated the NES study results would be a factor of 2.2 to 2.6 times higher than the corresponding repair estimates of this study. Although the agreement between the results of these two studies is acceptable, the results of the present study, being better validated, should be incorporated into the NES model as soon as possible.

#### Geographical Distribution of the Basic Chemical Industries

One measure of the geographical distribution of these industries is related to their proximity to standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs). An analysis of all establishments within the basic chemical industry group reveals that over 70 percent of the production capability is located in SMSAs.

The nature of the available information concerning geographical distribution of the basic chemical industries and the budget limitation for this contract have made it impossible to give a more meaningful presentation of such distribution in this study. With further research, however, it should be possible to uncover useful relationships.

#### Complexity and Interrelation of Chemical Establishments

The most modern chemical establishments tend to have increased use of automation in process control, and computer control systems are becoming more prevalent. These factors result in establishments more vulnerable to nuclear attack since control and control systems are relatively soft in comparison with more chemical equipment.

Another trend in modern plants is toward the interrelated plant or multichemical complex. In some cases, these plants have long interconnecting product pipelines, with related plants being 50 or more miles apart. In complexes such as these, vulnerability of production capability is increased due to dependence on interconnections with other establishments.

#### Classification of the Basic Chemical Industries

Due to the nature of existing establishments manufacturing chemical products, the classification of these establishments into specific groupings is rather arbitrary and the actual boundaries between such groupings are indistinct.

#### Recommendations

Based on the results and conclusions of this study, the following areas of future research are recommended.

- Study in detail a large multichemical plant to determine more accurately
  the effects of nuclear attack on a chemical complex with many interconnected product lines.
- 2. Apply the appropriate mathematical models to the actual chemical establishments of the SIC 281 industry group present in the cities of the Five-City Study. Such a study would provide basic inputs for the post-attack recovery portion of the Five-City Study and provide a better understanding of the problems facing the basic chemical industry group.
- 3. Explore the application of the results of this study to other industries. By appropriate addition of new equipment items to the damage/repair catalog of this study, it should be possible to make estimates for the repair requirements of a wide range of industries outside the SIC 281 greep.

URS 687-4

4. Examine the decrease in demand for chemical products of the SIC 281 industry group that would result under various conditions of nuclear attack and the resultant changes in repair requirements caused by the changes in demand. This would require study of the interactions of these chemical products with industries outside the 281 group as well as the effects of population decreases and the damage experienced by other related industry groups.

- 5. Explore in more detail the potentially useful relationships among repair effort, capital costs, and degree of complexity for a wide range of chemical establishments. It appears that some significant shortcuts to repair estimation may be possible by relating these variables. Application to establishments cutside the chemical industry also may be possible; this could facilitate repair estimates for the whole spectrum of manufacturing establishments.
- Examine in depth the available information concerning geographical distribution of chemical industry establishments to uncover the controlling relationships.
- 7. Incorporate applicable portions of the results of this study into the NES model to yield more accurate predictions of industrial capacity and restoration.
- 9. Perform research into the existence of currently unreported labor skills that are possessed as a result of military service, former employment, or hobbies. The tabulation or estimation of the number of persons falling into the various labor-skill categories would provide useful information for restoration and reclamation studies.

(V)

## REFERENCES

THE THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE

to be made to the standing between the standing the standing to the standing t

the a substitution of the many many and the best second temporary and

X

#### REFERENCES

- 1. Van Horn, W. H., G. B. Boyd and C. R. Foget, Repair and Reclamation of Gas and Utility Systems, URS 669-6, URS Corporation, Burlingame, California, July 1967.
- 2. Standard Industria! Classification Manual, 1967, Bureau of the Budget.
- Bickley, L. J. and A. Sachs, <u>Industrial Hardening Classification: A Method-olgy for Simplifying the Evaluation of Hardening Costs</u>, IDA, Vols. I and II, October 1966.
- 4. 1965 Annual Survey of Manufacturers, "General Statistics for Industry Groups and Industries," Bureau of the Census, M65(AS)-1, 1966.
- 5. 1963 Census of Manufacturers, "Industrial Inorganic and Organic Chemicals (SIC Group 281)," Bureau of the Census, MC63(2)-28A, March 1966.
- 6. Brown, James E., "Onstream Process Analyzers," Chemical Engineering, McGraw Hill Co., New York, May 6, 1968.
- 7. "Ready for Blackouts," Chemical Week, McGraw Hill, New York, June 8, 1958.
- 8. "Finding Plant Sites Geis Tougher as Shortages Worsen," Chemical Week, October 28, 1967.
- Chemical Economics Handbook, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California, 1962.
- 10. Private communication with William Penn of MERI, May 1968.
- 11. "Staring Spaghetti Bowl Surplus," Chemical Week, August 19, 1967.
- 12. Waddeil, R. M., et al., Capacity Expansion Planning Factors, National Planning Association, Washington, D.C., April 1986.
- 13. Glasstone, S., ed., Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Department of Defense, 1962.
- 14. Fernald, O. H., et al., Critical Industry Repair Analysis, Petroleum Industry, Advanced Research Inc., Wesley Hill, Mass., October 1965.

122 URS 687-4

15. Thayer, S. B. and W. W. Shaner, <u>The Effects of Nuclear Attacks on the Petroleum Industry</u>, Stanford Research Institute, July 1960.

- 16. McCormick, C. Gene, <u>Electromagnetic Pulse and Civil Defense</u> (U), The Dikewood Corp. (SECRET R/D), December 1967.
- 17. Mason, H. G., Personal Communication, June 1968.
- 18. Bauman, Carl H., Fundamentals of Cost Engineering in the Chemical Industry, Reinhold Publishing Corporation, London, 1964.
- 19. Gallagher, John T., "Cost of Direct Fired Heaters," Chemical Engineering, July 17, 1967.
- 20. Cornigan, T. E., et al., 'What do Chemical Reactors Cost in Terms of Volume," Chemical Engineering, May 22, 1967.
- 21. Derrick, George C., 'Estimating the Cost of Jacketed, Agitated and Baffled Reactors, Chemical Engineering, October 9, 1967.
- 22. Clerk, Jackson, "Multiplying Factors Give Installed Costs of Process Equipment," Chemical Engineering, February 13, 1963.
- 23. Hand, W. E., "From Flow Sheet to Cost Estimate," Petroleum Refining, April 4, 1968.
- 25. "Updated Investment Costs for 60 Types of Chemical Plants," Chemical Engineering, December 4, 1967.
- 26. "Critical Industry Repair Analysis: Food Industry," CIRA-3, Advance Research, Inc., Needham Heights, Mass., undated.
- 27. Goen, Richard L., et al., Analysis of National Entity Survival. Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California, November 1967.
- 28. 1960 United States Census of Population Detailed Characteristics, Bureau of the Census, PC(1)-1D, 1963.
- Mitchell, David L., An Optimization Study of Blast Stelter Deployment.
   Vol. 1, Summary Report, Lambda Corporation, Arlington, Va., September 1, 1986.
- 30. Statistical Abstract of the U.S., Bureau of Census, 1965.
- 31. 1960 United States Census of Population Occupation by Industry, Bureau of Census, PC(2)-7C. 1963.

URS 687-4 123

32. McFadden, F. R., and C. D. Bigelow, <u>Development of Rapid Shutdown</u>
<u>Techniques for Critical Industries</u>, Stanford Research Institute, January
1966.

- 33. Sax, I. N., <u>Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials</u>, Reinhold Publishing Corporation, New York, 1957.
- 34. Case Histories of Accidents in the Chemical Industry, Vol. 2, Case history 9601, Manufacturing Chemists Association, Washington, D.C., 1966.
- 35. Private communication with Dr. Margie Evans, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California, April 1967.
- 36. Van Dolah, Robert W., and David S. Burgess, <u>Explosion Problems in the Chemical Industry</u>, ACS Short Course Syllabus 104, American Chemical Society, 1968.
- 37. Brown, William M., <u>Emergency Mobilization for Postattack Reorganization</u>, Hudson Institute, Croton-on-Hudson, New York, May 1968.

#### APPENDIX A

BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR CHEMICAL PROCESSES AND THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

#### APPENDIX A

BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR CHEMICAL PROCESSES AND THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

- 1. Backman, Jules, <u>Studies in Chemical Economics</u>, Manufacturing Chemists Association, Inc., Washington, D.C., 1965.
- 2. Bauman, Carl H., Fundamentals of Cost Engineering in the Chemical Industry, Reinland Publishing Corporation, London, 1961.
- 3. Brown, George, Ed., <u>Unit Operations</u>, John Wiley and Sons, New York, N.Y., 1951.
- 4. Chemicals, Business and Defense Services Administration, U. S. Department of Commerce.
- 5. Chemical Economics Handbook, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California, 1968.
- 6. Chemical Origins and Markets, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California, 1967.
- 7. Current Industrial Reports, M19A and M28A, U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Celsus.
- 8. <u>Directory of Chemical Producers</u>, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California, 1968.
- 9. Faith, Keyes, and Clark, <u>Industrial Chemicals</u>, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, N.Y., 1957.
- Kent, James A., <u>Industrial Chemistry</u>, Reinhold Publishing Co., New York, N. Y., 1964.
- 11. Kirk, Raymond E., and Donald F. Othmer, Eds., Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology, Interscience Publishers, Inc., New York, N.Y., 1947.
- 12. Lipsett, C. H., Industrial Wastes and Salvage, Altas Publishing Co., Inc., New York, N. Y., 1963.

123 URS 687-4

13. 1965 Annual Survey of Manufacturers, "General Statistics for Industry Groups and Industries," Bureau of the Census, M65(AS)-1, 1966.

- 14. 1963 Census of Manufacturers, "Industrial Inorganic and Organic Chemicals (SIC Group 281)," Bureau of the Census, MC63(2)-28A, March 1966.
- 15. Perry, Robert H., Ed., Chemical Engineers Handbook, 4th Edition, McGraw Hill Book Co., New York, N.Y., 1963.
- 16. Shreve, Norris R., Chemical Process Industries. McGraw Hill Book Co., New York, N.Y., 1956.
- 17. Sittig, Marshali, Organic Chemical Processes Encyclopedia, Noyes Development Corporation.
- 18. Standard Industrial Classification Marual, 1967, Bureau of the Budget.
- 19. Synthetic Organic Chemicals, U.S. Production and Sales, U.S. Tariff Commission, -TC-206, 1967.

#### APPENDIX B

SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVE INDUSTRIES

APPENDIX B

SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVE INDUSTRIES

The selection process used in this study was guided by the criteria delineated in Section I and assisted by technical consultation with personnel from Rogers Engineering (subcontractor to URS Corporation). As indicated earlier, the selection was performed at the level of major industry numbers within the 281 group and also at the level of chemical products under the selected major industries.

#### First Selection Level

The six major industry headings were surveyed and four industries were selected as being most representative of the SIC Group 281 establishments as a whole. Each of the six industries is reviewed and the rationale for inclusion or exclusion is presented.

#### 2812: Alkalies and Chlorine

Chlorine would be a very important chemical in the early postattack period because of its use in water and sewage treatment and also in the pulp and paper manufacturing industry. Sodium hydroxide also would be important in the early postattack period because of its use in the pulp and paper industry and in petroleum refining. In addition, both of these chemicals (chlorine and sodium hydroxide) along with sodium carbonate (another 2812 chemical) are extremely important due to large volume production and extensive use in manufacturing organic and inorganic chemicals. For example, they are used in the production of soap and detergents, fibers and plastics, glass, petrochemicals, pulp and paper, fertilizers, explosives, and solvents.

#### 2813: Industrial Gases

Included in this group of chemicals are oxygen, acetylene, helium, hydrogen, and refrigerant gases. Oxygen and acetylene would be vital for immediate postattack recovery because of the need for metal welding and cutting. Oxygen and helium would be important for medical purposes. The staply of refrigerant gases also may be vital in the postattack period. Oxygen has become a high volume production chemical in the past ten years due primarily to i's use in steel production, but it is also important in the manufacture of acetylene, ammonia, and methanol. Nitrogen is used in high volume also, and is employed in manufacturing ammonia and preventing rancidity in foods sealed in containers. Hydrogen is important for its use in ammonia synthesis, hydrogenating edible oils, and for electrical machinery and electronics.

# 2815: Cyclic Intermediates, Dyes, Organic Pigments, and Cyclic Crudes

The majority of products in this group of chemicals (dyes, color lakes and toners, and organic pigments) must be considered unimportant for the immediate recovery period. The few items of interest in the list (cyclic intermediates such as benzene and benzene derivatives) are products manufactured in much larger quantities in other manufacturing groups such as petroleum refining (specifically, the SIC 29 major group), or as byproducts (for example, from coke ovens).

#### 2816: Inorganic Pigments

Since inorganic pigments would not be considered vital in the immediate postaitack period, this group of industries is not of prime importance for our study. In addition, this group of products represents less than 5 percent of the manufacturing value added for all basic chemicals.

#### 2818: Industrial Organic Chemicals

This group of products accounts for over 48 percent of the total manufacturing value added for all basic chemicals and contains a number of products considered important for immediate postattack recovery. Included in this list are chemicals such as: insecticides, hydraulic fluids, industrial alcohols, the basic raw materials for many important medical supplies, and petrochemicals.

#### 2819: Industrial Inorganic Chemicals

Inis group of products includes about one-third of the manufacturing value added for basic chemicals and contains many chemicals important in the immediate postattack period. The most significant items include fertilizers, water treatment chemicals, disinfectants, explosives, raw materials for the manufacture of soaps and medicines, and chemicals necessary for paper production. The chemicals in this group are produced by a variety of processing equipment and techniques.

On the basis of this initial survey, Industry Numbers 2812, 2813, 2818, and 2819 were selected for the purpose of this study as most representative of the industry as a whole.

#### Second Selection Level

Having chosen four major industry headings, the next step was to select plants manufacturing chemicals in each of these industries that are representative of each of the four-digit SIC code industries (2812, 2813, 2818, and 2819).

#### 2812: Alkalies and Chlorine

The chlorine-caustic soda (C12 ÷ NaOH) electrolytic process was chosen as representative and typical of the 2812 industry. Hydrogen manufacturing (a 2813

URS 587-4 133

chemical) is included as a byproduct of this process. The reasons for this selection were:

 Chlorine and caustic soda comprise over 60 percent of the dollar value of products manufactured in the 2812 industry

chlorine - \$124, \$21,000

NaOH - \$147,040,000

Total Primary products (2812) - \$415,963,000

- Chlorine and caustic soda are two of the most important basic chemicals in the industry and typically are made in the same plant.
- The electrolytic process used to make Cl, and NaOH is basically the same as that used to make some of the other chemicals in the 2812 industry—such as KOH (potassium hydroxide).
- Soda ash (sodium carbonate) is the third major chemical in the 2812
  industry group. Twenty percent of the soda ash used in this country is
  produced from natural sources (Trona) while the remainder is manufactured
  by the ammonia-soda process or as a byproduct of the electrolytic process
  of chlorine-caustic soda.

#### 2813: Industrial Gases

The production of oxygen and nitrogen from air was selected as the process to reprotent the 2813 (industrial gas) industry. (The production of argon will be included as a byproduct.) The reasons for this selection were:

- Oxygen is a basic reagent for many chemical and manufacturing processes (for instance steel making) and accounts for approximately one-third of the total 2813 industry sales.
- Nitrogen is manufactured from the same process as oxygen and, together with oxygen, represents 43 percent of the 2813 industry. By itself, nitrogen rates fourth in the industry in overall sales (11 percent).
- Acetylene, ranking second in industrial gas sales (24 percent of total sales), is used chiefly for the manufacture of other chemicals. However, other chemicals (such as ethylene) can be used in some instances as a feedstock in its place and acetylene used for welding can be made by using small portable acetylene generators fed by carbide. Therefore, it was not included in the typical 2813 plant.

18 . Alter toman white the said one will now helper the place wound to the the this

Carbon dioxide, ranking third in industrial gas sales (12.5 percent), was considered a noncritical chemical as 75 percent of the CO<sub>2</sub> produced for sales was used for refrigeration (many other refrigerant chemicals are available) and carbonated beverages. Therefore, it was not considered in the typical 2813 plant. Carbon dioxide is manufactured through natural gas or oil burning, or as a byproduct of other processes (urea, fermentation, etc.).

#### 2818: Industrial Organic Chemicals

An ethylene production plant has been chosen to represent the 2818 industry. Reasons for this selection are given below.

- Ethylene is the largest volume-production chemical in the industry (about 5 percent of the 2818 total).
- Ethylene is a very important basic chemical and is the building block for many other large-volume chemicals, such as, ethylene dichloride, ethylene exide, ethylene glycol, and polyethylene.
- The equipment and operations in the production of ethylene are basically
  the same as those used in the production of many other chemicals in the
  2818 industry.

#### 2819: Industrial Inorganic Chemicals

The industries selected as most representative of the 2319 group are ammonium nitrate manufacturing, and a sulfuric acid plant. The reasons for the selection of these particular industries are given below.

- Ammonium nitrate represents approximately 4.5 percent of the 2819 industry MVA and had a 1963 production of 4 million tons. Ammonium nitrate is manufactured by combining ammonia and nitric acid in a reactor. Its primary purpose is for the manufacture of fertilizers. Another major use of NH<sub>4</sub>NC<sub>3</sub> is commercial and military explosives; this accounts for 20 percent of the overall use of the chemical. Both fertilizers and explosives are considered vital during the postattack recovery period. The process equipment used in the production of NH<sub>4</sub>NO<sub>3</sub> is representative of the types of process equipment found in the solid chemical segment of the 2819 industry (compressors, filters, evaporators, reactors, coolers, absorbers, furnaces, burners, quenchers, liquid gas separators, dryers, crystallizers, centrifuges, and grinders).
- The sulfuric acid industry is considered a basic inorganic chemical industry as it is used in innumerable processes. Twenty-one million

tens of H<sub>2</sub>SO<sub>4</sub> were produced in 1963 and accounted for 6.5 percent of sales in the 2819 group. The contact process for sulfuric acid manufacturing is the most commonly used (89 percent of all H<sub>2</sub>SO<sub>4</sub> made) and while it is a relatively simple process it is representative of other liquid chemical manufacturing in the 2819 industry.

The 2819 industries below were considered for inclusion in the study but were rejected for the reasons noted.

Commercial and Household Bleaches. Representing 6 percent of the 2819 industry sales, bleaches were considered to be a nonvital item for postattack recovery. Chlorine, the chemical base for most bleaches, is being investigated under the 2812 industries.

Boric Acid. This was not considered an essential postattack chemical.

Hydrochloric Acid. Although a major acid (one raillion tons produced in 1963), HCl is primarily (80 percent) made as a byproduct of other chemical processes; the process equipment is similar to that used in H<sub>2</sub>SO<sub>4</sub> manufacturing.

<u>Phosphoric Acid.</u> A major product of the 2819 industry (2.1 million tons produced in 1963), the main use of phosphoric acid is for fertilizer. However, as the wet process for  ${\rm H_2P_2O_3}$  manufacture uses equipment similar to that of the zitric acid  $-{\rm NH_4NO_3}$  manufacture, it was excluded from the study.

Aluminum Oxide. Aluminum oxide represents the largest chemical sales (10 percent) for the 2819 industry. The primary use of Al<sub>2</sub>O<sub>3</sub> is as an intermediate step between mined bauxite ore and the production of aluminum metal. Aluminum oxide was not considered critical in this study because new aluminum ingots would not be essential in the initial postattack period.

Sodium Salts. None of the various sodium salts (phosphates, silicates, sulfates) was considered critical to the postattack recovery period. Examples of primary uses for sodium salts are sodium phosphate (in detergents) and sodium sulfate (in kraft paper manufacturing).

# APPENDIX C TYPICAL PLANT PROCESSES

URS 687-4 139

APPENDIX C

TYPICAL FLANT PROCESSES

#### Chlorine and Sedium Hydroxide


A plant that produces 70,000 tons paryear of chlorine and 70,000 tons per year of sodium hydroxide was selected and hypothetically designed to represent the 2812 industry (Figure C-1). An electrolytic process utilizing disphragm coils used by 73 percent of the industry, was chosen as the most representative of the chlorine manufacturing processes.\* In this process sodium chloride is mixed with water in saturators (Figure C-1) to form a brine solution which is then purified in clarifiers and filters heated, neutralized with hydrochloric acid, and fed to a diaphragm cell. in the diaphragm cells, electric current (d.c. produced by large rectifiers) is passed through the sodium chloride solution which is decemposed by the current to form a 19 to 12 percent sodium hydroxide solution at the cathode and chlorine gas at the anode. The chlorine gas, which contains a considerable amount of water vapor, is cocled in heat exchangers and then passed through special ceramic drying towers where sulfuric acid is used to dry the chlorine. The dry chlorine gas is then compressed into a liquid, cooled, and stored as liquid chlorine. The sodium hydroxide solution is removed from the bottom of the cell and pumped into multiple effects evaporators with a barometric condensor, producing a 50 percent sodium hydroxide solution. The solution is centrifuged and filtered to remove impurities, then stored or shipped as 50 percent sodium hydroxide.


#### Liquid Oxygen

The manufacture of oxygen by the modified Linde-Franke! low pressure process was chosen to represent the 2813 industry. The typical oxygen plant, which also produces nitrogen and argon as byproducts, has a production of 33,600 tons per year (Figure C-2). The Linde-Frankel liquifaction process takes incoming air, compresses it in a centrifigal compressor, cools the air, dries it, and sends it into the cold box through reversing heat exchanges. The cold box contains various distillation columns, heat exchangers, and dryers; it is here that the air is cooled


<sup>\*</sup> The mercury cell, which represents 26 percent of the industry, is of growing importance as a source of purified caustic. Structurally the mercury cell (approximately  $4^{\circ}$  by  $40^{\circ}$  by  $6^{\circ}$ ) reacts very differently from the Hooker cell (Appendix E).


Figure C-! PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM, CHLORINE CAUSTIC PLANT





3





to a liquid and fractionated into oxygen. nitrogen, and other components. The oxygen and nitrogen are then drawn separately from the column as gases and sent through either an oxygen compressor or nitrogen compressor, reliquified and stored as either liquid oxygen or liquid nitrogen.

#### Ethylene

The manufacture of ethylene from refinery gas was chosen as the process to represent the 2818 industry. The typical ethylene plant used in this study has an annual production of 232,000 tens (Figure C-3). In the ethylene process, refinery gas is initially compressed in centrifical compressors, passed through a caustic scrubber and an acetylene hydrogenation unit to remove impurities, cooled, passed through alumina, dehydrated (which lowers the dew point), and then partially liquified by further cooling before being sent through a series of fractionating columns. Typically, three distillation columns are used. The first removes methane, the second separates ethane and ethylene from the remaining gases, and the third splits the ethylene from the ethane. The ethane is taken off at the bottom of the column, passed through cracking heaters, and put back into the cycle. The ethylene is removed from the top of the column and either stored or shipped as as product.


#### Ammonium Nitrate

The manufacture of ammonium nitrate from ammonia and nitric acid was selected as the process to represent the solid chemical portion of the 2819 industry. The ammonium nitrate plant used in this study has an annual production of 78,200 tons (Figure C-4). In the typical ammonium nitrate plant process (prilling process), ammonia vapor and nitric acid are reacted in stainless steel neutralizing vessels under agitation to form ammonium nitrate. The reutral solution is then pumped through evaporators, concentrated to approximately 95 percent, and pumped through the top of a prilling tower. In the prilling tower, the nitrate solution is discharged through a spray head and falls countercurrent to a stream of conditioned air. As it is falling, the material solidifies into small pellets or prills, which are fed to a rotary kiln dryer and then through a coating drum where the prills are coated with a fine clay to minimize caking tendencies. The prills are then shipped or stored as producis.


#### Sulfuric Acid

The manufacture of sulfuric acid by the contact precess was chosen to represent the liquid chemical portion of the 2819 industry. The typical sulfuric acid

Figure C-3
PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM, ETHYLENE PLANT FROM ETHANE



A



The second of th


HEAT EXCHANGES C-12 D


CENTRIFUGAL PUMPS C-18 D

B

25

Figure C-4
PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM, TYPICAL AMMONIUM NITRATE PLANT






Rogers Engineering Co., Inc

URS 687-1

plant (Figure C-5) used in this study has an annual production of 300.000 tons. The contact process using raw sulfur as an input, pumps incoming air through a drying tower, and mixes this with liquid sulfur in a sulfur burner in which sulfur dioxide is produced. The sulfur dioxide mixture is passed through a heat exchanger and then into a converter containing a platinum or vanadium pentoxide catalyst; the sulfur dioxide is converted to approximately 95 percent sulfur trioxide gas. This gas is then partially cooled in a heat exchanger and sent to an oleum tower where oleum is formed. The gas remaining is passed into an acid absorption tower where a slightly higher acid strength is yielded. The acids are then cooled in acid coolers, sent to storage or shipped as product.

Figure C-5 PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM, TYPICAL CONTACT SULFURIC ACID PLANT



ELECTRIC POWER 200-400 KW-h-/hr WATER FOR BOILER WATER FOR ACID PROCESSING


33.000 GPM AWAILABLE STEAM AFTER RADIO USE 40,000-120,000 lbs/Hr.

## OTHER STRUCTURES:

COOLING WATER: C-15

CONTROL CUBICLES: C-36 [] 1 CONTROL BUILDING (3.000 59 11): A-9 ( 560' x 15' PIPIUG: C-37 []

SOURCE: Rogers Engineering Co., Inc.



APPENDIX D

AN APPROACH TO STRUCTURAL FAILURE PREDICTION

URS 687-4 157

APPENDIX D

AN APPROACH TO STRUCTURAL FAILURE PREDICTION

#### **Prediction Bases**

The fundamental problem in failure prediction is the translation of design criterion and procedure into a reasonable failure criterion and procedure. Basically, all structures are designed to function safely under normal usage, plus survive a reasonable amount of "natural" abuse (high winds, snow, overload). The usual approach in the design situation is to establish the "normal" operating and/or service loads based on considerations such as location and usage (for example, a 70 mph wind and a 100 psf floor load). A safety factor for the possible eventual abuses is then applied. General safety factors have been established through experience and satisfactory performance of structures by government agencies, and research institutes.

In establishing a failure criterion, the safety factor must be removed from structures. The particular problem faced by this study is the desire to make "general" failure predictions for entire industries rather than for individual structural elements or even individual structures. A safety factor of 2.0 was considered reasonable for all structural members. For steel building, the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) recommends a safety factor of 1.67 for tension and flexure and a range of 1.6? to 1.92 for stability or buckling problems. Due to the so-called "hidden" safety factor of plastic behavior & structural steel, the average true safety factor for structural steel elements is about 1.85. The American Concrete Institute (ACI) recommends about 2.2 for flexural failures and about 2.5 for compression or buckling failures. While individual organizations, agencies, and firms may use different safety factors, these generally are higher because of particular experiences and uses. For example, the American Society of State Highway Officials (ASSHO) and the American Society of Railway Engineers (ASRRE) both use safety factors of 2.0 or slightly more for steel construction because of the possibility of overload, fatigue, and vibrations.

The pext aspect of a broad general failure prediction is the statistical bebayior of actual failures. Structural strength (hence, failure) predicted from design information with the safety factor removed is a lower bound failure because design allowables are based on minimum properities, ox about a one percent probability of failure. To make other estimates—such as at 50 percent or 99 percent--probability distribution is needed. Here, again, it is necessary to use average distribution(e) for a broad class of failures. Figure D-1 represents a composite of findings of the references listed at the end of this Appendix, and is by no means a precise probability statement. However, it is felt that it gives a reazonable survey of the statistical nature of the problem. One may interpret Figure D-1 as follows: suppose we predict a column failure (buckling) at 100 kips; this means that one percent of similar columns would fail at 100 kips\* or less. From Figure D-1 we see a 1.25 strength factor opposite 50 percent and 1.5 opposite 99 percent; it may be interpreted that 50 percent of these columns will fail at 125 kips or less and 99 percent will fail at 150 kips or less. Similar statements for failure can be made about beams (Lexure), ceramic parts (brittle fracture), and other segments.

## The Prediction Method

A structure is designed for a set of service loads that can be functionally described by setting the structural resistance "R" equal to a function of load:

$$R = f(V_D + V_L + H_D + H_L + ...)$$

where V<sub>n</sub> is Vertical dead load

V<sub>T</sub> is Vertical live load

H, is Horizontal dead load

H, is Horizontal lise load

It follows then that the failure Resistance  $R_{\mathbf{F}}$  can be shown as:

$$R_F = S_I n f(V_D + V_L + H_D + H_L + \ldots)$$

where S<sub>f</sub> is the statistical strength factor, and

n is the safety factor (2 in this study)

It is understood that the sum notation in the functional relationship is illustrative, meaning the summation of effects and not numbers. One of the interesting aspects of this type of design philosophy is that it is intended to yield a uniform safety factor to a structure; that is, if all loads on the structure are increased by Sm the structure will fail with a corresponding probability of failure. However, if only one load component is increased, the failure will not be Sm for the

<sup>\*</sup> kips=1,000 lbs

L'ANTENNATION DE LA CONTRACTOR DE LA CON

of paint is is is this course in the court of the court o





FIGURE DELITY OF STRUCTURAL FAILURE AS A FUNCTION OF THE STRENGTH FACTOR

corresponding probability. For example, let us consider a tank type of structure that is supported on a ring of columns which is common for this type of industry. Assume it is a high pressure tank and the columns are the weak link from external perturbations such as a nuclear explosion. The design of these columns would have been controlled by the vertical gravity loads ( $V_D$  and  $V_L$ ) and a horizontal load ( $H_T$ ) from wind of 100 MPH



We must assume the vertical loads are small (gas filled tank) compared to the wind load, let:

$$P = H_{L} \div (V_{D} \div V_{L})$$

$$P = 100 \div 50 = 150$$

then: 
$$P_f = S_f n(150)$$

or for 50 percent probability of failure

$$P_{\rm f} = 1.25(2) 150$$

$$P_f = 375$$

Note, now that  $P_I = S_I n = 2.5$  time the design leads, or if both the vertical and horizontal loads are increased by 2.5, the tank will fail 50 percent of the time when  $V_D + V_L = 125$  and  $H_L = 250$ . Since wind force increase at velocity squared this means a wind velocity of  $\sqrt{2.5}$  100 = 158 MPH a high and rare wind. However, if only  $H_L$  is increased, as would normally happen in a nuclear explosion on a "drag" structure, that means

H<sub>L</sub> + 50 = 375 would cause failure 50 percept of the time; which is 3.25 times the design wind load which corresponds to 180 MPR, that is we get an increase of 3.25 instead of the previous 2.5.

161

Another problem one could pose is  $H_L$  and  $(V_D + V_L)$  reversed in the above problem; such would occur in a tank designed to hold a heavy load. For this case let

$$P = V_D + V_L \div H_L$$

$$P = 100 \div 50$$

Then at 50 percent probability of failure

$$P_{\rm f} = 1.25(2)(159) = 375$$

as before. However, if we again only increase the wind we have

$$375 = H_L \div 100$$
or  $H_L = 275$ 

which represents a 5.5 increase in the failure load or a wind of 235 MPH.

From the foregoing, it is seen that the actual failure strength of a structural system is highly dependent not only on the loading mechanism (the type of imposed load and/or loads) but on the inherent characteristics of the structure (dead load to live load ratio) and, to a lesser extent, the mode (flexure or buckling).

This brief discussion may explain the large discrepancies in the failure resistances of structures designed with the same factor of safety.

## References

Cornell, C. A., "Stochastic Process Model in Structural Engineering,"
 <u>Technical Report No. 34</u>, Department of Civil Engineering, Stanford, Calif., May 1964, pp. 177-213.

- Crede, C. E., "Failure Resulting From Vibration," <u>Random Vibration</u>,
   Vol. 2, Ed., S. H. Crandall, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1963,
   pp. 103-146.
- 3. Epstein, B., "Statistical Aspects of Fracture Problems," <u>Journal of Applied</u> Physics, Vol. 19, 1948, p. 140.
- 4. Freudenthal, A. M., "Safety Reliability and Structural Design," Journal of the Structural Division, ASCE, Vol. 87, No. ST3, Proc. Paper 2764, March 1961, pp. 1-16.
- 5. , "Safety, Safety Factors and Reliability of Mechanical Systems," Proceedings, 1st Symposium on Engineering Applications of Random Function Theory and Probability, held at Purdue University, Lafayette, Ind., 1962. Ed., J. L. Bogdanoff and F. Kozin, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, N. Y., 1963, pp. 130-162.
- 6. \_\_\_\_\_, and E. J. Gumbel, "Statistical Interpretation of Fatigue Tests," <u>Proceedings</u>, Series A, Vol. 216, Royal Society of London, England, 1953, pp. 399-332.
- 7. \_\_\_\_\_, and M. Shinozuka, "On Upper and Lower Bounds of the Probability of Structural Failure Under Earthquake Acceleration," <u>Transactions</u>, Japan Society of Civil Engineers, No. 118, Tokyo, Japan, June 1965, pp. 9-15.
- 8. , "Structural Safety Under Conditions of Ultimate Load Failure and Fatigue," WADD Technical Report 61-177, Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, October, 1961, pp. 10-12.
- 9. Huang, P. C., "Deterioration in Strength of Brittle-State Porous Bodies,"

  Journal of Applied Mechanics, "ransactions, ASME, Paper No. 64-WA/APM-15,

  1964.
- 10. Irwin, G. R., "Fracture," <u>Encyclopedia of Physics</u>, Ed. S. Flugge, Vol. VI, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany, 1958, pp. 551-590.
- 11. Kececioglu, D., and D. Cormier, "Designing a Specified Reliability Directly into a Component," Proceedings of the Third Annual Aerospace Reliability and Maintainability Conference, held in Washington, D.C., June 29 July 1, 1954. Society of Automotive Engineers, New York, N.Y., June 1964, pp. 546-565.

- Majerus, J. N., and S. K. Ferriera, "Fracture and Reliability of Filament-Wound Chambers," <u>Journal of the Engineering Mechanics Division</u>, ASCE, Vol. 91, No. EMI, Proc. Paper 4234, February 1965, pp. 107-136.
- 13. Prevorsek, D., and W. J. Lyons, "Fatigue Fracture in Fibrous Polymers as a Brittle, Crack-Nucleation Process," Journal of Applied Physics, Vol. 35. No. 11, November 1964, pp. 3152-3164.
- 14. Resemblueth, E., "Probabilistic Design to Resist Earthquakes," <u>Journal of the Engineering Mechanics Division</u>, ASCE, Vol. 90, No. EM5, Proc. Paper 4090, October 1964, pp. 185-220.
- 15. Shah, H. C., "Regression Analysis of Reinforced Concrete Columns,"

  Journal of the Structural Division, ASCE, Vol. 99, No. ST1, Proc. Paper 3785, February, 1964.
- 16. Shinozuka, M., "On the Reliability Analysis of Mechanical Systems," <u>Proceedings</u>, 5th International Symposium of Space Technology and Science, Tokoyo, Japan, September 1963, pp. 943-954.
- 17. \_\_\_\_\_, "Probability of Structural Failure Under Random Loading,"

  <u>Journal of the Engineering Mechanics Division</u>, ASCE, Vol. 90, No. EM5,

  Proc. Paper 4088, October 1964, pp. 147-170.
- Tichy, M., and M. Vorlicek, "Safety of Eccentrically Loaded Reinforced Concrete Columns," <u>Journal of the Structural Division</u>, ASCE, Vol. 88, No. ST5, Proc. Paper 3292, October, 1962.
- Weibull, W., "A Statistical Theory of the Strength of Materials," <u>Proceedings</u>, No. 151, Royal Swedish Institute for Engineering Research, Stockholm, Sweden, 1939.
- Yokobori, T., "Fatigue Fracture from the Standpoint of the Stochastic Theory," <u>Journal of the Physical Society of Japan</u>, Vol. 8, No. 2, Tokoyo, Japan, March-April 1953, pp. 265-268.
- 21. Zsutty, T. C., "A Statistical Analysis of the Ultimate Strength of Reinforced Concrete Beams Without Web Reinforcement," <u>Technical Report No. 8.</u>, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1962.

APPENDIX E

DAMAGE/REPAIR CATALOG

Month Maintennish Strong Charles and Bolder John Charles and Charl

UNIT: Distillation Column

3

ANTONING THE PROPERTY OF THE P

ORSCRIPTION: AH ft high by i ft 15 diameter, 3100 ft. i mix dein, pipe connections; throw 10-13, pipe connections (light unugu); that, keater 2-fg, andhor bolts

_			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
	527.00		Содими примируо		
		אבטחועבט אבטחועבט	A Richaule Operators Operators 1 Milhoretain 1 Pipo fitters 2 Cortified wolders	a Highery 2 Equipment chorustors 1 Millwright 2 Phps filtery 1 Corfers 2 Corfers 2 Corpers 2 Corpores 2 Labrers 3 Truck driver	HIMMORE S RULPHOUL OPERATOR ALINESHI S RILEGE CONTITED CONTITED WOLDOFF HOUSONORE HOUSONOR BUT TONGORE
NEPAIN ESTIMATES	ונפטווונט	BUPPLIES AND SPANE PANTS	Pipo Kiagota Cibngos Gaskots	Pipo Almeellamona flankok Gusketa Concrota Pora lumber	Valves-gauges Pho-flonges fletings fletings Golde plate Conduct Bustoreing bar Bustoreing bar Bustoreing bar White ton Annuation Mingulation Mingulation Mingulation
	HEROUNCES HEOUINED	CONSTRUCTION OR HEPAIR EQUIPMENT	Crinto Ony-acoty Cheeting meer Reaging goar Wolders	Crans Oxyencoly Ontilds Ontilds Higging Frick Engleskor Engleskor Engleskor	Crudo Orvagory Full Ing out film Soldory Church Charrongor Ulay spolor Ulay spolor Ulay spolor Ulay spolor Ulay spolor
	JAN 1	HEGD (DAVB)	÷	=	2 2
	2 4 2	DAYB	SE.	§	
	200	4894 4894	2.	p. 6	e i
	PROBABILITY OF	OVERPRESSURE 50%	818 8	±	0'01
Avend have been been	014	) N	8'1	÷	<b>a.</b> 0
DAMAGE ESTIMATER		FARLURE	Drag	Drau.	Prof
		DEBCHISTION	Ryant half of voluming oxioting plant or university of section and the section of sectio	Crober botts bug.c. ristangles subungental states of ground	Distiblation culinin sveis- there doe to fulling of shelve bolts, all deningtions are newled end thermal trays distributed

and and the company of the control o

the second of th

7-3

DECHIPTION HE ILLE IN A IL IN ALEMENT. 1100 III BIN 1-III, PIPO CONDOCIONEL UNEO 10-IN, pipo connoctione (light mango) i liave, twolve 2-in, anchor boles. Column in fall of liquid.

MANAGEMENT OF THE PROPERTY OF	REPAIR ESTIMATES		LABON SKILLS	IIIC PANTS	Prince of Tringory Columniants of Tringory Columniants of Tringory Onkels 1 Milbright 2 Pipp filtory 1 Trongory of Scyrified Scyrified Scyrified	Minutes of Hemers  Alumins  Chartors  Chartors  1 Millwright  2 Profile  2 Profile  2 Profile  2 Profile  2 Profile  2 Profile  3 Curified  4 Carified  4 Carified  5 Carified  7 Truck driver	Valvos-gauges  Pipu-flangs  Fittings  Conserved  Conserved  Nolled plate  Nolled plate	
	200	resources prouped	CONSTINICATION	UIPMENT		Crino Oxy-sacty autting Mimonis outfile Outfile Rigging Most Granvie Truck Comprement Pore incher Constant	Crano Oxyracoly cutiling P Critita Triack Chaptes North	
		TIME	TIME NEOD (DAYB)		-	÷	9	
AND LABORATE PARTY AND		NAM.	DAYS	NEVIN	s 2	8	e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	
1	Language and	VEN VEN	100	<b>\$</b> 0.8		0.	6.	
-		PHORABILITY OF	OVERPITEBUJIC	80%	J. 9	16,0	11.0	
		PIC	70	<b>*</b>	0'0	c.u	10.0	
	HOTIMATER	10 mm . 40	PAILURE FAILURE		חוהע	4444 444	A sec	
HEROCOPPOS RESOLUTIONS OF SECURITY SECU	DAMAGE ESTIMAT		OESCRIPTION		kkturnil pipliik abknualut to nypor salf of oxtraction colum brunka at kround annoationa duo to tha aolumia dafluction	Anghor bolth mint ylvitling guinding the golden of the guinding of the foundation wightly on the foundation	Andhor botta fail and tho oxeraction column overturin rovering all external connections and dimerranking internal trays	

The second states of the second states of the second states of the second secon

į,

Man was with the contribution to the first of the same of the same

DESCRIPTION: MR It high by 4 ft in thesoter, 1100 ft3; six 4-in, pips connections; three 10-in, pips connections (light gauge); base, tested #-ix, anglest bolts, Column is proceed with loads,

			COMMENIA				
			Labor skills arounged		diggents 2 Crans operators 1 Millwright 1 Forworker	HIGGS STATE	1 Higgors 2 Crane Operators 1 Hill Investit 6 Pronsurvey 4 Carpenters 4 Laborers 1 Kquipment 1 Kquipment 1 Cosont 1 Cosont 1 Cosont
	nepain estimates	กธุดบเคชย	BUPPLIES AND	EPAHE PAHTS	Pypo Nincelluncore Lingus Ornicelu	Phys Lingua Clarketa Conketa Conerete Form Junher Isol Alock	Ni we all nine the state of the
THE ACT OF THE PERSON NAMED IN THE PARTY OF		nerounces heguined	CONSTITUETION	EQUIPHIENT	Crain Osymoraty cutting ogaly, Woldors Algging goal	Crano Day-neuty cutting equip, Validors Kingling goor Fruck Compressor	Стапо Ому-псызу спібля одпрь колдерня Стабк С Стабк С Стабк Стабк Стабк Стабк Стабк Стабк Стабк Стабк Стабк Стаб
ant yeard Homest		971	0000	(III )	=	x	3
		MAM	MAN. DAYS REGD		ŝ	C z	, a
		0¢	<b>#</b>	×20	n.	5	9.11
		PROBABILITY OF	OVERPRYSSUIE		# #	± ± ± ± ± ± ± ± ± ± ± ± ± ± ± ± ± ± ±	o 1
77.71		PRO	Ś		o. e	e e	o.
	DAMAGE ERTIMATES		TAILUIN TO TAILUIN TAILUIN TO TAILUIN TAILUIN TO TAILUIN TO TAILUIN TO TAILUIN TO TAILUIN TO TAILUIN TA		Drag	# HAR	Dring.
	BOAMAG		DASCHIPTION		Upper bulf of cotiums sectional pepting beauties at ground convostions due to defloction of column	Anghor ladta bugin ylodding Gnowing stight, shifting of Rosam	Distillation column everturns (to fallipe of anchor bolts, all connections are several and internal trays distirringed

UNIT: Hartzental Cystuarient Prossure Years

وَّ

NEPAIR ESTIMAȚES	בע אבטטואבט	אפנים כי	COUPMENT SPACE PAINS	6 Yoldoru Gruinlated and 2 Ironfurboru Applium to a Klamm Ibaklic torchem pewiderid glamm I Kildur Ilrad vehret Angly grinder Gauge glamm I Voculain  And Buffor Hollad plate worker  Ventilation  Blower  Humpirator	The Woldors Granulated and I fromworkers For horizontal agency of the foreign powdered gloss I Wolder Versels sciented to Angle withder Child place worker ground on columes worker foreign torein structural I Pape filter Workers Shull foreign worker ground on columes workers to Versting torein sumbers in Pape filter blower fittings filtings	Nelsure Granulated and 2 fromworkers For horizontal useful libering torches powdered glass 1 Wolder Versels mounted dudy glass 1 Wolder Proceedings 10 follows ground and buffer Revetural 1 Show fitter Structural 1 Show fitter blower Phower Phower Phower Phower Phower Fittings 2 Equipment floathrater fittings
REPAIR B	מפפחווכבע וונסחוונס	<u> </u>	MENT	3	Corehos Trer Trer Trer Trer Trer Trer Trer Tre	2 22 2
	IMI	4600	(0AYB)	E	Clours of the control of the control	103 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
_	NAM	12		E	7.0 Por x3 20 20 You un verse) 15	10.0 Minud Minud Syor un Vorkel
	PROBABILITY OF	OVERPRESSURE	$\vdash$	o'r	0, 9	74 C ( )
ĭ	PRO	8	1%	<b>9</b>	e e	0.2
DAMAGE ESTIMATES	30	FAILUIG		: :	N C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C	A a c
NOWYO		DESCRIPTION		Olink Linek in shuttered bliowing tenk contents to struck metal sheil	The two lunkard happorting columns both bunking counting the shootles of the Yuricus asternal piping connections to the Yuricus	Vogral ovorturna dun ta fallura ef supportun golumna

Fig. 18 Comments of the first of the comments of the comments

(continued)
Versul
Pressure
Cythadrium
Horizontal
L L

on the first statement which is the sold statement in the sold the sold the sold the sold the sold the winds the sold th

N. A.					-	THE PART OF SECTION	Annual Property and Personal Property and Pe			
DAMAGE	DAMAGE RETIMATES							REPAIR ESTIMATES		
	CAUSE OF	אטו געורר	PROUAGILISY OF FAILUNG AT GIVEN	NE S	MAN	3W1.£	אנפטחויהבא וובטחוטבא	ROUMER		COMMENTS
CRECHIPTION	FAILUIR	Š	OVERPRESURE	¥	DAYR	300	CONSTRUCTION	SUPPLIES AND	LABOR SKILLS	
		1%	<b>%09</b>	×09		(DAY8)	EQUIPMENT	SPARE PARTS		
Anchor bulta fall causing the vancel to whife on the appeared and severing oxternal pripe connections	Deng	16,0	9'11	⇒ ≥ Ξ	a .	~	Compromyor Concrete della Coleting torch Woldor Righter Righter	Piporfinhon- filtings Hincollancons Mincollancons Mincollan Indi Mock	6 Ironworker R Kquipsent operators 2 Pipe fitters 2 Certified welder 1 Kolder 1 Laborer	for horizontal vennols mounted along to the ground on for piern
Vounul dimplaced off its sounting when unclose holts when	Urait.	C * R1	o'08	o n	9	3	Compronency Juditangory Cutting torch Wolfor Hadis Crone Fruck	Firtings firesings firesings firesings miterial miterial bolt stock	1 Wolder 2 Mulder 2 Multiphont 2 Multiphont 2 Cortifie 3 Cortified 4 Cortified 5 Librer 5 Librer 1 Truck driver	For horizontal tonness on low piers

UNITE Vertical Pressure Versel

G-0

COMMENTS operators 2 Pips fittors 2 Cartified welders 2 Welders 1 Isbover 4 Tronvorkora
2 Zgnignoni
2 Dipersiona
2 Dipo fitture
C Ceytifud
2 Woldere
3 Laboreza 10 ft atamator by 45 ft high, 1/4 in, aboll, aight dein, noggive, two 18-in, man holon, drain and f 1 valvon, Labon rkills Intouned Equipment REPAIR ESTIMATES SUPPLIES AND SPANE PAILTS fittings Migellencous structural materials Pipu-Clungon-Cicinga Rincullanoua atructural anturfula HEBOUNCES AKQUINED Congresses 11 Congresses distributed congress Highing equippedut Grane CONSTRUCTION OR REPAIR EQUIPMENT Confrontor
Contine torol
Wooder TIME HEOD DAYB) **-**MAN. DAYB 2 119.2 PHOHAIILLITY OF PAILUNE AT GIVEN OVEMPHERSUNE 2.5 11.24 11.24 1.K 999 DAMAGE CITIMATES CAURE OF FAILUNG Anchor with full and vortor Anchor by in bouin yielding countil of the state of the state of the state of the state of the pipe connections DESCRIPTION CERCINIPATION

÷

ed extrayoram mades a seguidated del adde de papa a como a si ancomo de la como persona a seguidada de la seguidada 

Water the Colored Color

UNIT: Liquid Phine Ronators with Mixors

9

mount on which the takent of the transfer of t

		COMMONTE				For glass Sined reactors		
TPA LATE			ARGUMED		1 Pigo fittor	1 tronvorkor 1 Moldor 2 forcolnin Morker 1 inninter	Housestore  Operatore  Welder  Welder  Certified  Wolders  Pluo fitters  Wolders  Wolders	Electrician Electrician Electrician Electrician Action Action Action Action Action Action Action Investor
Il nizor-stoum Juci	REPAIN ESTIMATED	หลดบาคยอ	BUPPLIES AND	BPAILE PAILTS	Ontherations (2) Frond (1) Liquid level (1) Heaum trap	dangos tos dos plate pipe Grandalses or postoros Klass	Daugen Valven for obavo Hollad slata Plutingn fittingn	Manyon Valvon for above Hollouf Dhake Figure faint Mixor unit aumpheto
H ft bigh, 1/2 in, shull, led fig. four dain, pipu luge; 20 HP miror-mtoum jackotudi		nebounced heodined	MOITUUITION TO THE STATE OF	KOUIPMENT		Oitting torch Widor Battnik torch	Cutting torch Koldor Grano Rigating goar Boating torch	Colling torch Artior Grano Haging your Honling torch
948 4-1		35	HEGO	IDAVII		<b>*</b>	3	Ξ
100		Ž	DAVB	uron uron	-	2	= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =	¥.
61.10 601.00		a N	) K	<b>166</b>	2,6	7.2	<u>n</u>	0 W L
In, about		PROBABILITY OF	OVEHPRESOUR	¥0g	n,	o.e	e -	0'6
of bigh, 1/2 in, shoil, 104 f.st. faste a		7 PIG	ò	<u>*</u>	0'8	e a	9	ਤ ਜ਼
by M ft hi	DAMAGE ESTIMATES	24 30114	FAILURE		DIST. & SSARILOR	DICT. 6 61451109	Drau	r.
DESCRIPTION Of Culturator by w	BOVWCO		OKACHIPTICA		Control gauges unashed and rappression	Ober touched aido	figuretor overturns (if empty/ bronking all conjuctions to farred	All Zonnout fons to vorkel

gandisting photo. Expaniah indendropan dhamandin i anga i masa ang sessas apad norad Missiosia ana

naksan gerekalanna Harend delandak kopande alak alabah Indoneriesa endigera

all the state of t

4-0

DESCHIPTION: 6 ft diameter by 30 ft high, 570 ft = eyclory suparities 4 ft character mounted ment top of vessel blower at grade and tred into rotten of reactor by 18-in, diameter give - vessel operates at tow pressure.

	77 P. C. A. A. A. C. A.	DAMAGE ESTIMATES	COMMENTA		RECUINED  BUPLIEB AND  BATH FANTS  CHILLIAN  PLUT DIALO  BUTHOLUTE  BUTHOLUTE	MEGGIFICER N REPAIR N REPAIR N REPAIR N LOFGH N LOFGH	1 (OAYS)	MAAN. DOAYE 1 3 13 14 14 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16	70 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 .	8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	CAUSE OF FAILURE DITT. DITT. DEAN DEAN DEAN DEAN DEAN	DAMAGE  DAMAGE  DAMAGE  DAMAGE  DESCRIPTION  COULTON GUNDON BRUNDING  CYGLOD GUNDON BRUNDING  CYGLODO RUDDING  CYGLODO RUDDIN
Draif A.O A.K 9.0 24 7 Citting Rough Plat plato 1 Control Cont		AGE FALLORE TRIVEN THE GONSTAUCTERS RECOURED LABOR SKILLS CONSTAUGTERS OF FAILORE TRIVEN CONTRIBUTED AND STAULE TRIVEN CONTRIBUTED AND STAULE TRIVEN SWILLS SWILLS TRIVEN TO STAULE TRATE TRIVEN SWILLS TRIVEN THE DISTRIBUTION TO STAULT THE DISTRIBUTION TRIVEN SWILLS THE DISTRIBUTION TO STAULT THE DISTRIBUTION TRIVEN SWILLS SWILL SWILL SWILLS SWILLS SWILLS SWILLS SWILLS SWILLS SWILLS SWILLS SWILLS SWILL SW			Monur pigo Plut plato Monur houning	Cotting torch Wolder	<b>3</b>	2	n t	p' 0	0'0		eer displaced off mounting deformed, but air intaku o in feant or vosas) ared
Diff. 6.0 6.4 7.2 15 6 Cutting torch illower pilou 1 minut 10 minut pilou 1 minut minut minut pilou 1 minut minut pilou 1 minut minut pilou 1 minut pilou 1 minut pilou 2 minut minut pilou 2 minut minut pilou 2 minut pilou 2 minut minut pilou 2 minut pilou 2 minut minut pilou 2 minut minut pilou 2 minut	Diff. 6.0 0.4 7.2 13 6 Citting toroh Blower pipe 1 None & Minetio Blower inciding 3 Blomer inciding 2 Blomer inciding 2 Blower inciding 2	CAUSE OF FAILURE AT GIVEN MAN. TIME GONSTRUCTRINS BUPLIES AND LABOR BRILLS FAILURE OVERPHESSURE DAYS HEND CONSTRUCTRINS BUPLIES AND REDUINED 1% DOX 99% HEND CONSTRUCTRINS SPAIR PARTS DAYS 1.0 2.0 2.2 2.4 1 1 1 COUMBING		1 Pigo fittor 2 Frankorkers 1 Meldor 2 Equipment operators	Plat plate Structural shape	Crain toroli Voldor	₹	a	e ÷	3,76	0.8	Nex	ono auparator ovorturna tu'ila conjuettona to stor voakol
Drag 5.0 3.76 4.6 9 4 Crayo Phut plato 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1	Diff. 6.0 6.4 7.2 15 6 Cutting tores Plut plate 2  Wolder Grow Birmonural 2  Wolder tores almone 2  Wolder 6 6.0 6.4 7.2 15 6 Cutting tores 110 0 110 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	CAUCE OF FAILURE AT GIVEN MAN. TIME CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES AND HEDDINED HEDDINED HEDDINED HEDDINED HEDDINED HEDDINED HEDDINED		l Pipo fitter	ปกบหุ <i>ย ซ</i>		-	-	च 20	E .	0'8	מונני	eol gaugen panandud and
Diff. 2.0 4.2 4.4 1 1   Crabo   Plut plato	Diff. 2.0 3.76 4.6 D 4 Grave Plat plate Cutting torch Hemorusal Woldor Birnesulal White Birnesulal White Birnesulal White Birnesulal	PROBABILITY OF MAN. TIME NEGOTIFICER RECUIRED		LABOM BRILLS HEQUINED	BUPPLIEB AND	CONSTAUCTERS ON REPAIR EQUIPMENT	HE3D (DAYB)	DAYE	78 90 x	80% 80%	, SQ	FAILURE	DESCRIPTION
15   15   15   15   15   15   15   15	PAILUME   TA   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1		PARTATION		невина	Mesourcks	TIME	ŽY	N N	BABILITY JHE AT G	FAEL	60 40104	SAMAGE

The state of the s

June.
BL comman
Bose
Achi and
TIME .

# : :

flant		COMMENTS			Plouting roofs can withstand much incher overpressures and would only (Ril at	Espty tank	Pull Cank
vartont taddar-		I ABOU EKILLE	REGUINED		f Propertions 2 Welders 1 Herev 2 Krolpsent characters	2 Sakarbro 4 Ironworkove 4 Higher byldove 2 Kyllowen Operatore 1 Higher	S Labitary 4 fromvorkers 4 fromvorkers 5 wolfors 6 wolfors 1 higger 1 higger
istii, Andaluat unu v	nepain estimates	IRGUIRD	SUPPLIES AND	MANG PANTS	for 1/2 of roof phaps fructural abayes	tottod plato Plat, plato Plutingo Ittingo	Hotted plote Flut plate Fluttings fluttings Hotted
t high merkon groot, 12,600 ft³, uno 18-in, K.K.; thrav 8-in, Angslegi uno vartioni taddar-float	ļ	HEACURGES HEOURES	ON HEPAIR	ECUIPMENT	Chttleh torch Wolden Gruno Hunna Hebi	Cheling copul Modulus Ileging aquipmont	Cheting torob Midder Algning equipment
, oxo		¥	1000 (0448)		ž	2	2
000 Ft 3		ŽY \$	8448		781	ř	74
, la,		N.S.	=	39%	v	e a	***
rton at		PROBABILITY OF FAILURE AT CIVEN	OVERPHEROUSE	¥03	0'1	e -	3
htgh as		FAIC	ð	2	0.0	9.7	8 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
<b>)</b> ~	DAMAGE ESTIMATES	CAUSE OF	FAILUME		אנגי	÷	מוני
DEBSHIFFION: BU ft alabatur by 30 gage tarket board,	DAMAGE	DAMAG	DERGHIPTION		ting fails at juints to tank ting gollapsos into the tank,	fank uplifted on that loaded sido with bottom rupturing blong joint with aboll platem piga connections to tank brunk at entrance into shell body	fank uplifted on blant londed sidowith bottom rupturfur blong joint with wholl platom pipu competions to tank brank at ontrandy into Mioll body

The state of the s

ş

ancennesses season and the contract of the con

DESCRIPTION: 60 ft diamotor, 80,000 ft2, sight 12-in, pipo column lugar 100 No. prounder 1/2 in, sholl M.H.s.

					-				Promote and the second second	
DAMAGE GSTIMA	GSTIMATES							REPAIR ESTIMATES		
70		PIO	PHORABILITY OF	200	7747	1716	negounges hequinkd	нканнкв		
DAMAGE	CAURE OF	004	OVERPRESSURE			100	CONSTRUCTION	BUPPLIES AND	LABON SKICLS	COMMENTE
		1%	¥09	*	0011	(BAVB)	GOUII-MENT	BPANE PANTS		
wind (or aboar) bruging conducting aupporting columns falls	Nead	7.0	0,8	810	11	e	Calting toroh Moldor Migging oquipmont	squal to dingord dingord	4 Higgore 2 Ironorkers 3 Kalders	
Column deformstan buglar gauning thiot and cuttol piping to bronk	Drug	9 g	0.81	9. E	2	6	Chiling torch Wollor Hibbing oquipment Cranv	Structural shepon for bracing Plato for logs and altachwent Plipe for loga while out the	A HIRKOTH 2 FORMOTHORM 2 WOLIGEN 2 ENTREMENT 2 ENTREMENT 3 PROF ILLOTA 3 CONTINIED	Sphot Lund Rank Le Unkor. Bbl v
Bupporting columns deform and voil the land	Я	0,14	10,0	0.4	93	ร์	Cutting torch Walder Walder Walder Crange Affrica Crange Affrica Cruck	Structural whapva of for brincing and bip for laga and outled and outled black of the construction of the	1 Truck driver  Malagora  Malagora	Overproseuros givan at the left are for a spherical tank that is full. If tank is uspry the predicted fallures would endury higher overproseures (10-16 percent)

				COMMENTS					
				אנטחוונה ראפטו פאורנפ		2 fromorkors 2 Koldors 1 Higger 1 Kalpment operator	1 Pronuctura 1 Woldera 1 Ringer 1 Equipment Operator 1 Milwright	1 renkorkora 1 Woldera D Riggera 3 Equipment operationa 2 Milwright 1 Pho (ittera 2 Carpentora	H Tronworkers H Wolders R Rangers R Rquipment Oppripment oppringer N M lwright H pp fitters Carpencers
		REPAIR ESTIMATES	неоливо	BUPPLIER AND	SPAILE PAILTS	Pinto atool Atructural atool	Plate steel Brinchiral steel Ruplacement conveyor sections	Plate stord Burneturn stord Bobbeconnt Conveyor stortions But stock Congrete Porm lumber	Nato stepl Revisional stepl Replacement conveyor rections Roll stock Concrete Form lumber Reinforcing bar
for bright of again, see 5 to 20 miles to a 12 for the brighted education accommendation			nerounces neguined	CONSTRUCTION	COUPMENT	MILLING LOPCHON Maldorn Erano Pikklink, O.K., Kaar	Catting torehom Poldern Brand Fikkline, O.K., Kont	Chitting torehom foldorn Crinto ringituding, O.K., Nonr Compression Concrete drill Truck	Chitting torehom foldorm France Figging, O. Hr. 1 (101) Compression Compressio
1 2			1	100	(DAYR)	c	=	9	-
1			MAN. DAV8 HEOD		2021	e T	<b>.</b>	¥ ±	001
100			2 N		ž	P	6.	7 2	0'01
			PHOHABILITY OF	OVERFRESSURE	<b>X04</b>	[1]	<b>6</b>	-	0'6
17.14			DIG	3	*-	1,0	0°0	7,0	9. *
ł		ESTIMATES		CAUSE OF		biff,	Drag Drag	Dra M	<b>Вго</b> м
to of antimosts of the MOITSHORD	londing myston	WILES SOWYO		DAMAGE		Roof of tank falls at Joints. to roof and collopson into tank	Convoyor Touding mystem duforead and connections to tunk braken	Anchor boltw bogin ylulding, tank whifted on foundation	Anghor bolts fall, tank ovorturns gausting severo doformation to 20 pergont of tank twiy

[--

DESCRIPTION: 10 ft diameter by 25 ft high, 1,360 ft, 3/8 in, wolded plate construction

			1		
		COMMENTS			
		HEOUINED HEOUINED	1 Wolder 1 Pipo fittor 1 Laborer	1 Wolder 1 Pipe Citter 1 Laborer	1 Woldorn 1 Fipo Cittor 2 Laborera 2 Historera 2 Historera 3 Corporiac 1 Corporiac 1 Milveright 2 Froncorkera 2 Froncorkera
REPAIR ESTIMATES	нколінев	BUPPLIES AND SPAHE PAHTS	Rollod plato Fint plate Pipe flanges and fittings	Cattling torch Rolled plate Wolder Fint plate Hinging equipment Pipe flanges and fittings	Hollod plate Fint plate Pipe flanges and fitthings Bolt stock Reinforeing bar
	HESOUNCES HEQUINED	CONSTRUCTION ON REPAIR FOURMENT	Cutting torch Rolled plate Wolding Righting equipment Pipe flanges and fittings	Catting torch Wolder Higging oquipment	Calling toroh Rollod plato Wolder Rightne oquipment Pipe Clanger and fittings Bull receing bar
	1	HEOD (DAYS)	26	211	-
	3	DAYB	=	9	8
	2	E X	0,4	0'9	2.61
	PHOBABILITY OF	OVERPHESSURE 50%	1.0	0.0	3
	OH.	00 %1	1,0	4.0	0.11
ESTIMATES		FAILUNE	חונני	חונני	Brau
DAMAGE ESTIMAT		DESCHIPTION	Tank uplifted on blant loaded with bottom rupturing 1/3 of errumforance along with mholl platom, inlot and outlet pipe connections break it untrance to tank	Tank uplifted on blast londed side with button ruptureing 1/3 of olecumforunce along joint sith shollphates, inlut outlet pipe connections brank at ontrance to tank	Tank overturns, 20 percent of shell severely deformed

THE MENT OF THE PROPERTY OF TH

Cilly Bertzontal But Bahanger

- 5 - 5

-		
Ì		
I		
-	3	
AJOSES BEN	I she I	
POTENCY OF THE PROPERTY AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON NAMED IN	ator 1	
	Stuber +	
	175	
	tuber.	
	18.	
	18. 3/.	
WHE SEPTEMBERS OF STREET	TENED I	
222	5	
Ì	25	
A WALLAND STATES AND STATES OF THE STATES OF	long exten	
	201	
l	7£	
	140 K	
	exchir noadle	
	5 t	
	Š	
	<u> </u>	
	) E (S)	

DVWVOI	DAMAGE ESTIMATES						_	REPAIR CSTOMATES		
***************************************	#U 19111V	FAILU	PROBABILITY OF	70 V	NA NA	, ANIX	HEROUNCES REQUIRED	REDUINTED		
DESCRIPTION	FAILURG	OVE	OVERFRESSURE	-		9600	CONMITTIUETION	SOPPLIES. NAIS	LAYON BKILLS	COMMENTS
THE PERSON AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE AND PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF THE			<b>\$0</b> %	ž	2	3	COUSMENT	SPARS PARYES	2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	
ongroup, folds holding und oxedenyors defined begin ylodding und poet broaking plys cecinculions	<b>H</b> anka	0',	A.	T	=	-	and the property of the conditions to the condit	CCROII andhale	TCONTITION  Wolder  Laborer  MILIMETAL	Hove of the solies on the solies of the other
Anutur dalle fatt and hoat vachangura uvortyph fuptuving all pipting ond caunua nonu produtu myd minni hydnong of internal	Prog.	0 £	z S	e. 0	2	•	Cherry picker Arme for for the for the form toreh Place   Plac	Jural atou) Jynmowurk La	1 Equipment Opporator 2 Higgs 7 2 Higgs 7 2 Higgs 7 2 Higgs 7 3 Corf 17 3 Corf 17 4 Corf 17 4 Corf 17 5 Higgs 14 5 Higgs	Thrue of wore for the thericolly heat exchanger required in keriah by blacking one on top of the other
			<del> </del>						2 Mily fictors 2 Mily fictors	
duter eat muler pipes benin	Drag & minutio	 9 <u>1</u>	5. I	=	P-	<del>-</del>	Welching mounting Conference (State Conference Conferen		1 Voldor 1 Cortextad Norder 2 Pipe fitters	For a single heat evelowed by the ground by the ground on low ploys
thest exchanger displaced of secure in the second of secure in the second of second of second of the	Blant to	o 0 0			<u>e</u>	*	Charpy Dichor Wilding machine Oxy-nearthone torch	Pronuos Broof pisty Vinas Circh meters Fire	A AGNITANDE Spergear A Billiget & COUTHING WIND OF MOINT A BOLD SPERGE A BALL A BALL OF LICE LA BALL LA BALL L	tor a single host oxercyncy wounted close to the graind on low piers
								3		

and and the state of the states of the state

A STATE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE

DESCRIPTION: Radiungur in 2C ft high by 3 ft almoster, 3/4 in, tithen, 176 tubou vectur in abill (4) of ft newstern the filld dealign shell and gulm widen. Aindrally tuben, need shell.

CONSTINCTION SUPPLIES AND CONTROL ESUIPMENT STATE STAT
Wolding machine Ory-newlylone Loren
Chorey plaker Florense Bluet plats Childing machine Bluet plats Childing machines Childs anglore Childing Child Childing Child Ch

-}

第十つの様でいるないとなるとなって

F1.04.

THE SAME STREET, AND ASSOCIATION OF THE SECOND

The state of the s

<del></del>	r		_~						
o, ingulacion —			C. frankliki ib		Unit inoperable, genporator espty	Nanusl operation required	Unit inoporable		
direter, Auno fistively,			CARCH SKILLS		# Equipment openitors    Plpo fitters    * Contified    * Alders    # Modure    # Modure    # Insulators	2 Pipe Attorn	D Ironworkerw 1 Weltor 2 Pipe filterw 3 Certified welderm	4 Woldors 2 Equipment 2 Diversions 2 Leonworkers 2 Dipo fitters 2 Cortified 4 voldors 8 Insulators	All of above plura Physical Cortified wolders
ghs aldo by id (t v teo Bota, norri protr, tovol, con	REPAIN BSTIMATES	geniugo	BUPPLIES AND	BPANE PANTS	Rabled plate Flat plate Tipus-flgos, «flxs, Gaugus Insulación	Deugo =	RRRING OPTIDENT REPORTED A PRINCE STATES. THE STATES OF TH	Chaire Highling orgalisms of the string of t	Nickel pipe Mickel flanges
d officer — d abolin spirate under vacuus, etth uccasanry objecter, Ob it atraighs aldo by 16 it disotor, 3000 ftg, External sulfunors — 24 in, vopor outlos, d in, meko op — 55.12-in, nowive — 250 3-41, nomiver, 2-in, black insulosion — 12 ft high structural support Jogo — guio bultom — dogo top - gaugus (lukp., proks, royol, control).		いたららいれただりがたいいれたの	CONKTITUCTION	COUPMENT	1980		Haring uquipment Calcona coron Sylver Corona jank Oquipment Criticope Enterior	Crano Hirking oquipmon Salting ternh Botdor Botor Oquipmon Ben (colding	Cesting torch Wolder Rigging oquipment
tore tup		11814	9	IDAYII	91	£1	¢	ž.	o,
) посиня 10, мб) (Сэм — с		MAKA.	BAVO	0050	EW1	<del>-</del>	ž	ē	906
1105, 4 1105, 4 01110 to		8 2 2	200	ž.	q'l <sub>F</sub>	0.0	0.0	e a	13,6
ndor vae		PHEAABILITY OF	OVISANCEAUNE	~ *O;	84.78	e.	4.6	a•01	2.2.
rate un K in, v upport		STIVE STIVE	2	×	n'e	e. a	0.0	5 *	e a
Changra - Ciructural	RETIMATER		ביאחים מל		Denk	DITE &	Drok	Merca	DAFF.
OGSCRIFTICNI 3 offices — d obothe External artificiora 12 ft bigh atructur	DAMAGK IBTIMATI		OPENING OF STREET		Reportor overturns aroaking oil occupitions and aufform atight (aforeating of Apoli	Kantlaring gaugos aro brokan and bont, pavimeric gontrol tabing suplanes	Laoward my Rosting Columbustics desirating frame overstor se exitly intent	Respondent overtheir when kenned kenned aupporting ortunes 25 percent of extil bady meyordy duformed, all godings to evaporator are explained.	Makel inter and outlot food prova are drugbed and terepatrable

The state of the s

The bugget the transport of the section

UNST: Coolain Liver

01-0

DESCRIPTION: 3 gotta, 20 et by 20 et long, below la ft high, 8 in, exist 3syon, (3) a ft. danotof fair, fydwood fill, not GPACcoll

Cooling tower skill issued reduced officiency COMMENTA Fan tasperable a Carponera Corrugated B Carpunters and action at Sing Barbores and action at Sing Barbores Labor Briges 2 Truck driver 2 Laborers 2 Carpenters 3 Millwrights REPAIR ESTIMATES SUPPLIES AND SPANE PANTS Pan Clades Pan zelladers todeock Inch adwood lash HESOUNCEU MY OCHHER CONSTRUCTION ON REPAIN RUIFMERT BEAFFOIGING TIME ALCO SIAYS) = 2 = MAN UAYA HEOC 3 ន 꿒 0.5 ÷. ÷. 8 PHOBABILITY OF FAILUNG AT GIVEN OVEHFREBRURE 2,7 3 == 0 G ... ... × 0. 0: . :• ÷ DIFF, & DAMAGE ESTIMATES CAUSE OF DIC. Drag Circulated bedracker tombook of the Brewe Cald to the Brewe Cald to there into the Cald Cald of the tower towor from fulls,
foliapsing cosor broth into
brothin, all oxformal and
letternal profing the brothin,
fan bindon sto severally
dinformed and drive shaft
bottern and drive shaft
anticormed and drive shaft
foliamsid manufath Pan t. Isnger shustors gauning deferation of fan blades Prodystvo poreont of theory and in destroyed in DESCREYSYN

and the second of the state of the second second

· 1873

County Salay to a last

:

Addition a section and additional than a second distriction of the sec

and the second of the following of the

Cold (INIT: Dread Pread East Type libertoen

AD CL wide by 60 ft Long, 40,600 ft 2, of ft "Bovegrouss, vertierl base wate eas pitched seaf. 30 ft to hase of atook, a busher, afock ft in, in diameter, beigt lived flood walls welves of busher, bushe seate in ft high, balonce of busher in roof pitch. Athir oxternal branch (e.g., d in, l) f/4 glyse walte, 3 in, water tubus recked on inside sections of walls any roof. Utack linei with 3 Az, spreyed on guntte. DEIKHIPTION,

DAMAGE	DAMAGE EBTIMATUS						745 m/ 147 man (774,/147 man, 774,/147 man,	REPAIR ESTIMAYER	A POSTA DESCRIPTO, DE CAMPANA, A LA MANAGA		
1	20	2017	PACOBABILITY CO.	 პ₹	ZY X	ZIME	HESTANGES HOOVERS A	Hyduks a		COMBOL	
MONTHUM DESCRIPTION	PAIL JRE	300	OVENYINESSULIE	2	SAY8 OCAN	UKOD J	CONTINUENCES ON DEVIN	BUTPLIEN AND	Laron brills Recomed		
		*	Š	š			ECOUPMENT	SEASING PAYERS			
Piro hetak itutuk boutar midom im jarrad Joono mid Ulirown into bottam of Turnao damuging burnora and tuban	nitr.	0'1	હ.	0*8	are.	70	Cutting (035%) Suldor Ribles softorn	प्रित्तिक्ष १ सा, फिरीशम १,सम्बर्ध १,सम्बर्ध	4 Bridger 4 Cartiviou 20 Idora 4 Brigkingera	րեղն <u>r սոստո</u> նն	
thentor frume bogling to bucklo gounday shouring of indet and outler connections to boater and deformation of internal tubes	: a	e -	e e	G R	9 g	3	Colling tours	Drick Group prato 3 11, Lie day tudy 3 4unis-calps 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	d Drichermore d Bostermore doliver holiver notherm d Trebtore d Trebtore d Taboroca s reducter d Wildern d Wil	Dyeppering given in for a first with for a first part with forest the Driented Constant when the Drients were confinitely man was confinitely man with a first would on the first for a first for a forest on the confinitely 1-2/2 timen the comprehence of the forest for a forest forest for a forest for	
Hantor freso fully through buokling and furnace ovorturns	ם דנג'	e e	0.4	÷ ė	94	-	Rolling Voren Rugelog ognitasoft Tabley voldoli Berasik	Brit.) State 1 pr. 30 State of the State of	derectance helpora helpora helpora deference latecora latecora lentence len	·	

The second of th

£1-5

CEBSCIIPTION: 10 ft alimator by 75 ft long, 40,000 ft2, 2 tirow 1/2 in, plate wall 8 ft high at loy and and 10 ft high at high and, the Plan hadding one and - algebrage housting athor and all bride. Direct gent drive through gone reducers. Barner one and, Plan end, Plan end of the share finded in plate, Dischery housing has "tines" plates, plates.

		4 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5				
		אנסהווונס ואסהווונס		i Equipment operatoru 2 tronvorkoru 2 wezderu	2 Equipeant cpertura 3 Iromorkers 2 Welders 2 Pelecs	4 inhoreeu 2 uilheruhta 2 leintoon 2 leintoorkera 2 kaldora 3 bileellera 3 bileellera 4 fipe fictora
REPAIR USTIMATES	เรอบเทเอ	פווארונפ אאני	SPANC PAILTS	1/4 placo Renecural chapor	1/4 plato Revetural whype. Lings pluto Piplug for	Bp 180 bull whool and pinton Pire brick forlow platon Platon Platon Brunch platon Brunch ploton Broing
	MESOUNCES HOOUTH	CONTINUENTON	KOUMENT	Craw Catting tarch Waldor	Critic Corch	Chilling toreh Wollor Higging gour
	50.5	HEOD	1000	G	2	÷
	MASI.	LAYB	2	ນຕ	2	ē a
	7 OF	0.5	90%	B. 4	e. 0	o.
	PROHABILITY OF	OVERPHERRUTE	ğ	e':	= =	9.1
	110	8	*	9'4	0'8	n 2
DAMAGE ESTIMATES		CAUSE OF	- 1	9111° 4	Drug	Dr. e.g.
UNMAGE		DEBGNIPTION		litako duét son flue duit erunkod and ruptured	All are broken	Kiln ir diaphaad aff sountings, gift gent touth are broken, sesse deforbation of gilb shoil

The second secon

age to age to

**(\*)** 

CHARLE WASHING AND MACHENTAL CONTRACTOR

(-1x)

UMIT: Contribunt Pap

of the source of the second se

Children anothern state than a tell had and

DESCRIPTION: and of Till, Sou dest, 4 in, Dinak., 14 in, most., Cl came, Cl bows, 46 hp motor, AKA Rid, type,

	-			Unit, Dusporable
		LARDI BKILLB HEGUURED	Cortified  wedder  wodder  boder  liberier	Pipo fillor Bloctricini Miloror I debior I disperior Operator Corified
REPAIR ESTIMATES	i Eouiii ko	RUPPLIES AND SPANE PANTS	Ptpe geskets	Remit.
	HEBDIICES HEOLITED	COMBYNCETION OIS NEPAIN COMPARAT	One-neary lens Lardh Woldfing abelinu	Grenn
	171	IIEOO (DAVB)	<del></del>	c
		DAYS HEOD	÷	=
	200	11K 09%	14.0	2, 3.
	PROBABILITY OF	OVERPRESSIE	0'81	*
	240	17,	01#5	0
DAMAGE ESTIMATES		CAURE OF FAILUNG	Drug &	or month
	The first A seminated by the seminated b	DAMAGE DFACHIFTION	Nusp intot and outlet pipus beauk	than plats and the shores the shorest off, when the sover, brings and prime sover, brings and prime sover, brings from we settle too we settle from we settle too south the south of the so

一般の一般の ないない とうない としない ないない ないましないがく

. C. .

<u> </u>	<del></del> -						
		COMMENTS					
		-	עלפטווענט וונטרווענט		B Kluetrioisus B Kinkers	2 Higgers	Highwin 1 Kourten 2 Levorura 2 Levorura 1 Kourten oliereter
Las processors and the second	REPAIR ESTIMATES	HECHINED	BUPPLIER AND	SPANS PANTS	thie places Echtur cullu	Countist trux Couls	Mater places thater polls Ancher bolts Grout Autor sinft
		HEBOUNCER HECKNINED	CONSTRUCTION	COUPMENT			Crono Compignation Jack Pressor Truck
		I W	HEUD	A A A C	-	*	<u> </u>
		<u> </u>	DAVA	_	Ξ	ě	ā
		2	*	ž	0'#		0.64
		FHOP ANILITY OF	OVERPRESSURF	<b>200</b>	0.6	z.	o.
ronous		FECE	OVE	1,4	0.1	?	9.
בנישי האווהות	DAMAGE ESTIMATES	40 99140	FAILURE		Minnilon Laiff.	Missilon, 45ff. & dring	Albario.
OESCRIPTION 1000 Sp. 400 rps. synchronoup		2474	DESCRIPTION		Middler debugs vient builties, wushing wovers shipt alventia (if dangud	Kloukric york fullbufflons to guide oth moverul, lighlut die in dolorwif	divisor 1991 to shent, mitae despendings, penindro danago to solor combine combine from obaries
DESKINIPTIO					Minni dir	Klenkric to sulor number	dependents peubahts pontur pontur pontur pontur

WHATER STANDED AND THE SECOND OF THE SECOND

THE SECTION OF THE PROPERTY OF

And the robbits contributed and the robbits of the robbits of an indicated and the robbits of contributed and the robbits of t

3

UNIT: Mean Turbing brive

The first of the second contract of the second seco

enit insperable COMMENTS KESCHIPTION: Bingle stage 26 dp., 3005 rps., 160 paix inter, 40 ps/s rehegat, confloted, rechanters governor, ring order boarings. Pipu fittore Wolster Cortified Wolder Mislwright Indoror y Pipe fillers laborer Riugners Equipment operator Milberabi Obertfors welder LABÓA BXILLB REQUINES 1 Millwright Grout Expansion bolts Whim stock Coupling REPAIN ESTIMATES New Historica and Sovernor valve Pipo & fittings BINFLIEB AND BPANE FAHIS REBOYNCER VEDUINFO E E COMBTHUES AN ON RAPSIN FOURMENT Ocy-neatelens toren Rolding medi. Crone Compressor Jack hanner TIME HEOD (DAYS) • 74 MAN. Ţ Ξ Ξ 366 16.0 5.6 - F E. FROUGHILITY OF FAILUNE AT DIVEN OVEHPRESSUNE 101 0'51 0' 77 84.3 7.7 - -- - : - : ×-9.0 9.07 2. Mineile, drug & diff. CALINE OF DAMADE ERFIMATER Minnite Le dron Drug & Drag ¥ Cooling sotor pipe and drain convertions to turbine are Bleas inter and outlet pipes to the touch diverting tentume deformed with guvernir valve deformed Anathur balla abour and
thebline 1. diaplacod off
exactour, all ontornal
piping connections acverad DAMAGE DESCHIPTION

UNIT! BOYOF

LANDER CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR OF THE PERSON OF T

		LABOR SKILLS COMMENTS	HOUNED	Milleright Pipo fitter Laborer	Milwrights Dipe fitter Eloctricion Laboror
	ndpa'a Batimates	A.P. In Harmond !	SUPCLIES AND	Atuel plote 1 M	froot plure finalization Angle, fron Bueting Conduit and wire
		HI BOURCES HEOURIED		Plane entitue	Plum entling voldor
		TIME.	10.4%	7	<del>-</del>
		MAR	303K	c	5
		NO.	X OA	0.5	o.
		FROMABILITY OF	×03	0,0	19.0
		OF C	=	0' <del>+</del>	e *
4	ESTIMATES	CAUSE OF	FAILUME	Diff & drag	7 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 -
4	DAMACI	DAMAGE	DERCHIPTION	Bucking of blower quaing and negation of cutlet	High and

Second School of Englands Second Seco

And the second s

				COMMENTS			Unit inoperable	
	фиур Поог.			LAHON BRILLA		1 Pipe fittor	1 Pipe fillor 1 Insulator	Pipo fittoral
	ita mantad 3 ft.	HEPAIH ESTIMATES	INCOUNTED	BUPPLIES AND	SPANE PANTS	Qualic	Piper Canger	Pipo-fings Follings folls finalation Ejuctor parts
	or and ejactor un		HEROUNGES INCOUNED	COMPTHUCTION	FOURMENT			Wereing offertiment
	100fu   * .		1	00	(DAYB)	-	<b>a</b>	=
			MAN	DAYB	IIEOD	-	3	2
	ים בים בים בים בים בים בים בים בים בים ב	DAMAGII UBTIMATOS	10	), E	38	G. E		о н
			PROBABILITY OF	OVERPRESSURE	<b>3</b> 6	77 77	7. CT	6.
	: :		084	ò	×.	0' 11	0,21	e:
						Diff, &	Drag &	Diff.
CARROLL CONT.	observerions 3 wealth in the difference by 8 ft long. After condonner-injector and ejector unita manned 3 ft sbave Hoor.	DAMACIE		DESCRIPTION		Prowntro gango seashod and Imporable	Moon thirt pipe and contennate entitlet pipe break as the connection to the pipe multiple	Unit dimplaced off of foundation and overturns when anchor botts fail, all overturns gennections are severed and obouters intogral piping suffers answered ofersation

			8 2 3 5 5 5		Manual operation roguined		
			LABON SKILLS		2 Pipe fittors	2 Pipo fitters Centified welder I Welder 2 Miggers 2 Laborers	2 Milwrights 3 Miggors 1 Miggingon Coportion 2 Dipo fittors 1 Cortified welder 2 Laborura 2 Laborura 2 Laborura 3 Laborur
	REPAIN OSTIMATAS	IEGUIRSO	BUPPLIES AND	BPANE PANTS	Pipo, tabing promniro gaugos tomp, indicatore	Pipe	Motor what the Water Water Chapter of the Water Cha
iora		HEROVINCER HEOVIRTO	COMBTRUCTION	EOUIFMENT			Granv
4 091(1)		3	100	(DAYH)	52	¢.	3
ר י (מישו) י		NAM	DAYB	1 00 1 00	-	=	3
ngo nte		200	<u> </u>	ક	1,0	0'v1	9 5
2-st		PROBABILITY OF	PAILUNE AT GIVEN OVERPRESSURF	<b>7</b> 04	0'6	14,0	o
rado br		F 5	Š	-	0'8	0.12	0.00
po, balance	ESTIMATES		CAUSE OF		NIMETO, drok 4 drff,	Diff., drag & missile	drad drad
DESCMIPTION: 1809 hp, 480 epm, balancod opposed 2-stugo nie gosp., 4 cylindues	MUZE ESLIM		DEAMAGE DEAGHINTON		Shall centrol pipsing grugos rupturod, indicuving grugos system and imporable	Deformation of oxygenal piping with remotive broaks and evpturos occuering	Miniturent del motor

ANDA COUNTER IN SHORE SHOWING CARD. ARTHUR SHIPPING CONTRACTOR IN THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY

0-B

大学 からい いいましています こうしょう

UNITY Caparitings Compressor

BOVING	DAMAGE ESTIMATES							AEPAIN UBTIMATES		
		5	PHOBABILITY OF	5			HEBOVICES AFOUNCED	REDUKED		
DAMAGE	CAUSE OF	200	OVERPHESSURE			ar an	COMPTRUCTION	SUPPLIE AND	t Album Skill &	COMMINIS
		2	*00	šã	2032	(DAYA)	CH HEPAIN CHUPPIENT	SPANI PAPTA		
Short gentrol pipting rupturol, gangos shoshol and impopolato	Alantle, deng k diff,	818	9.6	0'+	-	э		Provente gauge a Tomp, 1621 atura pipe, toning	a Pipe filters	dinia que il test
intot and outlot pipon spensol off at compositon to gospitoman	a a a	Ç.	o .	9	R	8	Cruno	+ to 0 1 d	Bliggera 2 Pipo fitti en 3 Ki d'arignta 3 Woldora 1 Kqui pazni 3 parenter	
Compround displaced of familia in the constitution of the constitu	3 - 1	6,	Š	e	÷	ź	Chapterwork	Pertine	2 Collegen Chargeous Operator Salversalte 2 Xalversalte 2 Piper fittors 2 Holdery	
					A many discount and a second	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				

USPF BANGOLFIC Contensor

CONCRIPTION: D (2 disemper by N ft hint) on mernight mids, 107 ft. - mounted 38 ft above krude - 3 to, toil 9150 ft. 1-1/2 to, studes - 3 in, rather, 4 in, has nonate,

	DAMACH COTIMATER							REPAIR ESTIMATER		
		300	PHOKAHIKITY OF	2	34	imi	HESOURCES HEOPINED	HEQUINED	The street or the street street or the stree	**********
	האואטונב ראואטונב ראואטונב	<u>*</u>	OVERPILEMENT	*An	UAYA	A POD (DAYS)	CONSTXUETION OH REPAIN POUPMENT	BUPPLIES AND NAME PANTS	AFOUNTS AFOUNTS	8 11 100000
Control and Konstarting Medica spished condomer whether refully on working	Drff, 4 deag	=	e -	⇒ a	=	5	Great Callein torch Wolder	Mullan	1 Equipment operator 1 Worder 1 Dige fitting 7 Lemmirker	
Cubdurat ovortuma, sago doama, sago doama, sago doama, sago doama, sago doama, sago	H <sub>1</sub> V <sub>2</sub> V <sub>3</sub>	e e	e f	ę	â	5	Crasse Calling tores Synffolding	Ternened francis (Francis (Francis Francis Fra	H Woldors  2 Reviewent  2 Pertified  1 Cortified  Woldor  1 Inpulator	

THE CONTROL OF THE CO

762

a sent Atheres continues even nathemaring and makempanality bandous to part and a particular and the second transfer of the second transf

The Market Market Standard St

Carlo Book to Brown Carlo China China

33

. . . . . . .

• •

-507

Charles who will have selected and a service of the service of the

USTE Chloring dox Dryor

COMMENDE CUBCRIPTION: A REAGON S II diamato: by 20 ft bigh, RGS (12) to 10, 18lot and 10 fm, bestelf 141/2 fy, seld intol cab ourbots languaged salecate." 4 Laborora 2 Ptpn ft tora Any tisor of the tisory of the Laugh skills Heddined THEOLINGES SYCHURGO Herrica on thouse Cost the piech isotent Revertige and bottles of the door in the Buttily and spape painte Braking squipmin Canstillation On Hopail Elliphy (m) TIPE JEOD OLYN \* NAN. Daya Head S Ę 7.0 ¥. 200 FRUITABLITY OF FALURE AT GIVEN \$ | = 7 2 0. 6 DAMAGE EDTIMATES CAUST OF FAILUME Drag Drag Outest press suparabul from countril to the first tower occition to develop towers tower out of the first to the first out of the first bullets. Sower overtures, neverthe all commertions, ()vo noutlons are negalished and bythe years DAMAGI OC SCHIPTICH

The state of the s

stear or and the superconstitution of the state of the st

C-27 UNIT: C

UNIT: Contribugo

DESCRIPTION: 30 bp, 3 in, inlac, 3 in, outlet, (9) Mive, 1 in, conn.

				<u> </u>		
			KOPANEN IS	famint operation required		Brit imporable
			LABOR BRILLS FAO: UREC	1 Pipe Sitter	2 Wildory	1 Jaborer 2 Rivers 2 Rivers 3 Rivers 3 Vigers 3 Pipe filters
	HEPAIN EUSIMAYES	ntaunto	BUSOLIEB AND BPAIR CARTE	Pipe Prone gaugon fluyacactore		Expuncion Balls Unlouding mach, parcs Xiro Krout
		20	CONSTRUCTIONS OF REPAIR EQUIPMENT	ļ	Oxy-acotylonu vorch Wolding math.	Çı ileşi
		4711	II COO II	5	•	3
		7	27.578 NEOD	n		3
		20	¥66	۸,0	9.0	3
		PROBABILITY OF	OVENIFIERSAINE 562	9,6	E E	* ·
		OHA	ě z	0'8	0'x	0,0
	DAMAGE KETIMATES		נעומע סג נעומענ	Mustle 4 dreg	Au.u?	7 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
	ВАМАОВ		HOHAIRDS CO	Badl control pipica cuplurud	Yout pipe shaared at convection to contrifuge	Mounting builts shoot and controlling, all connocisons shored, univerling suchanism jurged end deraged

THE THE POST OF THE SECOND SEC

The second state of the se

THE SECTION OF THE PROPERTY OF

E S

<b>JESCHIPTION</b>	(inerota	aca tub and	a tar	- JCMOI	ower individual units o to	WALLA	~	<b>±</b>	=	5	0 45 Up 0 ft by 0 ft	ift by a ft, 1,18 tons i	=======================================	-	or thy Cl,	, CI,	Capacity,	
	17 AK 174	I'M NO.	100	_														

_							
		сомментя			goll insparable syon displaced of nour frigs	damages  o Shirelaing sy other calla o Orienteries to binet wave o Apace belaces	
			הקשוו מאורנט הבטטוונט		a nigora	d linguist a pipo fittore	A Nepo filtora
	REPAIR ESTIMATES	(A) IEO(3) IEO	WAPLIER AND	SPANC PANTS	Congrote condition of the condition of t	Congreto cell top- Mer, pipo fittings Mar, montante Mat of anoides Bat of enthodes	Concrete cell top (w) I wall unit M we, wealente Mars, unselve McL of carbodom Misc, plue Pittinge
		ASOUNCES HEORIGIES	CONTRIBUTION ON HEYAIR	ROUIPMENT	Rahk be aquipaent Rahk Popk Alfe	Hugging squipment Constructo cell top 2 highery lighted that pipo fill fill fill fill fill fill fill fil	Highling aquipment Concrete cell top 2 Baggeor Base (2011 will unit of Kipo fit My et anulonite of Kipo fit My et anulonite of Kipo fit Mare, pipo Fittings
		17714	1000	WAT 31	n	=	÷
		MAN. DAYB REGO		No. of	-	z	=
		fo	S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S		0'6	e v	e
		PHOUSELITY OF	OVERPRESSURE	ACTA	G H	H.7	7. 2.
		1014 1014	0	1%	0'1	સ્ક	e, c
	EDTIMATES		לאוליטוג פל		חנני	3.2	
	DAMAGE ESTIMAT		CHRCEFTICK		Contitute for influent number of a state of the state of	Charte to tap auffors britical failure (violating district distric	About and unfolto wath 2all frequentialist to blace were blace with the blace were blace with the blace will be and wolly and the blace concrete lining increases and shangling untraster and shangling untraster and shangling untraster.

The state of the s

UNIT: Booker Type Rivetralytic Cell (gentimmel)

K P

DESCRIPTION								essential property property.	Start For the Control of the Control	on branch year, but attacked the	
DAMAGU EBTIMATE	BYIMATES	7	114V-114			***************************************	The second secon	HEPAIR COTIMATER	68		Ī
DAMAGE	GAURE OF	FAILU	PROBABILITY OF PARTURE AT GIVEN OVERPRESSURE	2 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	<del></del>	11800	HEROUNGE CONSTRINGTION	HEROUNGER HEQUINED HIGHON RUSELLER AND	ראווסוו מונוירצ	COMMENTS	
		*	700	<b>700</b>	00 Ju	(DAVB)	COUPARKY	SPANE PAINTE			
Coll displaced off ceramic linealster menticular and the filest waves, displaced on the requiremental control better, preferble better, preferble better, preferble better and covering free replacement. Cathodon would love ambaton covering from lepact and brokwish of brite, requiring replacement, All control brokwish of brite, requiring replacement, All control brokwish of brite, requiring replacement, All control brokwish of brite, requiring coll, and the control brokwish of brite, requiring replacement of free of the control brokwish of brite, required of coll.	יני ווני	0.0	÷	o*6						The orientation of the 200 cells array to the bload wave can be accounted for. An example for an array of 3 cells hong for every 1 cells would but por ablant weve impling in the sell array cultiply overpressure flauren on left by 0.0. For blest wave on the long side of the left by 0.0. For blest wave on the long side of the left by 0.0. For blest wave on the long side willight overpressure flauren by 1.1.	of or tor. or tor.

LANGE OF THE STATE OF THE STATE

" Proffer ",

the second of th

TO THE REST. LETTERS

, zš. č.,

Indice absorption and the contraction of the contra

en et an tel fidelit finance en -

-, ·

The state of the second st

CHACHIPTION: Motion atpreciation atpreciation atpreciation attention, attention, problem in the control of the period of the control of the c 

ومسيسو و به دخواط قو کی عماموم مستحده در روستان	2000 2000 2000		v enfemba gasa, i ja visikkia yar. Arrantea				
	1	ILOVINED INTO	2 Dougorkoru 2 Milischille 1 Aulder 1 Vulanister	2 tronworkers 2 Wilferights 2 Wilsons 1 Wilsonsker 2 Usten fillers	Price filters 2 leginoriters 1 Welder 3 Nilberghin 1 Siteaning	2 Privo fictors 1 Fromorfice 2 Milyrights 4 Valcanteor	
REPAIR SETIMATES	AROUNEO.	SPANE PANTS	Abody insulators of principly spills of but yet public of the principle of	Plate scort Graphere (11)er	Copper birs by we wat we have having their and their birs have and birs has been been and birs have been been and birs have been been been been been been been be	Copper hars and 2 x's Ancie theology 2 Ancies and 14 adjustments 1 for Cly and II, the Cly and	
***************************************	18	CONTRACTOR OF CO	Calling Corol. Position Angle greenwer Nulconfilm platone	Sisting sorch	ballar torch Catler torch Fridar	Hibriting touto Catting toruh Wilder	
dispense of Standar	TIME	UKEN VIVAT)	=	=	2	•	
744400 100	*****	DAYB	=	=	ę s	ž	
	3.2	3 S	7	i k	e	۶. د م	
* Year 1, 1444 1 to	PROGRAMEITY OF	NEGRIPH COURT	7	n e	e	- · · · ·	
	PRE	à Z	0'3	o	3.	e e	
DAMAGE \$311MAY28	CALIRE OF	PAN, SINE	1111, h minnila	ner.	Gray & doff. G evinally	Drog &	
UNANG	LINEAL STANFORM THAT IN MINISTERINATE IN THE STANFORM BILLION OF THE STANFORM STANFO	<u> </u>	Chart glade deforms causting access counting access counted to antitude of percent of pe	Dictoration of Atom of Orthodorous with wish the William of Atom of the Contract of States	Cl. 1 ft, out, lot piken whiteful of a cultrate to coll the attraced his actualism and house adjustment althoughts adjustment althoughts and annio headings	Coll dividing of encyting and the over quinting four if worsery, support entra the server of his compression tre coll ben deviation and probability of porcessi minde deviations of the server of the	

OGSCHIPTICAL OF A diarator drine, 4 ft "eldo, 78 ft", thrus 3-in. easingt lone, thrus 1-in, connections, 25 ff thin drive.

THE STATE OF THE S

では、これのでは、これには、これがないできない。 これがい こうじゅう かんしゅう こうてんしょう しょうしん

<del></del> -								
-19(24)(1910)		COMMENTS			Uste, the wealth			
ALE TO BE DO NOT BE ARE ALCOHOLOGICAL TO THE PARTY OF THE		LABON BKILLS REGULIED		2 Pronactions 1 Winder 1 Pipe filter	2 Pipe fittors 2 Froncorbors 2 Melder	Propestar Priore Polder Pro filtera	Trumorkera A disimplyhe B Pipa fittepp I Weldar	A Malberchie Molder Molder B Pryo filters
REPAIR EGYIMATES	II \$ OUTUS	SUPPLIES AND	SZANC PANTS	Surved grid meticon Rolled plate	Patrol piping	Corved grid nuctions Rollod place Flat plate Flat plate	Pipe-fillenft.da	Hinro filtor Grus Holfod pilysn Flot panto Pipo-fique, -fras
VATI	UZHINOSH SSOUNTSH	CONSTITUTION DI BEFAIR	BUNIFMENT	Cutting toteh Wolder Priviler buffer frightly noutpient		Sarring torch Kerlyst Orinior biffyr Algging squipsent	ngking oquipson.	likain, equipamit
		00 M		6	=	>	τ	٠
	1	SAYR		s	2	5	ä	3
	3	3.6	\$	e a	e a	* -	3.	0,41
	PROBABILITY OF	OVENIFIESOUSE	žė:	a a	a a	3	? \$	g g
-	Ž	ò	2	0'7	0, 5	0.4	7.b	0.01
DAMAGE BUTIMATED		CAUSE OF		Mination 6 drag	DLCC, A Fran & blantlu	Drug & missilu	2 3:	ими
· , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		DESCRIPTION	7 THE R. P. LEWIS CO., LANSING, S. L. P. L	the filter arid on the plact leaded side to tare by mentles	Bok)) euntrol piting rup/ursd, gauges smaebud am) insperable	Pilly, Keld Adporting Engeled on than I ladd side coldupe into filter drub. Intursal piping limite drub demand by missiles	Ancher wilth physicand vicinity filter is shifted off the bane, unternal piping commontains along	Filter overteens, the filter drum in manshed, the filter fails in biddind, minafiguent occups byween filter drive meter and madt

Manual durate mentioned Selections, Company

- Incompassion of the second state of the second se

UNIT! BEEUT CHARREL

G-0

OSSCRIPTION: 12 in, diameter by 30 ft lang fully engloved, 7040 ftt, . ocar fysis on injut-free discherse - 2 HP chain drive - mornted A ft above ground - 1/2 rivyl bulton.

Book Marie Mari

Marie Control of Superior State State Control of

		2 Cariota 1 2	Val C Incoverable			
		LAUCH BRILLS MEQUINED	1 Frankorius 1 Wolder	A Proportors 1 Wolder 1 Millwright	1 Politoriant	i minerentore i milarient
HEPAIN ASTIMATES	REQUIRED	BUGHLIEB AND	Anto plate	Rolled plate Pest plate	Rolled plate Flat plate	Ratted plate First prato Section of Euglacowont Trank and trankl
Primeral transference bestricts primerates p	i	CONSTRUCTION ON HERAIN	Wilten toren	Chilling Lordh Hareing Lordh Hypen Jack Ogulpbani	theedry corob Sport of the Poper shou squipment	Chiting torch Houting torch North Juck Oquipment Kikking oquipment
		PROD	a	r.	÷	6
		DAYE		<b>-</b>	2	<u> </u>
-	5	EASUNE SA		: -	<u> </u>	3 2
	PROMARILITY OF	OVERPREASORE	12.	ກ,	3. 3.	11.6
	016	ž	n'a	9. <del>0</del>	¢ *	e 3
DAMAGE ESTIMATES		CAURE OF	2 2	BLFC. A Blanco	MICHERO MICHERO	D + 4 0
DAMAGE	į	DAMAGG DEBCAIPTION	Aldon and top of convoyor trough dunkly inwards jasming flight convoyor (mutn serva (codur)	Plights (serve throuds) ava partially defensed	Pight conveyor whift suffers alght nemigroup with countershof goar box and is also sirelizind with its nemier bestings	Conveyor in displaced of its bountlings when andbor builts shout cenator, severa dispersation of the shaft and conveyor fitthes, and severo buckling and rupture of trough

UNIT, Chiriteur

congress and the contract of t

A CONTROL OF THE SECOND SECOND

2000 W.

- 191

OESCHIPTION: 30 ft diabutor stout tonk, 30 ft high, 40,146 ft<sup>2</sup>, - 2 seoup stos and blades mainted on centur drive pedestal - studes printed on centur drive pedestal -

	DAMAGE ESTIMATOR							REPAIR ECTIMAYES		
		A C	PROBABILITY OF	10.3		***	HISOURCES ARXINED	RECOINED		
DENGHIPTION	CAUSE OF	30	CVERPRESCUR	:		301	CONSTITUCTION	SUPPLIES AND	LABON SKILLS REGUINED	COMMENTS
		Z	ž	ž.		_	AOUIPMENT	SPARK PAHTS		
Tank uplifted on binat leaded wide with bottom rupturing 1/2 of offcuntownee along joint with sholl platon; brine contot pipe ruptured at gonnewtion to tank	: E	o 1	0,	0,4	<del>-</del>	e e	Culting toren Keliup Genza Bikating oquipment	Ao) lui plates Bret plates Bretural Shipos Tompareny Actualis Postes Plyo and These bolts	4 Talkerore 1 Page filter 2 Certified 2 Proleorkore 2 Molfore 2 Paulore 2 Paulore 2 Paulore 2 Paulore 3 Paulore 5 Paulore	Clarifier incperable
Drivo motor and supporting Rodhandsman tain from aupporte authling duformation of driving shaft	7	o ±	?. c	0.01	2	2	Catting torch Walder	Fig. phitos Distring Short Cours ings	A Tronsstern 3 Wellern 1 Millorium Christopen 4 Inborern 1 Pipe filter volder	

About the and the second of the second of the second second to the second the second that the second tensor the second tensor the second tensor tenso

. . . .

.

A CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF TH

Land have nowed the same the bound of the same of the same

and the same of the same time is a fact to the

ontrentationalakearadatathpheantionalakeary, orreserve cambara becomplessed between

			4	COMMENTA	·	Julof and say-mor E	Unbolt, roset. Fufrimo and valuelt	
II, cont tron,				LABOR SKILLS		7 Pipe (Ittora	2 Fronsorkers 2 Pipe filters 2 Equipment	filtora 2 fromeoritora 2 squipmons opolatora
nstructed of 1/4 i		REPAIR BETIMATES	REGUINCO	GNV VAITAJINS	SPARE PARTS	Joints of 4 th. flanked pipe	Jointa of 4 in, I finish pipe Miscellsheds structured	duints of 4 in. I impostinges Hiscollancens #1 foolstancens #1
O OUTUMN TONE, CO.		AND S-COUNTY AND COMMISSIONS AND AND COMMISSIONS AND COMMISSIO	HEROTHICES RECUMEN	CONKINUCTION	COUPMENT		Cruno Higging oquipment finnseilaneum Wolding oquipment Mincellaneum Mincellaneum Mincellaneum	Kighing orgithment Kulding orgithment
An and 16	. 124		N. C.	HECOD	(SAVS)	-	G.	5
a colub			rd A N	UAVE	arab	я	=	ş
11 11 11 11			0 ×	75	1.	9.0	₹ <b>*</b>	0,61
10 001	<del>2</del> <del>2</del>		FILCHE AT DIVEN	OVENPARRIUM	ğ	e'u	F-	9 3
rface,	101101		2 2	ð	ŗ	oʻe	5. 5.	40.9
gooding sor	alvr, aath	DAMADU USTIMATED	40 001147	IAILUIK		BPRA	10 m	Minus a
DESCRIPTION: 1250 MA FL of GAMILIN MATERIES, 10 SOUTHING LI A COLUMN AND 10 GALANDE TONE, CONSTRUCTED OF 1/2 IN, SAME IFON,	cio cidy (Abia		1047	CORCUMENTAL		Meth inter and outlot pipon to gold contain emplies (? beneke)	detal ganture white ulightly off have two importions	Adul varien ovaquamistron Puptuptug of Intergommertron Jointy

UNIT. Package Ketfiga pation Symbon

į

Per selections and alleger ch

The second secon

URSCHIPTION: (2) 160 hp coapercomers (2) 160 hp motor deterra, whitee equipole to empenate by flexible couplings

DAMAGE	12	8						HEPAIN COTIMATES		
AMP W 40 0 July 1284 19 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15		Kare a	PHOHIAILLITY OF		7		HEADUACER HEQUINED	160vmrp		
COFNORMERICAL	CAURE OF	300	OVEHPHERRUMS	-	DAYA DAYA	100	COVATRUCTION	HUPPLIEB AND	LARON BAILYS	COMMENTS
		2	1474	ž	CCOM	Days.	ECHIPMENT	WANE PANTS	ļ	
Control gauges sunded and troporable	DITC. 4.	o' n	2.5	G*#	•	_	Мони	Pressura gauge Temperatura control valvas Thermenters	a Pipe fittors I Blegirician	Specific damage to the press mount of the refrigeration mynthm in covered in Tables C-10 and C-20.
Control panel saughed and tort from the sountings, control wiring and piping the several at the panel	DIFF. & winnile	0.0	n e	7.0	2	=	Chain boint	Motor mentur Halaya Contuctora Yubing, with	2 Pipe fitters 2 Biotricione 2 Shootmital	
Mater competions to the lubs oil enolor are severed	Dran & minnilo	7.0	*.	ē.	<u> </u>	2	Chain hean	Ptps (plus s)) of noove)	2 (1)10 (1) tors 2 Electricians 3 Shoytman	
Water injet and outlet pipes to the conles and condenses rupture	Drug & Mine 11c	0,	e E	9.01	ā	r	Oxy-meetlyono toreh Chain hoint	Plips (plus all af abovo)	Cortified wolder wolder a Wolder 1 Wolder 1 Melecriters 2 Meetwels and the swither	
Mindiginent ind princ movor	:	o.	a.	F. 98	2	×		Blim mtook (plim all of abova)	Cortified wolder a Melder 2 Pipe fitters 2 Electricians B Sheetmets miths Millerights	

BENEFIT OF THE CONTROL OF THE OFFICE OFFICE

.

. A de la respectablication de la manda de la respectación de la respe

per librar ble ser a socialism of the

A LINEAU LEAN AND LEAST AND THE AND TH

(E-2-) UNIT. Automotive Kepnikural

UNIT, ABSTOCKED SEPTEMBER DESTRUCTION OF BOAR DESTRUCTION OF THE SEPTEMBER OF THE SEPTEMBER

See the second of the second s

DBBGNIVTIDA, 460 CIV, (NV VIIM, AIF		Drivr, 10 ic. Alamotor, 0 ft krub	B 10. B	;						
SPLUMIN NOWYCO	CHTIMATES.				*		-	HEFAIR ESTIMATES	-	
LAWALIF	Cavite Of	_	FREDMINLITY OF	YAY YAY	nin!	, INIC	Headings aredings	PEGUINED		COMMUNIE
NO HOUDERO	Lavitone	3 6	OVERWINGE IN	7	SAY? MEDI:	HEGD 10AYED	CONSTRUCTION CH HEPAIR	Should and	HEQUINED HE	•
Property librations, to a print, but the first that	U.C. S		 6	×. °	-	<u> </u>		Premiser gange handley auntraller	l lipe fitter I Kloetrician	Verticed
Control panek severely deficient and kaya free lin bountlake, anakrol wirang and piping in	Bist, &	3	7.	٤.	e	=		Property Hauge Control of Vive Constit Things	Pipe Cittore Etoctifelma Misetsotel	Vast tueporable
Fifty porvous of abold oxternal plump to rupturual	Dr. 18 1 1 C	ė :	= :	3	<b>\$</b>			Promitty controlly, vivo Conduit (Soduit Physic	Pipe Aitter Riverician Mortectal	
bryns gwertur s, ald tripf and outlot, ptpus are ruptured	a state	3	e e	ž Ž	<b>c</b>	Ŧ	Sulting sacking Oggrandity lung to yell	Propense gauge Climidity Conforter Mive Conduit Orbing Prps	1 Pipa ditter 1 Cortistad 201der 1 Welder 1 Mederician 1 Bluospettel	

The state of the s

0.-30

UNIT, Control Cambion

DESCRIPTION: A fi wide restion, 7 ft 8 in. Right tan 1784 tan 1365 tae 75C, tent PROI the 1365 tae 75C, tent PROI

CAMA(16 (ISTIMAT	(STIMATES							REPAIN BOTIMATES	Art Lê descriptores describes de la Section de la Constitución de la C	***************************************	
		0.2	PHOHABILITY OF	2	77.7	1	HEBOUNCES REDUNED	กะอบเหยือ			
DESCHIPTION	באחשב מג	ð	OVERPRESAURE		8AVQ	100	COMBTHUCTION	SUPPLIER AND	LAROH SKILLS HEQUITED	COMMENTS	
		*	×oç	X O	an a	10.7.0	EQUIPMENT	SPANC PANTS			
Matera nickun and inepozeblo abetta bons and indicating apea bodty daturage	Diff. & Visualfo	9.1	v ·	e n	•	c		Propage controllora laval controllora (veguratura cura evalara	l Bloctrician	Marial aperation of programme programme and of programme	
Khuvrivo) comparitori auvorud, ppersatio control ligor pupturud requirtal regiacranik, panol peard duriegnj	Diff. &	÷ .	9. E	*.	5	2		Plow controllors (Personal Port part) Controllors Controllors Controllors Controllors Plow controllors	Pipo filler   Birctrian   Musikatal   Musikatal		
Control culticise anaplately doubleways	D117. 6	0 4	3 6	6	<u> </u>	5	לוח בינה להוה להוה להוה להוה להוה להוה להוה לה	Nubing Miro Dropento Controller Controller Controller Controller Controller Subspecture Subspecture Subspecture Subspecture	1 Pips 111ter 1 Ringter 2 Higgor 1 Moldor 1 Loberto		

TO LOS CONTRACTORS OF THE CONTRA

こうしゅうけいていないないない

THEOD KATONIK ZATOTOTAKINIKA KATOTOTOTOTOKOBIRIKANIKINIKANIKANIKA KATALAMAN PARAMAN PARAMAN KATATAN PARAMAN KATA

C- 53

LINIT PHING AND PHINGS HOUSE

			200				
Per par a resultable demands par demands to the		F. (************************************		ויייינים אינינים		A Tronscript 2 Voldors 2 Cran operators	2 fromvorkor seffork 2 feffork 2 feffork 2 fortified 2 fortified welder 3 thuisters
	· double docker ·	ARPAIR ESTINATES	AKOURED	SUPPLIER AND	MANY PARTS	ttructura) alepoa	Almoturol Mpo Immilation Actual
SERVICE TO PICK LIVER CANDELLINES OF CANDELL	romat, 1990 ft <sup>3</sup> , ~		กาสดดเลยเล สะอยเลย	CONTROCTION CONTROCTION	LOUIFMENT	Catving forch Welder Grans Cribbing	Greens Callon Gribbing Gribbing
	7 L		I I	ar/11	104731	73	2
	- ~ •		NAN.	CAYB	a E	<u>\$</u>	2 2
-			3.3	ž	ś	a'n	9.
-	7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	MIND PAPER OF TOPICS	FROUNGILITY CIF	CVERPILESSURY	1,14	٥٠,٨	¢ *
	f proc.	-	245	₹.	*	e'÷	2
# ( F. 6 ) Comment of the 1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1	g souther to	DAMAGE SUPPLIATES	40.40	FAILUIN		Irag	thra K
and the state of t	DEBCAIPTION: One for thing acotions of pitto, rack 22 ft aido, 17 ft off ground, 1940 ft <sup>3</sup> , ~ double docker ~ a in, logo, "II" nottein loga ~ 12 in, konsa	DAMAGE	TALLACT	DEECHIP TION		Bologialist of supporting forlunds	through certain backling and pion certains and onto Around

1

UNIT: Dan Borvice Motor

DESCRIPTION: A fuote-Connorgyllo type industrial gas sorvice reter, beanted from standing, above ground in a seal authous control gespion.

			CMMENTA			
			REGUINED RECES	1 Pipe fitter	1 Pipo fittor 1 Laboror 1 Instrument rupaleman	
	HEPAIN ESTIMATES		SPARE PARE	Basil piler k	Danbal sols k failerials Braly Packing	
***************************************		REBOUNCES REQUIRED	Construction on Repain Equipment	TATION IS NAMED AND STORY OF THE PERSONS IN COLUMN TO STORY OF THE PERSONS		
		1 ME	NEOD (DAYS)	-	a	
		ž	DAYS	-	n	
		2 0 2 0	7 × 50 × 50 × 50 × 50 × 50 × 50 × 50 × 5	7	ž.	
		PROBABLITY OF	DVEHPHERAUHE PON	2.	<u> </u>	
***************************************		25	S ×	9. B	e.	
904 Y 97 145 3	DAMPAIR COLIMATES	-	FAILUSE	מונגי	Minaile 4 dray	
SAMAN	BINGWAN		DESCRIPTION	Otal's and glass slight glauss for oil lovol are smanhed	Canu gruckud Irom mtrolli uxortud by tumnygling pipo	

Commendation of the state of th

A of the result of the result

Surrent the state of the second of the

UNIX, Oth Borview Bogulator

7-7

DESCRIPTION: A FIRMER CYDE Industrial and Burvice regulator, gas operated, pilot type, mounted froe standing, above ground in a shall midden control complex.

		COMMENTS			
		עבטחוונים		1 Pthe fitter	J Piper Citter i Laboreo: I Instrument rupa irmon
REPAIR ESTIMATES	นยอกเหตอ	RUPPLIES AND	SPANC PANTS	Banll pipo 4. fittings	Guekot note fa mutorinia Amilipipa 1 ( t.
	นาแกรม ของเกตร	CONSTRUCTION	EQUIPMENT		
	ani.	8	(BAVO)	-	78
	74.44	SVVO	115.00		<b>a</b>
	40 v	116	93% 1	7.0	9. 2
	PROPABILATY OF	OVEHPHERSUHK	Ş	a. e	0.01
	PRO	6	<u>*</u>	9'0	c x
DAMAGE ESTIMATES		FAILUME		trug k minuila	Disk A
DAMAGE		DAMAGE	of telebrons after the Johnson Chaldens are des 11 telebrasion des FT - Arthresians	finall vaturall pipink and computents broken looms compile brokles	Umuil piping and cognition one-hing demand forces acres acres and

DESCRIPTION: Worlingboune His core form type 60 eyele, 3 phase, free standing mounted on rails,

						ļ		~======================================		
DAMAGE	DAMAGE ESTIMATES							NEPAIR ESTIMATES		
		PHO	PROBABILITY OF	10 0 E	מאמ	A MIN	RESOURCES HEQUINED	HROUINED		
DESCRIPTION	FAILUIR	ě	OVEHPHESSUNE	<u> </u>	DAYB	9	CONSTRUCTION	BUPPLIER AND	LABOH SKILLS REGUIREV	
		1%	¥09	ž	2011	(UATB)	KOUIPMENT	LPAHE PAHTS		
Tronty-five porcent of radiator tubor are doformed and rupture enualng severe transference of lookuge	Draw	0.4	d.4.	0.0	30	=	Wolding & cutting Tubing villipment Cruno	Dibling	i Riocerkeiunn 1 Aikkor 1 Equipkon 0jorator	Transforms Inoperable
Power connections to transferent broken, porcelain bushings broken and umsmable; insulators destroyed	MINNIIO f. drak	2.0	r.	£. £	10	=	Kolding & cutting oquipment Crino	Publing Darbings Ingulators	7 Elugiricians 1 Equipment Operator 1 Higger	
Transformer overturned, radiators ruptured on one side, cover displaced with probable winding damage	Drag	0.1	10.0	0.21	97.1	ą	Wolding & sutting Tubing oquipment (healing Crans	Tubing Insulators Radiators	7 Electricians 2 Equipment operators 3 Higgers	
			-							
			_	-						
		-								
			•							

Ę

	_	
	=	
	meet	
	dl #eo	
	n tud	
	MINO	
	re and an	
	*10	
	Progra	
	rentt	
ĺ	5 5	
l	200	
ŀ	2083	
	=======================================	
	15 tol	
	unet ruc	
	מו כנו	
	tubul	
	[00]	
	Ŧ.	-
İ	v rat	1
	=======================================	100
	Š	
بسنتية المحسمين بصيب والمنافيات فللمتحدد	SCHIPT	
	5890	

	_	LAIDII SKILLS		Skluctricians Ranipscut operatora	Riverticiana Squipment operatora	Electrician Rgitpment Operators		 	 	
REPAIR ESTIMATES	ROUINED	BUPPLIES AND	SPAHE PAHTB	Copper than Block than the Branch though the Branch the	8, 4, 4,	B.A.A. Direconnegen 2	 		•	
	HEBOUNCES REDUINED	CONSTITUETION	COULPAGNT	Cross	Grana Cutting torch Woldor	Crako Satting torch Koldor				
		200	107 101	<del>-</del>	•	2	-	-		
	3	BAYO	Ĉ.	=	8	9			 	
	5		¥66	O*6	6.	0'0		 		
	PROBABILITY OF	OVERPIESSURE	¥00	4.b	a .			 	 	
	1	ð	×.	0.1	0,0	0, 5		 	 	
DAMAGE ESTIMATES		PAILUME		Drose & Menter				 		
DAMAGE		DESCHIPTION		Paranjent doformation	Dus structure part, ally collapsed and small directi brashers overtured	Bus structuro fully gullapsod, sost inhilators broken and disconnects deferest				

LINITE American

Braile Row Confrol	COMM		REPAIR ESTIMATES  REDUIED  SUPPLIES AND  SUPPLIES AND  SOFTER  Indicator  Alnaton tor  Iron  Now control  Phinis  Profit for units   THESOURCES THESOURCES THESOURCES THESOURCES TOPOR TOPO	1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	0 0 0 172 103	2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	3.70 3.70 3.70 3.70 3.70 3.70 3.70	80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	CAMAGE GRIMATES  broken  tw bont  tw bont  doformut  doformut  doff; &  ntwill  ottons  ndly  nels  diff; &  diff; &  diff; &  missio	
			indicator abofts	liberting topen Wolder Porter Jack Oqulpwont Hughing Oqulpwons		)				011111111111111111111111111111111111111
MINETO MINETON MINESTRANCE MINESTRA MINESTRANCE MINES		1 from orker	SPARY PARTS	Cutting torch	(BAY8)	2 P	X O	200	¥ 0.	1166
DIFF. 4 E.O 2.6 3.0 0 3 Catting torch Motore 1 Indicator 1 Modell Minfth 2 Modell Modell Minfth 2 Modell Mod	co.w.	ראפטו מאיברפ הבטטווונט	AEOUIITO SUFFLIES AND SPAPY PAITS	CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUCTION	TIME HEOD (DAYS)	MAN. DAYS	N. W.	HE AT GIVE APPRESSUI	PRO	CAUSE OF
CAUSE OF PAILURE AT CIVEN MAN. TIME CONSTITUCTION SUPPLIES AND RESULTS  FAILURE 1% 50¢ 90% HEOD ON REPAIR SPARTS  DIFF. 4 E.O 2.0 3.0 0 3 CALLING LOVED MAILURE AND REQUINED HEADING MAILURE AND REQUINED HEADING MAILURE AND REQUINED HEADING MAILURE AND RECLINES AND REQUINED HEADING HEADING MAILURE AND REQUINED HEADING MAILURE AND ALICE	<del>-</del>	3 Tomas, managements	REPAIR ESTIMATES							ESTIMATES

[ ; ]

UNIT: Varticul Piltor

COMMENTE Menus) operation required Piller insperable until connections repaired	LANOH FRILLS  Pro fitters  Pro fitters  Cortified  Cortified  Fortified  Fort	HEOURED  BUTHER AND  BY AND  BY AND  BY AND  BAND PUPING A  CICLING  FILLING  FILLIN	HTROUNCES HEQUINED  CONSTINCTION CHIEVAIN CHILING COLLING COLL	7.1MK (DAVB) 2 2 2	8 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20	10, 6 10, 6 10, 6	PHOBABILITY OF FALLURE AT GIVEN OVERIURE SATING 14, 0	FAIL 0 00 8.0 8.0	DAMAGE ESTIMATES  UAUSE OF FALCUTE & drug  It is  It is  UAUSE OF FALCUTE & drug  If is  It is  UAUSE OF FALCUTE  I drug  II is  II is i	DAMAGE DEEGHIFTON FRATI COLTON TO PEDING FRATICUM INTOLEMENT OF THE BOOK OF TH
	operator 1 Higher 1 Millwright		Meeting confinence							nk kady
3			Chiting & welding unitheont Crane	a .	â	0.81	9.3	o' 72		unting both shoop and Itor overturing all nocations shooped off,
Filter incherable		Small piping & firther pipo & flangor	Calling & colding oquipment	٠-	3	9'01	0'6	0 1	e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	dot and outlet pipos oken ut the competion to iter body
Manual operation required	2 Pipe fillers	Bast piping 4	Cutting & wolding wolding	28	8	9'4	9'8	o. 	Minnifon & drug	all gottrol plured
	Annuman .	SPACE PAUTS	CH HEPAIH EDUIPMENT	(DAYB)	11200	ă	X02	=		
COMMENTA	LANON PAILL B	HEQUINED MINER AND	HTROUNGER CONSTINCTION	TIME	MAN	Z Z Z	BABILITY JIE AT G EHFRESSI,		GAVISE OF	DAMAGE
		REPART ESTIMATES							EBTIMATES	DAMAGE

N-1

DESCRIPTION: 6 ft diameter by 10 ft high, 140 ft2, mounted 30 ft above grade, 3 in, intet pipe,

	60113111100			Contest or flat top roof			
		LABON BKILLE REGUINED		2 Woldors 2 fronvorkors 1 Kgulpsont operator	2 foldors 2 fromvorkors 1 Equipment olyorator 1 Pipe fittor 1 Cortified	Moldora 2 Ironaphora 6 Equipment Operator 1 Pipo fittor 1 Cortified	Moldors  I Fourbrate  Rquiprator  Physicator  Physicator  Critical  Soldor
REPAIR ESTIMATES	REGUINED	SUPPLIES AND	SPAHE PARTS	Flut plato Htructural Mhapon	Fig. pinto Rrugtural Ringos Rollou pinto Pinngos	Fire piato Renotural Whippe Hollod plato Planto	Plat plato Recetural Ringon Rollod plato Piping Pinnes
	RESOURCES REQUIRED	CONRTHUCTION	COUIPMENT	Grano Calting torch Wolding equipment	Crano Creening torob Volding oqueprone	Crano Critting torch Voliting equipment	Cremo Catting torgh Voluting Villippont
	TIME	0031	IOATBI	÷	£	æ	2
	MAM	DAYB	00411	æ	â	a a	<b>2</b>
	OF	HE	90%	e a	0.	917	9.
	PROBABILITY OF	OVERPRESSURE	ž	e. 	o n	5. 6	e
	PIC	8	ž	°.	<u>a</u>	e'n	0' <del>'</del>
ESTIMATES	#O 481143	FAILURE		חוני.	are A	Drag	Drug.
DAMAGE ESTIMAT	MAHAN	DESCRIPTION		Roof collapsed into tank	Tank - ampty - tank avorthran- and collapson anto ground	Tank - full - mipporting columns dofors, competions to tank are broken	Tank - full - supporting columns bucklo, tank ovorturns onto ground

UNIT: package bottor that

# - V

11 ft d in, by 20 ft by 10 ft high - BO,000 lt/hr - 7 by 10<sup>7</sup> Utn/hr, gas flivd bollve with bare tuba economiser and foud water engulator, sout blowers and forced draft fan. DESCRIPTION

DAMAGE ESTIMAT	CBTIMATES						_	REPAIR ESTIMATES		
		5	PROBABILITY OF	5.2	2 4 2	1941	CHUNCH HEOMOGEN	ROUMED		7
OCSCNIPTION	FAILUNG	OVE	OVEHPRESSUNE	٠,		100	CONSTITUCTION	SUPPLIES AND	LABOR BRILLS REGULIED	COMMENTS
		74	20%	8	acti	(AVA)	EQUIPMENT	BYARE PARTS		
Cangon mnumbul and Impo-anto, mail control piping ruptured	DIT. drak & Klestlo	e a	a a	o. u	<b>1</b> 2.	o		Mees tubing Promine gesgen Lovel controller Unaper vontroller Gauge glunden	1 Klockrician	
Plus crushed and Fuptured	BICE. &	7.	0.0	5	2	<b>a</b>	Crano Jacks Oxy-acutylono Lovos Koldini machino	Stool tubing Proval controller a Lovel controller a Lovel controller a Lovel table  Lovel controller a Lovel table  I hate	S Knipmont operator and an analysis of the control of control of control of control of the contr	
lotter stden buckle, unbe distortion of side sall Eulen, mill refructory in grucked	B166, & S164110	9.		*	=	<u>=</u> ,	crane Jucks Jucks Oxy-acetylum Coxy-acetylum Kolding maching Yube rolling oqulimant	Propagate gauges Propagate controller a Insper Controller Controller Controller Insper Frey Fire Fire Fire Fire Fire Fire Fire Fire	Poutphonic opposite to the control of the control o	
Anglor batta futl and bottor in displaced or atting and overturin, all semination broken, buttor tuber different	Drau, HIFF, to Winnillo	3	7.7	۳. ع	£ .	S	abave)	(all of the above Pipe Tubes Withe Gusket Holtan Holtan Holtan Holtan Holtan Holtan Mesey valve Anchor bolte	plus following)    Kluctrician   Muctrician   Multipullis	

۷..9

UNITE Profess Britists

CESCHIPTION: A 6600 ft modular, profat, comercial mill building typo with sheet atout punels ask beginned attactural greet fragor, a sust crane support,

THE THE PERSON WITH THE PERSON

		COSMENIA				
		LATON SKILLS REQUIRED	D Ironworkers	O Ironworkers	O frontorkers 1 Granu oporator	
REPAIR ESTIMATES	REDUINED	SUPPLIES AND SPAHE PAHTS	Pastonoru Shoot sotul Clips	Fastonors Bhoot soin! Of the	Now profab busiding	-
	HESOURCES REQUIRED	CONSTRUCTION OIL REPAIR EQUIPMENT	Voliting & cutting outting	Molding & Gutting oquipont	Montaine & cauting equipment causing properties of the cause of the ca	
	TIME REOD (DAYB)		35	Ç	2	
	3	DAYS	3	Ĉ.	3	
	5	X X	1.8	9'0	0.0	
	PHOBABILITY OF	OVERPRESSURE 6 50%	1.0	e e	1.0	<u>.</u>
		20 %	8°1	6.2	9.9	
ESTIMATES		GAUSE OF FAILURE	DLFF.	DIE.	Dragge Residence of the	
DAMAGE ESTIMATE		DAMAGE DREGHIPTION	Pifty percent of roofing and side punels are designed or torn off	All roofing and siding stripped off, stool fram distorted	Antiding completely dendation dentroyed, only foundation intact	

APPENDIX F

DAMAGE TO THE BASIC CHEMICAL INDUSTRY FROM NUCLEAR ATTACK AND RESULTANT REQUIREMENTS FOR REPAIR AND RECLAMATION (U) URS 687-4 URS Systems Corporation, Burlingame, California June 1968 180 pp. Contract No. 12475(6300A-300) Work Unit 3311B

# UNCLASSIFIED

This study identifies the major equipment components commonly used by industries of estimates the consequent repair requirements. Case studies for selected industries were the basic chemicals group (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 281], estimates damage to the equipment components as a result of various nuclear weapon effects, and damage/repair for the selected chemical industries. Mathematical models were developed of various chemical establishments. These estimates were then scaled up to represent models, time-phased repair effort (with delineation of manpower by skills) was derived. to relate repair effort with damage level for the individual equipment, establishments, industries, and the overall basic chemical industry group. From the output of the

DAMAGE TO THE BASIC CHEMICAL INDUSTRY FROM NUCLEAR ATTACK AND RESULTANT REQUIREMENTS FOR REPAIR AND RECLAMATION (U) URS 687-4 URS Systems Corporation, Burlingame, Cailfornia June 1968 180 pp. Contract No. 12475(6300A-300) Work Unit 3311B

## UNCLASSIFIED

synthesized by assembling the damage and repair estimates for the equipment components synthesized by assembling the damage and repair estimates for the equipment components This study identifies the major equipment components commonly used by industries of estimates the consequent repair requirements. Case studies for selected industries were damage/repair for the selected chemical industries. Mathematical models were developed damage to the equipment components as a result of various nuclear weapon effects, and of various chemical establishments. These estimates were then scaled up to represent models, time-phased repair effort (with delineation of manpower by skills) was derived. to relate repair effort with damage level for the individual equipment, establishments, the basic chemicals group [Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 281], estimates industries, and the overall basic chemical industry group. From the output of the

DAMAGE TO THE BASIC CHEMICAL INDUSTRY FROM NUCLEAR ATTACK AND RESULTANT REQUIREMENTS FOR REPAIR AND RECLAMATION (U) URS 687-4 URS Systems Corporation, burlingame, California June 1968–180 pp. Contract No. 12475(6300A-300) Work Unit 33118

### UNCLASSIFIED

This study identifies the major equipment components commonly used by industries of estimates the consequent repair requirements. Case studies for selected industries were synthesized by assembling the damage and repair estimates for the equipment components synthesized by assembling the damage and repair estimates for the equipment components damage/repair for the selected chemical industries. Mathematical models were developed the basic chemicals group [Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 231], estimates damage to the equipment components as a result of various nuclear weapon effects, and of various chemical establishments. These estimates were then scaled up to represent models, time-phased repair effort (with delineation of manpower by skills) was derived. to relate repair effort with damage level for the individual equipment, establishments, industries, and the overall basic chemical industry group. From the output of the

DAMAGE TO THE BASIC CHEMICAL INDUSTRY FROM NUCLEAR ATTACK AND RESULTANT REQUIREMENTS FOR REPAIR AND RECLAMATION (U) URS 687-4 URS Systems Corporation, Burlingame, California June 1968 180 pp. Contract No. 1247516300A-3004 Work Unit 3311B

#### UNCLASSIFIED

This study identifies the major equipment compon: its commonly used by industries of estimates the consequent repair requirements. Case studies for selected industries were damage/repair for the selected chemical industries. Mathematical models were developed damage to the equipment components as a result of various nuclear weapon effects, and of various chemical establishments. These estimates were then scaled up to represent models, time-phased repair effort (with delineation of manpower by skills) was derived, to relate repair effort with damage level for the individual equipment, establishments, the basic chemicals group [Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 281], estimates industries, and the overall basic chemical industry group. From the output of the

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CO (Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexi	NTROL DATA - REI		he pressit report to classified;				
I ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)			T SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				
URS Systems Corporation		Į	Inclassified				
1811 Trousdale Drive		20 SHOUP	•				
Burlingame, California 94010							
3 REPORT TITLE							
Damage to the Basic Chemical Industr	y îrom Nuclear	Attack	and Resultant				
Requirements for Repair and Reclamat	ion						
4 DESCRIPTIVE HOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)	<del></del>						
Final Report							
S. AUTHOR(5) (Last name, first name, initial)	····						
Carl.R. Foget							
William H. Van Horn							
Xilton Staackmann							
6. REPORT DATE	70. TOTAL NO. OF P	SES	74. NO. OF REFS				
June 1968	230		21				
Se. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	Se. CRISINATORY RE	PORT NUM	sec(5)				
1242 (67022-300) DAHC-20-67-C-0136 URS 687-4							
à Project no.	URS	6 687-4					
_ Task Order No. 3310(67)	<u></u>						
e lask Order No. 3310(01)	95. OTHER REPORT NO(3) (Any other numbers that may be essigned this sepert)						
d Work Unit 3311B							
10. A VAIL ASILITY/LINITATION NOTICES							
This document has been approved for	Public Release	and Sal	le; its				
distribution is Unlimited.							
	·						
11. Supplementary notes	12. SPONSOPING MILI	TARY ACT	VITY				
	Office of	Civil I	Defense				
	4		cretary of the Army				
	Washington	1, D.C.	20310				
13. ABS*RACT							

This study identifies the major equipment components commonly used by industries of the basic chemicals group (Standard-Industrial Calssification (SIC) 281), estimates damage to the equipment components as a result of various nuclear weapon effects, and estimates the consequent repair requirements. Case studies for selected industries were synthesized by assembling the damage and repair estimates for the equipment components of various chemical establishments. These estimates were then scaled up to represent damage/repair for the selected chemical industries. Nathematical models were developed to relate repair effort with damage level for the individual equipment, establishments, industries, and the overall basic chemical industry group. From the output of the models, time-phased repair effort (with delineation of manpower by skills) was derived.

DD . FORM 1473

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

Security Classification

14.		LIN	KA	LIN	K B	LIN	KC
	KEY WORDS	ROLE	wī	ROLE	wT	ROLE	₩7
	Chemical Industry Industrial Plants						
[	Nuclear Explosion Damage			İ			
	Chemicals						
j	Civil Defense Systems	1					
	Dumage Assessment						
	Construction		ļ				
	Scheduling			İ			
]	Reclamation						
	Job Amalysis						

#### INSTRUCTIONS

- 1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY: Enter the name and address of the contractor, subcontractor, granter, Department of Defense activity or other organization (corporate author) issuing the report.
- 2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Enter the overall security classification of the report. Indicate whether "Restricted Data" is included. Marking is to be in accordance with appropriate security regulations.
- 2h. GROUP: Automatic downgrading is specified in DoD Directive 5200.10 and Armed Force Industrial Manual. Enter the group number. Also, when applicable, show that optional marking: have been used for Group 3 and Group 4 as authorized.
- 7. REPORT TITLE: Enter the complete report title in all capital letters. Titles in all cases should be unclassified. If a meaningful title cannot be selected without classification, show title classification in all capitals in parenthesis immediately following the title.
- 4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES: If appropriate, enter the type of report, e.g., interim, progress, summing, annual, or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is
- S. AUTHOR(S): Exter the name(s) of author(s) as shown on or in the report. Enter last name, first name, middle initial. If military, show rank and branch of service. The name of the principal arther as an absolute minimum requirement.
- 6. REPORT DATE. Enter the date of the report as day, month, year, or month, year. If more than one date apprais on the report, use date of publication.
- 7s. TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES: The world page count should fellow roomal pagination pr \_ecture, i.e., omer the number of pages complising information.
- 78. NUMBER OF REFERENCES: Easer the total member of references exted in the repoli-
- 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER: If appropriate, enter the applicable number of the contract or grant under which the report was written.
- Sh. Sr. & 2d. PROJECT NUMBER: Enter the appropriate stilling department identification, such as project number, subproject number, system numbers, task number, etc.
- 92. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT N'VBER(S): Enter the official report number by which the dill unem will be identified and entrolled by the originaling, alterity. This number must be unique to this report.
- 95. OTHER REPORT NUMBERS: If the report has been assigned any other report numbers (either by the originator or by the sponsor), also enter this number(s).
- 19. I VAILABILITY/LDETATION NOTICES: Ester any lin-

imposed by security classification, using standard statements such as:

- (1) "Qualified requesters may obtain copies of this report from DDC."
- (2) "Foreign amountement and dissemination of this report by DDC is not authorized."
- (3) "U. S. Government agencies may obtain copies of this report directly from DDC. Other qualified DDC users shall request through
- (4) "U. S. military agencies may obtain copies of this report directly from DDC. Other qualified users shall request through
- (5) "All distribution of this report is controlled Qualified DDC users shall request through

If the report has been furnished to the Office of Technical Services, Department of Commerce, for sale to the public, redicate this fact and enter the price, if known

- 11. SIPPLEMENTARY NOTES: Use for additional explana-
- 12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY: Error the name of the departmental project office or laboratory sponstring (paying for) the research and stressoment. Include address.
- 13. ABSTRACT: Enter an abstract giving a brief and factual summery of the document indicative of the expant, even though it may also appear elevabere in the body of the rechnical report. If additional space is required a confinentian sheet shell his attached.

It is highly desirable that the abstract of classified reports be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall end with an indication of the military security classification of the in formation in the paragraph, represented as (73), (5), (C), or (0)

There is no limitation on the length of the abstract. However, the suggested length is from 150 to 225 words.

14. EET WORDS: Key words are technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a report and may be used as index entries for cataloguag the report. Key words must be referred so that no security classification is required. Identities, such as equipment model designation, trade rame, military project code name, geographic location, may be used as key words but will be followed by an indication of technical context. The assignment of links, rules, and weights is optional.

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification